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CHAPTER	I	–	PREAMBLE:	THE	AGRICULTURAL	SECTOR	IN	BOLIVIA	
	
1.1 Introduction	
 
This	chapter	presents	a	brief	review	of	the	agricultural	sector	in	Bolivia;	it	presents	its	three	
remarkably	different	geographic	regions,	the	type	of	farming	performed	in	each	one,	the	
crops	they	produced,	and	the	animals	they	raise.	It	also	explain	the	participation	of	the	most	
important	sub‐sectors	in	the	country’s	agriculture	sector,	in	terms	of	their	contribution	to	
the	sector’s	GDP,	growth	trends,	and	land	holdings.	Finally,	it	gives	some	information	
regarding	land	tenure	and	soil	quality,	and	the	functioning	of	relevant	markets	for	the	
farmers.	
1.2 Bolivia’s	geography	and	its	regions	
	
With	an	annual	US$	1,363	of	GDP	per	capita1,	Bolivia	is	among	the	poorest	countries	in	Latin	
America	with	one	of	the	highest	share	of	rural	population	(36%)	compared	to	the	average	of	
its	surrounding	neighbors	or	to	the	average	of	Latin	America	(around	22%	in	both	
cases).2Poverty	in	the	country	is	particularly	prevalent	in	rural	areas	where	almost	80%	of	
the	population	is	poor	compared	with	53%	of	the	urban	areas.	Likewise,	the	distribution	of		
																																																													
1The	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	numbers	have	been	taken	from	INE	(2008);	they	are	preliminary	data	for	
the	years	2006‐	2007.	
2	CEPAL	(2006).	
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the	national	income	is	highly	unequal,	especially	in	the	rural	area,	with	a	rural	Gini	
coefficient	of	0.63.3	Based	on	these	numbers,	it	is	evident	that	the	major	structural	and	
institutional	reforms	introduced	during	the	past	23	years	in	the	country,	which	promoted	
the	return	of	economic	stability	and	growth,	did	not	succeed	in	terms	of	poverty,	inequality	
and	social	exclusion.	The	accomplishment	of	a	significant	progress	on	such	areas	is	not	only	
legitimate,	but	also	critical	for	the	preservation	of	the	democratic	political	system.4	
Bolivia	is	a	sparsely	populated	country	(9.1	million	people	or	8.3	inhabitants	per	km	
square),	with	the	Altiplano	and	Valles	regions	more	heavily	populated	than	the	Llanos	one.	
Although	the	country	lies	entirely	within	tropical	latitudes,	climate	conditions	vary	widely	
from	tropical	in	the	lowlands	to	frigid	in	the	highest	parts	of	the	Andes.	The	northern	plains,	
or	the	Llanos,	have	a	tropical	wet	climate	with	year‐round	high	temperatures,	high	humidity,	
and	heavy	rainfall.	The	central	valleys	(Valles)	are	located	at	an	altitude	between	5,900	and	
9,500	feet	above	sea	level,	and	have	a	tropical	wet	and	dry	climate.	Finally,	the	Altiplano	or	
highland	plateau,	is	located	at	an	altitude	of	9,800‐13,000	feet	above	sea	level,	is	swept	by	
strong	cold	winds,	and	has	an	arid,	chilly	climate,	with	sharp	differences	in	daily	
temperature	and	decreasing	amounts	of	rainfall	from	north	to	south.	
This	geographic	and	climate	diversity,	coupled	with	other	historic	features,	have	given	way	
to	remarkable	regional	differences	that	are	reflected	in	the	regional	levels	of	production;	i.e.	
the	GDP	per	capita	of	the	department	of	Tarija	which	is	geographically	located	in	the	Valleys	
of,	is	US$	3,033,	compared	to	US$	1,972	for	the	department	of	Pando	located	in	the	
Lowlands,	or	to	the	US$	1,003	of	the	department	of	Potosi	located	in	the	Andean	region.	
																																																													
3	The	country’s	urban	Gini	is	0.55.Data	for	poverty	and	inequality	comes	from	CEPAL	(2006).		
4	Many	authors	have	extensively	explained	the	subject.	For	a	comprehensive	work	see	for	example	Government	
of	Bolivia	(2001).		
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Next,	we	develop	some	of	the	highlights	of	the	agricultural	activity	at	the	national	level,	and	
for	each	of	the	three	geographic	regions.	
1.3 The	agricultural	sector	
	
Farm	production	has	a	very	important	role	in	Bolivia’s	economy.	Based	on	data	collected	
from	the	ECLAC	(Economic	Commission	for	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean)5	the	total	
agricultural	gross	domestic	product	(agricultural	GDP)	has	represented	for	the	country	an	
average	of	13%	of	the	total	gross	domestic	product	for	the	last	15	years,	with	a	slightly	
decreasing	trend	during	the	2000s.	The	same	relation	shows	a	much	lower	participation	
average,	5%,	for	both,	the	Latin	American	Southern‐Cone	countries,	and	Latin	American	
countries.	
There	are	significant	differences,	however,	among	the	various	sub‐sectors	that	make	up	the	
agricultural	sector	in	the	country.	Next	we	briefly	mention	them.	
1.3.1 Agricultural	sub‐sectors	
	
Some	are	particularly	dynamic,	such	as	the	industrialized	farming,	while	others,	i.e.	
traditional	farming,	have	stagnated	or	even	declined	over	time.6	The	agro‐industrial	GDP	
grew	at	an	annual	average	of	11%	between	1990	and	2004,	while	the	average	growth	rate	
for	the	non‐industrialized	agriculture	products	was	2%	for	the	same	period.7	According	to	
CEPAL	et.	al	(2001),	the	enhanced	farm	production	during	the	1980s,	1990s	and	first	years	
of	2000’s,	in	both	agro‐industrial	crops	and	more	traditional	crops,	has	been	a	result	of	
many	factors.	Among	them	are	an	increased	external	demand	(especially	for	the	Andean	
																																																													
5	Access	through	the	web	page	http://www.eclac.org/estadisticas/bases/		
6	The	way	the	agriculture	sector	is	structured	in	this	paper,	and	most	of	the	data,	are	based	on	the	work	of		
Malky	(2004).	
7	We	can	understand	agro‐industry	as	a	field	in	the	industry	that	transforms	the	raw	materials	from	agriculture,	
livestock,	fishery	and	forest	into	added‐value	products.	
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market),	the	expansion	of	the	amount	of	land	devoted	to	cultivation,	and	the	usage	of	
improved	seeds.		
The	industrialized	farmers	are	mainly	geographically	located	in	the	Llanos,	and	produce	
export	products	like	cotton,	sugarcane	and	soybeans.	Its	participation	in	the	sector’s	GDP	
has	been	at	an	average	of	13%	during	the	period	1990‐2004.	This	group	owns	
comparatively	larger	amounts	of	land,	are	more	specialized,	modern	and	profitable,	and	
more	easily	linked	to	foreign	markets.		
The	non‐industrialized	agriculture	farmers	are	mainly	located	in	the	Altiplano,	and	account	
in	average	for	the	47%	percent	of	the	total	agricultural	GDP	(1990‐2004).	This	group	is	
mainly	comprised	by	farmers	that	own	small	plots	of	land,	have	little	specialization	or	
technology,	are	based	on	family	work,	and	whose	agriculture	outputs	are	devoted	to	self	
subsistence	or	domestic	markets.	The	production	of	this	group	consists	mainly	of	roots	and	
tubers,	corn,	vegetables	and	fruits.	According	to	the	Agrarian	Question	literature,8	we	can	
characterize	these	small	farmers	as	a	“poverty	refuge”	minifundio,	economically	incapable	of	
significant	accumulation,	and	yet	resistant	to	total	elimination,	probably	because	the	
peasants	themselves	highly	value	their	land	as	a	way	to	assure	their	subsistence.	
The	numbers	for	the	country’s	output	per	land‐unit	are	below	the	region’s	average	for	the	
majority	of	the	agriculture	products	that	Bolivia	produces,	as	UDAPE	(2004)	shows.	Even	
though	the	study	does	not	give	any	specific	information	of	the	productivity	of	the	two	
already	mentioned	types	of	agriculture	farming,	it	concludes	that	agricultural	yields	are	
especially	low	in	the	Andean	region	characterized	by	poor	small	farmers.	This	view	is	also	
																																																													
8	The	Agrarian	Question	debates	the	destiny	of	the	small‐scale	farmers	e.g.	its	survival	or	extinction	over	time;	it	
includes	three	different	hypotheses,	namely:	the	Chayanovian	view	that	explains	the	survival	of	a	competitive	
and	stable	peasant	sector,	the	class	differentiation	view,	that	argues	the	disappearance	of	the	sector	over	time,	
and	the	“poverty	refuge”	view,	that	imputes	a	resistance	and	longevity	of	small	farmers,	with	income	levels	
that	only	ensure	their	survival.	More	details	in	Carter	and	Mesbah	(1993).	
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shared	by	the	analysis	of	the	World	Bank	(1995)	that	explains	the	profile	of	rural	producers	
in	Bolivia	in	terms	of	the	same	two	groups;	one	very	poor	and	traditional,	mainly	located	in	
the	Andean	region	and	Valleys,	called	minifundios	(e.g.,	farms	with	too	little	land),	and	the	
other	one,	called	the	modern	subsector,	located	in	the	tropical	lowlands,	and	comprising	
medium	and	large	holdings,	ranging	from	50	to	tens	of	thousands	of	hectares.	
Livestock	production	is	the	agriculture	sub‐sector	that	has	the	second	highest	percentage	of	
participation	in	the	total	sector’s	GDP	(27%	in	average),	and	has	expanded	at	an	annual	
average	of	2.5%	during	the	same	period.	The	livestock	sector	produces	poultry,	lamb,	beef,	
camelids	and	pork	products,	and	also	derived	products	such	as	wool,	leather,	milk	and	eggs.	
Based	on	climate	conditions,	soil	quality	and	entrepreneur	skills	differences,	and	in	terms	of	
our	geographic	regions,	cattle	is	mostly	raised	in	the	eastern	part	of	the	country,	poultry	in	
the	central	valleys,	and	camelids	in	the	Altiplano.	
Finally,	the	last	important	sub‐sector	is	the	production	of	coca	leaves,	that	accounts	for	an	
average	of	6%	of	the	total	agriculture	GDP	and	a	negative	annual	growth	rate	of	7.8%	
during	1990s	and	first	part	of	2000s.	The	relevance	of	the	coca	production	sector	is	not	only	
due	to	its	economic	impact,	but	also	for	its	political	connotation.	During	recent	years,	the	
production	of	coca	leaves	shows	an	increasing	trend,	which	could	be	explained	by	the	
expansion	of	the	amount	of	land	devoted	to	its	cultivation,	and	also	by	the	decrease	in	the	
eradication	efforts	of	coca	plantations	due	to	the	active	and	combative	unions	and	the	
cocalero	movement.	The	vigorous	efforts	to	eradicate	coca	and	promote	special	
programmes	for	alternative	crops	seem	to	have	failed.	The	maximum	number	of	hectares	
legally	allowed	for	coca	production	is	12,000	hectares,	but	according	to	Laserna	(2004),	the	
actual	plantations	exceed	30,000	hectares.	These	volumes	of	coca	production	situate	the	
country	today	globally	in	the	third	place,	after	Colombia	and	Peru.	
‐	6	‐	
	
The	areas	where	coca	plantations	are	concentrated	are	the	tropical	valleys	of	the	
departments	of	Cochabamba	(Central	Valleys)	and	La	Paz	(Altiplano).	Specifically,	coca	
plantations	are	cultivated	in	the	Chapare9	and	Yungas	regions	of	those	Departments10.		
Aymara	and	Inca	civilizations	have	historically	cultivated	coca	leaves	for	centuries	in	the	
high	subtropical	Yungas	valleys	for	traditional	(i.e.	legal)	consumption	(mainly	for	
medicinal	purposes),	hence,	this	region	was	designated	to	be	the	primary	legal	cultivation	
zone	under	Law	1008	since	1988.11	Since	all	other	coca	production,	including	that	in	the	
Chapare,	was	deemed	illegal	and	subject	to	eradication,	the	results	of	the	vigorous	efforts	to	
eradicate	coca	plantations	in	that	region	have	helped	to	increase	the	coca	production	in	and	
around	the	legal	zone	of	the	Yungas	exceeding	the	legal	amount	of	hectares	allowed	in	that	
region.		
According	to	much	of	economists	in	Bolivia,	one	of	the	most	problematic	and	relevant	issues	
in	the	country’s	economic	history	has	been	the	land	tenure	and	soil	quality.	Next,	we	will	
mention	some	of	its	most	important	features.	
1.3.2 Farming	land,	and	land	tenure	system	
	
The	most	important	factor	of	production	and	asset	for	rural	farmers	has	traditionally	been	
land.	It	contributes	to	wealth	not	just	directly,	as	an	input	of	production	or	as	a	way	of	
accumulation,	but	it	also	might	allow	its	owners	the	possibility	of	access	to	capital	(credit)	
when	it	can	be	used	as	collateral	(especially	in	an	environment	where	production	risk	
cannot	be	insured),	or	it	can	even	entail	some	status	among	neighbors	or	relatives.		
																																																													
9	When	authors	refer	to	the	Chapare	region,	it	includes	not	only	the	Chapare	province,	but	also	Carrasco	and	
Tiraque,	all	of	them	in	Cochabamba	department.	For	more	details	see	Laserna	(2004).	
10	In	this	case	the	reference	to	the	Yungas	region	includes	the	provinces	Nor	and	Sud	Yungas	and	Caranavi,	and	
the	“localidades”,	equivalent	to	a	village,	of	La	Asunta	and	Apolo.	Ibid.,		p.	7.	
11	http://www.congreso.gov.bo/11leyes/			
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The	land	suitable	for	intensive	farming	in	the	country	totals	only	3%	of	its	total	area12;	most	
of	the	arable	land	is	located	in	the	lowplains	(72%),	some	in	the	central	valleys	have	19%,	
and	the	remaining	9%	in	the	Altiplano.13		
According	to	Barraclough	and	Domike	(1966)	during	the	1950s	and	early	1960s,	Latin	
America	had	one	of	the	most	polarized	agrarian	systems	in	the	world;	large	land	extensions	
or	latifundios14	accounted	for	5%	of	the	agricultural	units	and	owned	80%	of	the	total	land;	
minifundios	represented	80%	of	the	agricultural	units,	but	owned	only	5%	of	the	land.	Land	
distribution	in	Bolivia	has	always	been	worse	than	the	rest	of	Latin	America,	and	its	
agrarian	reform	considered	among	the	most	complex	and	broader	in	the	region.15		
Conflicts	over	land,	which	have	occurred	recurrently	in	the	country’s	history,	and	the	
paternalist	and	rent‐seeking	perspectives	of	the	state	prevalent	since	the	colonial	era,	have	
had	a	decisive	impact	on	the	current	distribution	of	land	and	other	productive	assets.	
Looking	at	the	farm	structure	that	prevailed	in	Bolivia	during	the	last	agricultural	census,	
there	were	314,600	farms	that	cover	around	23	million	Has	(including	livestock	pastures).	
From	those,	the	small	farms	cover	only	1.5%	of	the	total	farm	area.		At	the	other	extreme	
are	the	large	holdings	occupying	70%	of	the	total	farm	area	are	representing	only	1.5	%	of	
the	holdings	(World	Bank,	1995).	
This	concentration	of	land	in	a	few	wealthy	hands	has	been	frequent	in	the	country	since	
colonial	times.		The	feudal	agrarian	structure	established	along	the	country	in	the	second	
half	of	the	19th	century,	and	still	widespread	during	the	first	half	of	the	20th	century,	
expropriated	and	distributed	indigenous	land	among	the	Conquistadors	and	new	
																																																													
12	Most	of	the	land	in	Bolivia	is	suitable	for	extensive	livestock	(25%),	for	extensive	farming	(25%),	and	about	a	
20%	is	not	suitable	for	any	kind	of	farming	at	all;	see	Morales	(2000).	
13	Ibid.:	12.	
14	Latifundio	comes	from	the	latin	word	lātifundium	(lātus,	"spacious"	and	fundus,	"farm,	estate").	The	term	is	
used	in	Bolivia	to	describe	large	extensions	of	land	owned	by	one	landlord;	they	were	called	Haciendas	during	
the	colonial	times	and	were	allowed	to	have	forced	labor	(indigenous).	
15	Thorp	(1998).	
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terratenientes16,	and	put	later	indigenous	people	under	peasant	servitude.	Even	in	those	
early	years	of	the	country’s	history,	regional	differences	were	already	present;	while	in	the	
Altiplano	and	Valles	regions	the	process	of	expropriation	and	feudal	system	continued	until	
1953,	the	Lowlands	saw	the	setting	of	the	foundations	of	the	agrarian	capitalism.17	
The	social	revolution	that	put	in	power	a	new	government	in	1952	soon	saw	the	first	fruits.	
In	1953	the	Agrarian	Reform	Law	was	enacted	and	it	established	as	its	main	objectives:	a)	
the	elimination	of	the	large	landholdings	where	no	technological	improvements	have	been	
applied	to	the	production	process,	and	where	the	owner	did	not	work	the	land	by	himself	
(latifundios);	b)	the	reversion	of	those	lands	to	the	state;	c)	the	abolition	of	peasant	
servitude;	and	d)	the	distribution	of	the	reclaimed	land	to	landless	peasants	(through	a	
settlement	process).18	
Even	when	a	large	number	of	rural	workers	and	peasants	were	the	principal	beneficiaries	of	
the	Agrarian	Reform,	the	bureaucratic	procedures	established	for	implementing	the	reform,	
the	pressure	from	powerful	groups,	and	the	lack	of	peasants’	resources	to	acquire	
agriculture	machinery	and	adopt	new	technologies	of	production,	facilitated	the	return	of	
much	of	the	land	to	the	large	owners	and	promoted	their	transformation	and	modernization	
from	the	old	haciendas	into	the	new	capitalist	farms.19	
During	the	decades	that	followed	the	Agrarian	Reform,	the	state	has	implemented	three	
different	processes	of	rural	land	acquisition.20	The	first	one	took	place	in	the	traditional	
regions	of	the	reform,	that	is,	the	highlands	and	semi‐arid	valleys,	and	was	absolutely	
redistributive;	large	estates	or	latifundios	were	reversed	in	favor	of	the	state,	and	later	
																																																													
16	Landowners	of	large	holdings	enjoyed	economic	and	political	power,	and	worked	the	land	with	wage	workers	
and	slaves.		
17	Antezana	(1969).	
18	Agrarian	Reform	No.	3464	of	1953.	
19	Thorp	(1998).		
20	This	section	is	based	on	Muñoz	(1999).		
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redistributed	to	the	peasants	occupying	them.	The	total	land	acquired	by	this	group	is	
around	20	to	25	million	hectares,	but	only	about	700,000	are	actually	cultivated	due	to	the	
low	quality	of	land.	The	most	common	land	tenure	system	is	the	family	farm	with	a	small	
landholding.		
A	second	process	of	land	occupation	was	a	result	of	“settlement	programs”	(programas	de	
colonización)	sponsored	by	the	state	in	the	humid	Valles	and	part	of	the	Llanos.21	Under	this	
form	of	access	to	land,	the	distributions	reached	between	3	and	5	millions	of	hectares,	with	
an	actual	cultivated	land	of	around	300,000	hectares	per	year.	The	resulting	land	tenure	
system	has	been	the	gradual	transformation	from	colonos	or	settlers	into	commercial	
farmers,	with	different	rates	of	transformation	among	the	settlement	areas22				
Finally,	there	has	been	a	“consolidation	process”	(programas	de	consolidación),	through	
which	private	property	rights	over	the	rural	land	have	been	allocated;	the	beneficiaries	
have	been	large	landowners	in	the	eastern	plains	of	the	country	(Llanos),	who	occupied	the	
land	when	the	Agrarian	Law	was	enacted.	However,	this	demand‐based	allocation	of	
thousands	of	hectares	of	public	land	has	continued	benefiting	well‐off	individuals,	and	
hence	promoting	the	formation	of	large	agriculture	properties	for	speculative	purposes	
also.	Here	agriculture	and	livestock	farms	coexist.	
Since	the	Agrarian	Reform	did	not	improve	the	unequal	distribution	of	rural	lands	and	did	
not	vindicate	the	historical	rights	of	indigenous	people,	and	given	the	existence	of		high	
insecurity	of	tenure,	in	1996	the	INRA	Law	was	enacted	with	the	following	primary	
objectives:	i)	to	create	a	new	tenure	regime	and	a	immediate	titling	for	the	communal	lands	
																																																													
21	With	the	main	objective	of	increasing	productive	efficiency	of	the	agricultural	sector,	the	government	of	
Bolivia	launched	in	the	decade	of	the	1960's	a	process	of	colonization	whose	main	purpose	was	the	settlement	
of	farmers	from	the	Altiplano	and	inter‐Andean	valleys,	in	the	tropical	lowlands	of	the	departments	of	La	Paz,	
Cochabamba	and	Santa	Cruz.	See	more	details	in	OEA	(1975).	
22	Colono	is	a	beneficiary	of	the	settlement	program.		
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of	origin	(TCO’s	for	its	acronym	in	Spanish)	for	indigenous	groups,	ii)	to	define	a	new	
distribution	system	for	public	lands,	handing	over	land	to	landless	or	small	peasants,	and	
supplying	land	to	the	rest	of	potential	buyers	at	market	prices,	iii)	to	establish	a	period	of	
regularization	of	property	rights,	and	iv)	to	consolidate	land	rights	and	redefine	property	
rights.23	However,	it	remained	established	in	the	new	Law	that	small	farmers	could	not	use	
their	land	as	collateral,	i.e.	ownership	of	small	farms	cannot	be	seized.24		
Despite	the	reforms	introduced	in	the	legal	framework	and	in	the	institutions	governing	
land	administration,	the	results	have	again	fallen	short	of	expectations	in	both	land	
regularization	and	land	distribution,	which	is	clear	from	the	data	provided	regarding	the	
severely	skewed	land	distribution	existent	in	the	country,	and	from	the	more	than	30%	of	
the	landholdings	that	are	still	in	process	of	being	regularized	(processes	of	reclaiming	and	
titling).	25	
The	results	after	decades	of	the	Reform	and	after	its	modification	in	the	framework	of	the	
Law	1715	in	199626,	have	been	different	depending	on	the	region.	However,	the	main	
tendency	shows	the	re‐concentration	of	land:	more	than	60%	of	the	agricultural	units	do	
not	surpass	4	hectares	of	extension,	and	they	are	predominantly	located	in	the	central	
valleys	and	in	the	Altiplano.		
1.3.3 The	functioning	of	relevant	markets	for	agriculture	
	
Regarding	the	functioning	of	the	relevant	rural	markets	in	Bolivia,	there	are,	as	expected,	
multiple	imperfections	that	constrain	households	in	general,	but	small	farmers	in	
																																																													
23	Munoz	(1999)	pp.	20‐21.	
24	It	is	actually	possible	that	a	small	farmer	can	use	its	land	as	collateral	if	he	decides	to	be	reclassified	as	a	
medium	farmer	that	must	pay	taxes,	and	whose	property	(e.g.	land	holdings)	can	be	seized.	This	seems	to	be	
rather	a	non‐interesting	option	for	the	majority	of	the	small	farmers.		
25	See	in	detail	also	Urioste	(2003).	
26	Ley	de	Modificacion	de	la	Reforma	Agraria	(INRA)	
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particularly,	limiting	their	ability	to	generate	income	from	their	asset	endowments.	Let	us	
briefly	review	below	some	of	the	characteristic	features	of	the	credit	and	land	markets	in	
the	country. 
Bolivian	capital	markets,	as	expected,	do	not	function	well.	There	are	two	options	to	access	
formal	credit,	through	commercial	banks	or	through	microfinance	institutions,	both	of	them	
regulated	by	the	state.	However,	the	two	of	them	discriminate	against	small	landholders,	
rationing	them	out	completely	due	to	legal	barriers	as	is	the	case	of	the	banks,	or	offering	
them	credit	at	rather	high	interest	rates	as	is	the	case	of	the	microfinance	suppliers	
(Valdivia	2004)27.		Informal	sources	of	credit	such	as	relatives,	friends,	money	lenders,	or	
Non‐Governmental	Organizations	(NGO)	are	available	for	some	rural	households;	the	topic	
however	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.	Nevertheless,	Carter	(1989)	explains	that	
informal	lenders	translate	informational	problems	and	the	weak	collateral	position	of	small	
farms	into	high	interest	rates.	This	would	make	informal	credit	even	more	conservative	
than	borrowings	from	formal	markets,	which	would	leave	the	small	farmers	with	a	credit	
market	from	which	they	cannot	borrow,	or	they	can	do	it	at	very	unfavorable	conditions,	
which	may	end	up	discouraging	any	attempt	of	borrowing.28	For	the	large	farmers,	mainly	
geographically	located	in	the	north‐eastern	part	of	the	country	(Llanos),	there	is	plenty	of	
access	to	the	capital‐rationed	credit	market	through	commercial	banks,	where	the	available	
capital	is	a	function	of	their	land	holdings	which	are	used	as	collateral.	
The	country’s	rural	land	market,	in	turn,	has	not	been	found	to	be	as	active	as	in	the	rest	of	
Latin	America.	Based	on	empirical	work,	it	has	been	established	that	the	sale	of	rural	land	in	
																																																													
27	Microfinance	institutions	do	offer	access	to	credit	to	small	borrowers	(in	both	urban	and	rural	areas)	without	
asking	for	collateral,	but	the	loans	are	short‐term,	their	size	is	rather	small,	and	the	interest	rates	quite	high,	
reflecting	the	high	operational	costs	of	these	institutions	for	collecting,	and	the	risk	of	the	loans.			
28	According	to	the	World	Bank	(1996),	the	average	loan	size	from	informal	lenders	varies	between	US$	50	and	
US$	500,	with	average	maturity	fluctuating	between	one	and	four	months,	and	annual	interest	rate	as	high	as	
50%	on	small	unsecured	loans.	
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the	region	is	active	but	with	just	an	average	of	2.8%	of	annual	rotation	of	landholdings	
(Echeverria	et.	al.	1998);29	unfortunately	there	is	no	such	information	in	the	case	of	Bolivia.	
Muñoz	(1999),	nonetheless,	explains	that	the	Bolivian	land	market	is	highly	restricted	due	
to	lack	of	up‐to‐date	titles,	and	by	community	rules,	especially	in	the	Andean	region,	and	is	
highly	segmented	by	size	and	social	status.	A	great	number	of	land	transactions	are	not	
properly	registered	due	to	high	costs,	and	to	the	lack	of	a	valid	proof	of	ownership	(title).	In	
general,	land	sales	can	be	characterized	into	two	groups.30	The	first	takes	place	in	the	
Altiplano,	where	the	land	sales	occur	between	peasants	belonging	to	the	same	community,	
or	belonging	to	different	communities	but	related	by	marriage	or	other	close	links,	or	
between	one	member	of	the	community	and	an	outsider,	with	prior	consent	of	the	
community.31	The	second	group	comprises	the	lowplains	region	where,	in	general	terms,	
there	exists	better	access	to	the	land	market,	even	for	small	settlers,	with	the	main	problem	
being	the	consolidation	of	the	land	rights.32	
1.3.4 Income	diversification	approaches	in	rural	Bolivia		
	
The	strategies	that	rural	households	use	to	overcome	poverty	are	varied.	As	elsewhere,	in	
Bolivia	the	more	important	ones	are	diversification	out	of	farm	activities	and	migration,	
both	of	which	most	of	the	time	complement	the	income	coming	from	farm	work	(UDAPE,	
2004)33.	Nevertheless,	farm	income	remains	the	most	important	means	of	earning	a	living,	
																																																													
29	The	average	has	been	calculated	based	on	the	data	provided	by	Echeverria	et	al.	(1998)	for	land	markets	in	
Colombia,	Ecuador,	Honduras	and	Venezuela.	
30	None	of	the	studies	provide	comprehensive	information	regarding	the	land	market	functioning	in	the	Valleys	
region;	for	most	of	it	the	information	is	definitely	not	available,	except	for	some	parts	of	the	humid	Valleys	and	
colonization	zones,	where	a	dynamic	market	exists.	The	migrants’	lack	of	ties	to	the	foreign	lands	
(colonizadores),	and	the	higher	quality	of	the	land	could	explain	the	dynamism.	
31	World	Bank	(1996).	
32	Unfortunately,	the	information	regarding	the	land	tenancy	market	is	not	available;	based	on	what	is	implied	in	
the	work	on	which	we	have	relied	for	our	previous	explanation	we	can	assume	that	it	mainly	follows	the	same	
functioning	as	the	land	sales	market.		
33	UDAPE	is	the	Government	Unit	of	Economic	Policy	Analysis.	
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accounting	for	52%	of	the	income	of	rural	households.34	Even	though	the	importance	of	
farm	income	is	unquestionable	for	all	regions	of	the	country,	regional	differences	arise	
across	the	three	agroclimatic	regions.	The	percentage	of	the	rural	household’s	income	
coming	from	farm	work	is	around	50%	in	the	Altiplano	and	Central	Valleys,	and	64%	for	the	
Lowlands	households.35		
In	general,	nonfarm	activities,	and	the	income	that	rural	households	obtain	from	them,	have	
been	used	to	compensate	low	returns	of	farming,	and/or	to	decrease	the	risk	related	with	
farm	activities.	However,	small	farmers	frequently	diversify	out	from	the	farm	given	that	
their	land	holdings	contribute	little	to	their	income	and	to	their	own	consumption.	Also,	
market	seasonality	of	farm	operations	and	labor	demand	condemn	them	to	seasonal	
unemployment,	and	hence	to	high	levels	of	underemployment	which	lowers	even	more	
their	labor	productivity	(World	Bank	1996).		
Turning	now	to	migration	and	remittances,	it	has	been	shown	that	Bolivia	is	among	the	
lowest		urbanized	countries	in	South	America,	i.e.	the	country’s	proportion	of	people	living	
in	rural	areas	is	still	high	(36%)36	despite	its	continuous	decline	since	the	middle	1980’s,	
and	it	has	been	projected	that	it	will	continue	to	fall	during	the	following	decades.37	
Migration	movements	originated	in	the	rural	area	represents	an	annual	30%	of	the	total	
migration	flows	in	the	country38,	and	among	those,	rural‐urban	migrants	represent	an	
																																																													
34	Farm	income	includes	agriculture,	livestock	and	derived	products.	
35	Jimenez	and	Lizarraga	(2003).	
36	Behind	Bolivia	are	Paraguay	with	a	59%	and	Guyana	with	a	28%.		
37	Since	1985	the	decline	in	Bolivian	rural	population	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	population	has	exceed	the	
average	percentage	of	the	rest	of	countries	in	South	America	by	more	than	1%,	and	it	is	projected	to	remain	at	
that	level	for	the	next	four	decades	(UN	2008).		
38	The	average	includes	migration	flows	in	1997	and	2002	from	Tannuri‐Pianto	et.	al.	(2004).	The	other	70%	is	
originated	in	urban	and	metropolitan	areas.	
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average	of	59%,39	or	approximately	26,700	households	per	year,	a	number	that	is	expected	
to	keep	increasing	as	already	explained.		
Based	on	data	provided	by	Andersen	(2002)	in	his	study	on	rural‐urban	migration	in	
Bolivia,	each	of	the	three	geographic	regions	in	the	country	has	a	capital	that	attracts	rural‐
urban	migrants;	La	Paz	(and	El	Alto)	in	the	Altiplano,	Cochabamba	in	the	Valles	(with	Tarija	
growing	fast	due	to	its	natural	gas	reserves),	and	Santa	Cruz	in	the	Llanos	that	has	been	
growing	faster	than	the	rest	of	the	departments	during	the	last	50	years.	As	the	author	
explains,	the	presence	of	different	urban	magnets	for	rural	immigrants,	imply	that	in	
Bolivia,	as	opposed	to	other	developing	countries,	no	city	so	far	has	reached	mega	
dimensions.	Based	on	Tam	(1994),	on	average	48%	of	the	population	of	the	major	cities	
destination	for	rural‐urban	migrants,	are	immigrants.			
Hence,	given	the	country’s	history	of	land	reform,	the	prevalent	distribution	of	landholdings,	
and	the	suitability	of	each	region’s	agroclimatic	conditions,	the	distribution	of	poor	rural	
households	across	farm	and	nonfarm	activities	would	most	likely	be	affected	by	those	
elements,	properly	accounted	for	in	the	subsequent	estimations	and	results	explanation.
																																																													
39	The	remaining	41.4%	are	rural‐rural	migrants.	Ibid.	pp.	5.	
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CHAPTER	II	‐	REMITTANCES	AS	AN	INCOME	DIVERSIFICATION	STRATEGY	FOR	
BOLIVIAN	FARMERS	
 
2.1 Introduction	
	
According to the United Nations (UN 2008), in 2008, for the first time in world history, the 
world’s total urban population would have reached the historic threshold of half of the global 
population, and it is expected to continue to increase. The proportion of the population living in 
urban areas in the less developed regions will reach this historic landmark around 2020 , and is 
likewise expected to increase.  In more developed countries, the urban population is expected to 
grow more modestly relative to rural populations during the next decades.  Hence, we can expect 
that the future urban population increase in the world will be primarily driven by the increasing 
percentage of people living in urban areas in the developing regions.  
Latin America and the Caribbean shows an unusually high level of urbanization for its level of 
development (78% in 2007), considering that the average for the two other developing areas, Asia 
and Africa, is 40%. Among Latin America’s three sub-regions, i.e. Caribbean, Central America 
and South America, the latter is the main contributor to that percentage, with a 79.5% of its 
population already living in the urban areas in 2007. However, South America embraces striking 
differences in patterns of urbanization. For example, in Argentina and Venezuela more than 90% 
of the population already lived in urban areas in 2005.  In other countries such as Bolivia,  
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however,	the	proportion	of	urban	population	is	relatively	low	(64%)	;	this	suggests	that	the	
future	increase	in	urbanization	rates	in	the	region	will	mainly	come	from	these	countries.	
Migration	from	rural	areas	is	among	the	most	important	determinants	of	the	urban	population	
growth	especially	in	the	developing	countries	(UN	2004).	In	Latin	America,	retention	capacity	of	
the	population	in	rural	areas	remains	low	and	its	contribution	to	urban	growth	high.	There	are	
three	sources	of	urbanization,	e.g.	natural	increase,	reclassification	of	rural	settlements	into	
cities	and	towns,	and	net	rural‐urban	migration,	the	latter	contributes,	more	than	40%,	on	
average,	to	the	urbanization	of	its	countries	in	the	region	(CEPAL	2000).			
In	Bolivia	the	proportion	of	people	living	in	rural	areas	is	still	high	despite	its	continuous	
decline	since	the	mid	1980’s,	and	despite	the	downturn	trend	shown	in	the	rest	of	South	
America;	however,	it	has	been	projected	that	it	will	continue	to	fall	during	the	following	
decades.40	Migration	movements	originating	in	the	rural	area	represent	an	annual	30%	of	the	
total	migration	flows	in	the	country41,	and	among	those,	rural‐urban	migrants	represent	an	
average	of	59%,42	or	approximately	26,700	households	per	year.		This	number	is	expected	to	
increase	as	already	explained.			
Todaro	(1995)	suggests	several	important	questions	in	the	study	of	migration	that	need	to	be	
addressed,	especially	when	the	focus	is	on	rural‐urban	migration.			First,	why	do	people	migrate	
from	their	home	villages	and	what	variables	determine	such	decision?	Second,	how	does	
migration	affect	the	social	and	economic	development	of	the	source	and	the	destination	
regions?		This	paper	concentrates	on	the	first	of	these	questions.		
																																																													
40	Since	1985	the	decline	in	Bolivian	rural	population	as	a	percentage	of	the	total	population	has	exceed	the	average	
percentage	of	the	rest	of	countries	in	South	America	by	more	than	1%,	and	it	is	projected	to	remain	at	that	level	for	
the	next	four	decades	(UN	2008).		
41	The	average	includes	migration	flows	in	1997	and	2002	from	Tannuri‐Pianto	et.	al.	(2004).	The	other	70%	is	
originated	in	urban	and	metropolitan	areas.	
42	The	remaining	41.4%	are	rural‐rural	migrants.	Ibid.	pp.	5.	
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It	is	widely	accepted	that	economic	considerations	provide	strong	motivation	to	migrate.43		The	
absence	of	crop	insurance	and	shortage	of	liquidity	are	among	the	most	important	constraints	
that	push	rural	families	to	look	for	diversification	across	alternative	sources	of	income,	which	
will	secure	a	source	of	income	not	just	for	the	migrants,	but	also	for	the	family	that	stays	behind	
in	the	village	(Lucas	1997).	
According	to	Taylor	(1999),	remittances	represent	the	largest	direct	positive	impact	of	
migration	on	incomes	and	production	of	the	rural	families,	in	particular,	and	on	migrant	
sending	areas	in	general.	Regmi	and	Tisdell	(2002)	explain	that	remittances	are	often	the	
reason	for	the	migration	decision	and	its	most	important	consequence.	The	impact	of	
remittances	on	migration	varies	across	countries,	and	may	vary	across	regions	within	a	country	
for	several	reasons.	Impact	depends	on	household	characteristics;	the	functioning	of	the	market	
in	which	migration	and	remittances	decisions	are	taken;	constraints	faced	by	households;	and,	
the	tradition	of	migration/remittances‐reception	of	the	surrounding	environment	of	the	
households.	
Despite	the	fact	that	remittances	might	not	be	the	dominant	source	of	income	among	rural	
households44,	their	impact	on	income	on	those	that	receive	them	is	considerable;	based	on	case‐
studies	in	some	countries	of	the	developing	world,	they	represent	up	to	16%	of	the	total	
household’s	income45.	Unfortunately,	no	such	information	is	available	for	Bolivia.		
Among	the	large	existing	literature	related	to	migration	and	remittances,	two	areas	have	been	
extensively	studied.	The	first	relates	to	the	effects	of	remittances	on	poverty	and	inequality;	the	
literature	shows	that	remittances	help	reduce	the	incidence,	depth	and	severity	of	poverty	in	
																																																													
43	Todaro	(1995).	
44	In	Burkina	Faso,	only	6.3%	of	the	rural	households	in	the	sample	received	internal	remittances	(Wourtese,	2008),		
while	in	Guatemala	the	number	was	14.6	%	(Adams,	2004).	
45	In	Burkina	Faso,	remittances	as	a	share	of	total	households	income	represent	a	10.4%	(Wourtese,	2008),		
Guatemala	on	the	same	indicator	is	15.78%	(Adams,	2004),	and	Egypt	15%	(Adams	1991).	
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developing	countries46;	the	evidence	regarding	the	impact	of	remittances	on	inequality,	
however,	has	not	been	as	conclusive47.	The	second	area	relates	to	the	motives	of	migrants	for	
sending	remittances;	they	range	from	pure	altruism	(where	the	sole	reason	for	the	migrant	for	
remitting	is	to	support	family	consumption	back	in	the	hometown),	to	pure	self‐interest	(where	
remittances	are	made	for	the	aspiration	to	inherit	or	to	invest	in	the	rural	town),	or	some	
combination	of	the	two.	Both	areas	have	been	applied	to	migration	across	countries,	and	to	
migration	within	countries.	However,	in	both	cases	the	analysis	focused	on	the	remitters’	
characteristics	and	their	contextual	settings.	48		
Adams	et.	al.	(2008),	using	data	from	Ghana,	takes	a	different	approach.		This	paper	analyzes	
remittances	in	a	framework	where	the	focus	was	precisely	on	the	origin	of	the	income	flows	
rather	than	on	the	existence	or	not	of	migration	assets	in	the	rural	household.				
Finally,	two	are	the	main	reasons	that	have	been	established	to	explain	the	presence	of	
remittances	among	the	income	sources.	Taylor	(1999)	and	Lucas	(1997)	suggest	that	
remittances	represent	an	income	diversification	strategy.	The	World	Bank	(2006)	posits	that	
remittances	ease	working	capital	constraints,	and	hence	represent	a	source	of	liquidity	for	the	
farmer.	This	has	yet	to	be	tested	econometrically.		
It	is	essential	to	understand	all	the	roles	that	migration	remittances	play	aside	from	increasing	
income	and	expenditure,	or	smoothing	consumption.	The	contribution	of	remittances	in	terms	
of	liquidity	can	represent	additional	benefits	for	poor	farmers	and	their	possibilities	of	
overcoming	market	failures	and	increasing	their	risk‐spreading	strategies,	strategies	that	have	
proved	to	help	reduce	poverty.	
																																																													
46	See	for	example	Adams	et.al	(2008)	for	Ghana,	Wourtese	(2008)	for	Burkina	Faso,	Taylor	et.	al	(2005)	for	Mexico,	
and	Adams	(2004)	for	Guatemala.	
47	The	World	Bank	(2006)	explains	that	the	effect	depends	on	who	receives	the	remittances	(the	better‐off	or	the	less	
well‐off),	if	we	are	considering	the	effects	in	the	short	or	long	term,	and	other	variables	that	affect	their	
distribution.	
48	See	for	example	Gopal	and	Tisdell	(2002)	for	Nepal,	Brown	(1997)	for	the	Pacific	Island,	Hoddinott	(1992)	for	
Kenya,	and	Lucas	et.	al.	(1985)	for	Botswana.	
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This	paper	uses	empirical	analysis	to	formally	test	the	econometric	significance	of	migration	
remittances	in	further	income	diversification	strategies,	using	a	nationally	representative	
dataset	from	Bolivia	and	its	rural‐urban	migrants.	If	migration	remittances	are	an	effort	by	rural	
households	to	overcome	market	failures	for	credit	and	insurance,	and	hence	represent	a	means	
to	diversify	their	income	sources	into	nonfarm	activities,	a	positive	effect	is	expected.	The	
country	is	an	interesting	and	relevant	case	study	since	its	characteristics	in	terms	of	market	
failures,	low	urbanization	rates,	and	increasing	importance	of	nonfarm	income	strategies	
resemble	those	of	many	countries	in	each	of	the	seven	developing	regions	of	the	world.	Valid	
inferences	can	be	drawn	from	the	study.		
Also,	this	work	includes	a	regional	analysis	in	terms	of	the	proposed	hypothesis.	The	use	of	
interaction	effects	will	control	for	the	likely	existence	of	agroclimatic	and	idiosyncratic	regional	
differences,	and	confirm	or	reject	the	proposed	role	of	migration	remittances	at	the	regional	
level.			
Unlike	more	traditional	approaches	to	study	migration	and	remittances,	where	the	focus	is	on	
the	migrants	and	their	characteristics,	this	research	work	concentrates	on	the	rural	households	
from	which	the	family	members	have	been	sent	as	migrants,	their	characteristics,	and	the	
contextual	settings	in	which	they	make	decisions.	We	follow	in	this	respect	the	novel	approach	
proposed	by	Adams	et	al.	2008.		
Finally,	among	the	variables	that	explain	the	existence	of	remittances	we	carefully	incorporate	
the	existence	of	migration	networks	in	the	social	group	to	which	each	household	belongs	to.	
This	has	been	found	to	have	a	significant	effect	in	receiving	remittances	and	has	not	always	
been	considered	in	similar	studies.49		
																																																													
49	Lucas	(1997)	establishes	that	one	important	group	of	factors	that	influence	migration	and	remittances	decisions	
are	the	contextual	setting,	or	general	characteristics	of	the	sending	community.	
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The	rest	of	the	paper	is	organized	as	follows.	In	Section	2.2	the	hypothesis	regarding	migration	
remittances	and	their	role	for	nonfarm	income	diversification	strategies	is	proposed.	Section	
2.3	presents	the	econometric	model	used	to	estimate	the	relationship	between	remittances	and	
nonfarm	income	diversification.	Section	2.4	outlines	the	database	used	for	the	modeling,	and	
the	variables	involved	in	the	estimation	process.	Section	2.5	presents	the	estimations’	results	
and	relevant	marginal	probability	effects.	Section	2.6	concludes.	
2.2 The	role	of	migration	remittances	in	the	farmers	household’s	budget	
	
Remittances	can	affect	households’	budget	and	wealth	in	different	ways.	Remittances	directly	
increase	the	income	of	the	rural	household	that	receives	them;	hence	they	could	help	poor	
farmers	to	escape	poverty.	Remittances	also	contribute	to	smooth	household	consumption.	
They	ease	capital	constraints,	faced	primarily	by	poor	rural	farmers.	Finally,	remittances	
increase	household	expenditures	(World	Bank,	2006).	In	this	work,	we	focus	our	analysis	in	the	
role	of	migration	remittances	of	providing	working	capital.	
Rural	farmers	choose	between	different	types	of	income,	which	can	be	earned	singly	(no	
diversification)	or	in	various	combinations	(diversification).		The	alternative	for	rural	residents	
are	farm	income,	farm	income	and	remittances,	farm	income	and	income	from	other	nonfarm	
activities,	or	finally	from	all	three	sources	of	income	simultaneously.		
Before	explaining	the	way	in	which	we	hypothesize	how	rural	farmers	decide	on	income	
diversification	through	remittances,	let	us	briefly	make	two	notes	in	regards	to	migration	
decisions	and	the	receipt	of	remittances.	First,	not	all	migrants	should	be	expected	to	migrate	
for	reasons	related	to	remittances.	Even	though	an	income	diversification	strategy	through	
remittances	may	begin	with	the	decision	to	send	family	members	away	as	migrants	(e.g.	rural‐
urban	migration),	the	decision	of	sending	migrants	may	be	motivated	by	other	factors	and	
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necessities.	Based	on	data	provided	by	Andersen	(2002)	in	his	study	on	rural‐urban	migration	
in	Bolivia,	at	most	18%	of	the		migrants	had	remittances	as	the	primary	reason	behind	
migration;50	but	of	course,	not	everyone	migrant	remits.		Therefore,	from	the	standpoint	of	
income	diversification,	the	mere	existence	of	remittances	in	the	rural	household	is	what	
matters,	since	this	is	consistent	with	the	desire	to	diversify	income.	
Second,	following	Niimi	and	Özden	(2008),	we	assume	that	if	remittances	are	observed	as	part	
of	the	rural	household’s	income,	it	is	because	the	household	sent	at	least	one	family	member	
away	as	migrant.	If	it	had	not,	no	remittance	would	be	observed.	This	rules	out	the	possibility	
that	the	rural	household	might	receive	remittances	even	if	no	family	members	have	migrated;	
we	treat	this	option	as	unlikely	or	negligible.	
We	can	now	proceed	with	our	proposition	regarding	the	motivations	and	contextual	
conditionings	involved	in	the	process	of	income	diversification	through	migration	remittances.		
A	good	characterization	of	the	limiting	conditions	that	rural	farmers	in	developing	countries	
face	is	the	one	developed	by	Lucas	(1997),	where	the	author	states	that	agriculture	is	a	high	risk	
activity.		Farmers	face	the	prospects	of	floods,	droughts,	pests	and	cattle	disease	for	which	
insurance	rarely	exists,	or	when	it	does	exist,	as	Stark	(1988)	explains,	the	transaction	costs	
may	be	prohibitive,	especially	for	poor	small	farmers.		Hence,	insurance	may	be	impossible	to	
obtain.		If	so,	rural	farmers	must	look	for	a	method	of	self‐insurance,	such	as	diversification	
across	different	sources	of	income.	The	object	is	to	develop	sources	of	income	that	are	not	
positively	correlated	with	farm	income,	e.g.	sending	family	members	as	migrants	to	obtain	
remittances	and/or	diversify	into	other	nonfarm	activities.		
																																																													
50	Among	rural‐urban	migrants,	50%	stated	that	family	reunion	was	the	reason	for	migration,	26%	said	education,	
4%	due	to	job	moved,	and	2%	for	health;	the	remaining	18%	mentioned	job	search	as	the	reason	for	migrating	to	
the	urban	area.	
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Risks	and	lack	of	insurance	are	not,	of	course,	the	only	limitation	faced	by	rural	farmers;	lack	of	
capital	and	imperfect	or	inexistent	credit	markets	might	also	constrain	them	(Taylor	1999)	in	
their	desire	of	making	farm	and/or	nonfarm	investments	(Taylor	and	Wyatt	1996).		
Under	such	characterization	of	the	limitations	faced	by	rural	farmers,	and	the	self‐insurance	
strategies	that	these	agents	follow	to	overcome	them,	a	rural	family	may	decide	to	diversify	
income51	using	an	income	source	that	counterbalances	the	lack	of	working	capital	due	to	the	
imperfect	or	inexistence	credit	markets.52Therefore,	we	hypothesize	that	initially	rural	farmers	
diversify	(e.g.	through	nonfarm	activities)	as	a	self‐insurance	strategy	against	agricultural	risks.	
However,	if	the	farmer	liquidity	constrained	and	faces	an	imperfect	or	inexistent	credit	market,	
he/she	first	need	to	loosen	this	constraint	in	order	to	undertake	any	business	venture	off	the	
farm.	Therefore,	remittances	end	up	being	a	means	for	income	diversification,	through	the	
provision	of	working	capital,	to	those	households	that	lack	access	to	credit	markets,	or	provide	
“cheaper”	capital	for	those	that	can	access	the	market	but	the	costs	are	extremely	high.		
In	concordance	with	our	hypothesis,	we	explore	the	effect	of	remittances	on	the	propensity	of	
rural	households	to	diversify	income	through	nonfarm	work,	conditional	on	the	characteristics	
of	the	households	and	on	the	environment	in	which	they	make	their	decisions.	The	estimation	
method	used	for	this	purpose	is	explained	in	the	next	section.			
2.3 Econometric	model	and	estimation	
	
Given	our	hypothesis	regarding	the	role	of	remittances	in	nonfarm	income	diversification	
strategies,	the	goal	is	to	model	a	situation	in	which	the	decision	to	remit	affects	the	decision	of	a	
																																																													
51	Decisions	on	income	diversification	are	now	widely	understood	as	a	family	strategy	rather	than	a	individualistic	
process,	see	for	example	Lucas	(1997)	and	Taylor		and	Wyatt	(1996).	
52	The	thesis	that	remittances	are	a	diversification	strategy	has	been	widely	analyzed	and	explained;	see	for	example	
Taylor	(1999)	and	Lucas	(1997).		
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household	to	diversify	income	through	the	nonfarm	work.	It	is	likely	that	unobserved	factors	
affect	both	decisions	for	a	typical	farmer	and	that	the	decisions	share	many	of	these.	
The	bivariate	probit	model,	an	extension	of	the	probit	model,	allows	the	presence	of	two	binary	
(0,1)	dependent	variables	correlated	through	their	errors.	Following	Greene	(2008),	the	
outcomes	of	the	two	discrete	choices	can	be	viewed	as	a	result	of	an	underlying	regression	or	
index	function,	which	captures	the	economic	benefit	calculation	that	leads	to	the	decision	of	
taking	an	action	ሺܻ ൌ 1ሻ	or	not	ሺܻ ൌ 0ሻ.		
Denote	each	equation	with	subscript	݅,	and	let	ݔ௜	be	vectors	of	observed	exogenous	variables	
that	affect	the	utility	of	the	decision‐maker	(e.g.	household),	ߝ௜	be	the	error	terms	for	the	two	
possible	discrete	outcomes,	which	are	jointly	normally	distributed	with	means	zero,	variances	
equal	to	one,	and,	ߩ	be	the	coefficient	of	correlation	between	the	errors	of	the	model.	The	
bivariate	probit	model	for	each	observation	can	be	written	as:	
ݕଵ∗ ൌ ݔଵᇱߚଵ ൅ ߝଵ, ݕଵ ൌ 1 if ݕଵ∗ ൐ 0, 0 o.w.,
ݕଶ∗ ൌ ݔଶᇱߚଶ ൅ ߝଶ, 																							ݕଶ ൌ 1	if	ݕଶ∗ ൐ 0, 0	o.w.,	
ܧሾߝଵ|ݔଵ, ݔଶሿ ൌ ܧሾߝଶ|ݔଵ, ݔଶሿ ൌ 0,	
Varሾߝଵ|ݔଵ, ݔଶሿ ൌ Varሾߝଶ|ݔଵ, ݔଶሿ ൌ 1	
Cov[ߝଵ,ߝଶ|ݔଵ, ݔଶ] ൌ ߩ	
(2.1)
where	ݕଵrepresents	the	presence	of	nonfarm	income	for	each	household	and	ݕଶ	the	presence	of	
remittances	in	the	same	household.	For	those	rural	farmers	that	we	observe	have	diversified	
income	through	nonfarm	activities,	ݕଵ ൌ 1,	otherwise	ݕଵ ൌ 0,	and	for	the	ones	that	receive	
remittances	ݕଶ ൌ 1	,	otherwise	ݕଶ ൌ 0.	
The	model	additionally	assumes	that	the	errors	are	uncorrelated	across	observations,	i.e.	
ߝଵ	and	ߝଶ	for	each	observation	ݐ ൌ 1,2, … , ܶ	are	iid	as	pairs	across	the	rural	households,	which	
means	that	the	errors	of	the	two	types	of	outcomes	for	each	household,	i.e.	diversification	into	
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nonfarm	activities	and	reception	of	remittances,	are	the	ones	that	are	assumed	to	be	correlated.	
This	implies	that	diversification	into	nonfarm	activities	and	reception	of	remittances,	are	
correlated	through	their	unobserved	characteristics.		
According	to	our	proposition	in	Section	2.2,	remittances	ሺݕଶሻ	determine	the	presence	of	
nonfarm	income	ሺݕଵሻ,	making	remittances	endogenous	in	the	nonfarm	income	equation;	this	
means	that	the	observed	outcome	for	receiving	remittances	is	correlated	with	the	error	term	of	
the	diversification	outcome	ሺߝଵሻ.	A	model	that	accounts	for	this	possibility	for	each	observation	
in	the	sample	is:	
ݕଵ∗ ൌ ߛݕଶ ൅ ݔଵᇱߚଵ ൅ ߝଵ, ݕଵ ൌ 1 if ݕଵ∗ ൐ 0, 0 o.w.,	
ݕଶ∗ ൌ ݔଶᇱߚଶ ൅ ߝଶ,																																				ݕଶ ൌ 1	if	ݕଶ∗ ൐ 0, 0	o.w.,	
	
(2.2)
The	system	is	fully	recursive,	as	long	as	the	conditional	mean	of	ݕଶ	does	not	depend	on	ݕଵ,	and	
consistent	estimation	of	the	parameters	can	be	made	using	full	information	maximum	
likelihood	(Greene,	1998).	The	statistical	assumptions	regarding	the	errors	terms	in	(2.1)	still	
hold.		
The	four	possible	mutually	exclusive	outcomes,	for	each	point	in	the	sample,	from	our	two	
equations	can	be	denoted	by	ݕଵ଴	(when	ݕଵ ൌ 1	and	ݕଶ ൌ 0),	ݕ଴ଵ,	ݕଵଵ,	and	ݕ଴଴,	and	the	
probability	for	each	of	them	equal	to53:	
ଵܲଵ ൌ Probሾݕଵ ൌ 1, ݕଶ ൌ 1|ݔଵ, ݔଶሿ ൌ Prob[ݕଵ=1|ݕଶ=1]×Prob[ݕଶ=1]
(2.3)		 ൌ ሼΦଶሺݕଵ, ݕଶ ൌ 1ሻ/Probሾݕଶ ൌ 1ሿሽ ൈ Probሾݕଶ ൌ 1ሿ	
ଵܲଵ ൌ Φଶሺߛ ൅ ݔଵᇱߚଵ, ݔଶᇱߚଶ, ρሻ
ଵܲ଴ ൌ Φଶሺ ݔଵᇱߚଵ, െݔଶᇱߚଶ, െρሻ
																																																													
53	The	bivariate	normal	probabilities	for	the	four	possible	outcomes	have	been	derived	by	Greene	(2008),	pp.	823.	
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଴ܲଵ ൌ Φଶሺെߛ െ ݔଵᇱߚଵ, ݔଶᇱߚଶ, െρሻ
଴ܲ଴ ൌ Φଶሺെݔଶᇱߚଶ, െݔଵᇱߚଵ, ρሻ
where,	by	convention,	Φଶ	stands	for	the	CDF	of	the	bivariate	normal	distribution.	The	four	
expressions	in	Equation	(2.7)	are	precisely	the	four	terms	that	enter	the	log‐likelihood	function	
for	the	bivariate	probit	model	whose	set	up	is	in	Equation	(2.1).	Hence,	in	our	recursive	
simultaneous‐equation	model	we	can	proceed	as	if	no	endogeneity	would	occur.54			
If	we	denote	ߠଵ	as	a	vector	of	the	right‐hand	side	variables	of	equation	ݕଵ,	and	ߠଶ	the	
corresponding	vector	of	right‐hand	side	variables	in	equation	ݕଶ,	the	contribution	made	by	each	
observation	in	the	sample	(i.e.	each	farmer)	is	the	logarithm	of	the	probability	that	the	two	
dependent	variables	ݕ௜	(݅ ൌ 1,2)	take	on	their	observed	value.	The	log‐likelihood	function	of	our	
recursive	simultaneous‐equation	model,	including	all	the	observations	in	sample,	is	the	sum	of	
the	individual	contributions:	
݈݊ܮ௧ ൌ ෍ ݀௜௝௧ ln ௜ܲ௝௧ ሺߠଵ∗, ߠଶ∗, ߩ∗ሻ௜,௝ୀ଴,ଵ 	 (2.4)
where	݀௜௝	is	an	indicator	variable	ሺ݀௜௝ ൌ ܫሺݕ௜ ൌ ݅, ݕ௝ ൌ ݆ሻሻ,	equals	one	when	its	argument	is	true,	
and	zero	otherwise,	with	ݕ௜	and	ݕ௝	representing	the	actual	choices	of	individual	ݐ.	In	(6),	
equations	ݕଵ	and	ݕଶ	describe	a	system	of	equations	for	which	the	parameters	are	to	be	
estimated	simultaneously.	The	Full	Information	Maximum	Likelihood	(FIML)	estimator	is	
consistent	and	fully	efficient	for	all	the	parameters	in	the	model	(Greene,	1998).		
Finally,	we	need	to	ensure	the	identification	of	the	model.	According	to	Maddala	(1983),	the	
identification	of	the	diversification	equation	requires	that	at	least	one	variable	from	the	
remittances	equation	be	excluded	from	the	diversification	equation.	Wilde	(2000),	however,	
establishes	that	in	the	case	of	a	bivariate	model,	the	parameters	are	identified	even	if	such	
																																																													
54	As	Greene	op.	explains,	this	conclusion	comes	from	the	fact	that	the	marginal	probability	for	ݕଶ	in	Equation	(2.6)	is	equal	to	the	univariate	probit	model	for	ݕଶ.	
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exclusion	restrictions	do	not	exist.	He	explains	that	identification	is	simply	feasible	based	on	the	
presence	of	varying	exogenous	regressors.	However,	since	identification	based	on	exclusion	
restrictions	is	being	found	to	be	more	robust	(Yoሷ ruሷ k,	2009)	we	make	sure	to	include	those	
restrictions	in	the	model.	
2.4 Data	
	
The	data	used	in	the	present	work	comes	from	the	database	of	the	Program	for	the	
Improvement	of		Surveys	and	the	Measurement	of	Living	Conditions	in	Latin	America	and	the	
Caribbean	(MECOVI	for	its	acronym	in	Spanish)55,	which	is	conducted	by	the	INE	(Bolivian	
Bureau	of	Census)	in	Bolivia,	and	provides	access	to	it	through	its	web	page	www.ine.gov.bo.		
The	MECOVI’s	have	been	conducted	annually	since	1999,	and	on‐line	information	is	available	
from	the	surveys	conducted	during	1999	through	2002.	Since	each	survey	does	not	track	the	
same	households,	and	some	key	questions	are	not	asked	in	each	survey,	we	perform	a	cross‐
section	analysis	for	the	survey	of	the	year	2000.	The	stratified	sampling	procedure	in	the	
MECOVI	2000	is	designed	to	eliminate	sampling	bias	due	to	the	household	is	included	in	the	
survey	(Rivero	and	Mollinedo	2000).	
The	annual	surveys	collect	data	on	such	diverse	topics	such	as	income,	expenditures,	education,	
health,	employment,	food	consumption,	assets	holdings	and	migration.	It	needs	to	be	
emphasized,	though,	that	since	the	MECOVI	surveys	target	variables	related	to	the	living	
conditions	of	the	population	and	not	migration	and	remittances	specifically,	they	contain	
limited	information	on	these	topics.	With	respect	to	migration,	the	information	about	migrants	
is	available	at	the	households	of	destination,	and	not	at	the	households	of	origin.	This	makes	
																																																													
55	The	Program	is	executed	by	the	World	Bank	(IBRD),	the	Inter‐American	Development	Bank	(IDB)	and	the	United	
Nations	Economic	Commission	for	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	(ECLAC),	as	well	as	specialized	institutions	or	
agencies	in	countries	participating	in	the	Program.	Subsequently	other	donors,	such	as	Canada,	Denmark,	Germany,	
Japan,	Norway,	Sweden,	UNDP,	USA,	and	the	Soros	Foundation,	have	supported	the	Program.	
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impossible	to	know	if	the	migration	assets	are	held	by	the	rural	farmers,	our	target	group.56	
What	we	have	is	information	regarding	remittances,	domestic	and	international,57	and	whether	
the	households	receive	them	or	not.	If	they	do,	the	exact	amount	is	provided.	As	Adams	(2004)	
also	establishes,	it	would	be	desirable	to	have	information	regarding	the	migrants	of	the	rural	
household.	However,	having	detailed	information	about	the	characteristics	and	the	
environment	in	which	the	farmers	make	decisions	makes	it	possible	to	explore	the	role	of	
remittances	as	a	diversification	income	strategy.	
The	MECOVI	survey	for	2000	covers	sample	units	from	urban	and	rural	households;	for	the	
present	work	we	concentrate	on	the	rural	sample	that	comprises	2,108	households,	or	9,092	
persons,	over	166	localities	in	the	nine	Departments	of	the	country.58	However,	among	the	total	
rural	households	only	1,960	are	in	our	final	sample	since	our	goal	is	to	estimate	the	degree	of	
income	diversification	of	the	rural	farmers	thorough	remittances	and/or	other	nonfarm	
activities.59	Finally,	the	classification	among	the	1,960	farmers	according	to	income	source	is	
shown	in	Table	1.60		
																																																													
56	In	relation	to	migration,	the	survey	reports	whether	some	member	of	a	household	is	an	immigrant,	and	if	it	is	so,	it	
provides	information	regarding	the	general	location	of	the	geographical	area	of	origin	(e.g.	if	the	person	has	
migrated	from	within	the	country	they	are	asked	the	Department,	Province	and	Municipality,	and	if	they	are	from	
abroad,	the	country	and	city	names).	Unfortunately,	this	information	is	not	enough	to	track	the	rural	household	
from	where	the	person	would	have	migrated	when	the	migration	originated	from	another	part	of	the	country.	The	
survey	unfortunately	does	not	ask	if	the	households	(rural	or	urban)	have	some	members	that	have	migrated	and	
so	are	not	present	during	the	interview.	Therefore,	it	is	impossible	to	include	information	regarding	the	migrants	
that	rural	households	might	have	sent,	and	then	among	those,	to	differentiate	the	ones	that	receive	remittances.	
57	The	term	domestic	applies	to	remittances	that	are	sent	from	anywhere	within	the	country,	and	international	for	
those	remittances	that	are	sent	from	abroad.	
58	From	the	total	2,108	households,	825	are	located	in	the	Altiplano	region,	756	in	the	Valles	and,	527	in	the	Llanos.	
The	survey	also	classifies	the	households	according	to	their	location	into	two	groups:	rural	populated	centers	(212	
households)	and	rural	dispersed	areas	(1,896	households).	
59	Rural	households,	whose	primary	and/or	secondary	occupation	is	not	related	with	farm	work,	have	been	dropped	
from	the	sample.	
60	We	later	drop	257	observations,	and	end	up	estimating	the	model	with	1,703	households	that	have	complete	
information.	
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Table 1 - Rural households classification according to income source 
	
	
In	the	next	sub‐section,	we	specify	the	variables	involved	in	the	estimation	of	the	bivariate	
probit	model.		
2.4.1 The	independent	variables	
	
The	variables	included	as	explanatory	are	individual‐specific	and	can	broadly	be	classified	
within	four	groups.	These	include	household	characteristics	(such	as	the	age	of	the	head	and	the	
number	of	adult	and	children	members),	household	human	capital	assets	(proxied	by	the	head’s	
education	attainment	and	total	number	of	years	of	education	in	the	household),	physical	assets	
of	the	household	(proxied	by	its	landholdings),	and	the	contextual	characteristics	of	the	
surrounding	environment	where	the	rural	household	resides	(proxied	by	some	characteristics	
of	the	social	networks	of	the	household,	and	distance	to	the	nearest	capital	of	Department).	
The	logic	behind	those	explanatory	variables	lies,	in	general,	on	the	standard	available	
literature	on	migration/remittances	(Adams	et.	al.	2008)	and	diversification	into	nonfarm	
activities.	In	the	case	of	the	characteristics	of	the	household,	we	can	expect	that	if	the	altruistic	
motive	is	behind	remittances	(Lucas	and	Stark,	1985),	households	with	older	heads,	fewer	male	
members,	and	more	children	are	more	likely	to	receive	remittances.	Migrants	can	be	thought	to	
remit	more	if	among	those	left	behind	are	elderly,	with	little	labor	force,	and	many	
dependents61.	With	respect	to	human	capital	assets,	and	following	Hoddinot	(1992),	we	can	
expect	that	the	higher	the	education	attainment	the	better	access	to	the	formal	sector	of	the	
																																																													
61	The	composition	of	the	household	variables	considers	all	the	members	left	behind,	after	some	have	migrated.		
Table 1. Rural households classification according to income source
Only farmers 1,086           
Farmers receiving remittances 219                
Farmers with nonfarm income 559                
Farmers receiving both, remittances and 
income from nonfarm work
96                  
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rural	labor	market,	and	hence	the	rural	household	is	less	likely	to	be	liquidity	constrained.	
Hence	we	expect	a	negative	impact	on	the	remittances	outcome.	We	proxy	human	capital	with	
two	variables:	the	years	of	schooling	of	the	head	of	the	household,	and	the	total	years	of	
schooling	of	the	entire	household.	A	squared	specification	is	included	to	permit	nonlinear	
returns	to	schooling.	
Asset	holdings,	which	are	proxied	by	landholdings,	have	been	extensively	used	to	approximate	
the	wealth	of	the	household	in	the	study	of	migration/remittances	(Wourtese	2008),	however	
based	on	contradicting	arguments	and	empirical	results,	we	cannot	establish	a	priori	its	final	
effect	on	the	remittances	decision.	For	instance,	a	larger	quantity	of	land	per	capita	increases	
the	marginal	productivity	from	land	and	may	reduce	the	pursuit	of	remittance	income.	However	
if	the	aspiration	to	inherit	is	an	important	reason	to	remit,	as	hypothesized	(Lucas	and	Stark,	
1985),	the	larger	the	potential	of	inheritance,	the	higher	the	probability	of	the	rural	household	
to	receive	remittances.	We	use	landholdings	per	capita	in	the	remittances	equation	to	capture	
these	effects	and	the	direction	of	this	relationship	will	be	determined	empirically.			
It	has	also	been	widely	explained	and	empirically	demonstrated	that	social	networks	greatly	
affect	the	decisions	made	by	entities	such	a	household	(see	for	example	Taylor	et.	al.	2005).	For	
sampling	reasons,	the	INE	divides	the	country	geographically	into	UPM’s	(Primary	Sample	
Units)62,	and	each	observation	in	the	sample	belongs	to	one	of	them.	Hence,	we	use	the	UPM	as	
the	group	of	reference	(social	networks)	for	each	rural	farmer.	In	terms	of	the	determinants	of	
the	propensity	to	receive	remittances	two	variables	are	included	in	the	model	at	the	group	level.	
First,	we	control	for	the	number	of	households	receiving	remittances	in	the	group	of	reference,	
and	secondly,	a	group	measure	of	wealth	is	included	to	capture	indirect	effects	on	migration	
remittances	as	suggested	by	Adams	et	al.	(2008).	These	control	variables	are	included	as	they	
																																																													
62	The	INE	divides	Bolivia	into	approximately	21,000	UPM,	each	bringing	together	an	average	of	50	housings.	The	
master	sample	used	for	the	survey	in	2000	contains	2,500	UPM,	and	the	final	sample	for	the	MECOVI	2000	
encompasses	150	UPM.	More	details	in	http://www.eclac.cl/deype/mecovi/taller9.htm.		
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might	influence	the	availability	of	obtaining	information,	the	costs	of	transportation,	and	the	
costs	of	sending	money.	The	variable	used	to	control	for	the	group’s	wealth	is	the	squared	
income	of	the	group;	this	specification	will	eventually	reduce	multicollinearity	problems	with	
the	land	asset	variable.		
Finally,	there	are	also	contextual	characteristics	that	influence	the	decisions	of	the	farmers	and	
need	to	be	incorporated	as	explanatory	variables.	As	such,	we	control	for	the	distance	to	the	
nearest	department’s	capital,	since	it	is	the	nearest	economic	and	political	center	for	the	
household	where	rural	farmers	send	family	members	away	in	order	to	pursue	remittances.		
In	terms	of	our	nonfarm	income	equation,	we	include	the	remittances	outcome	variable,	over	
which	we	want	to	determine	whether	it	has	the	hypothesized	positive	and	significant	impact	on	
the	diversification	decision.	Additionally,	we	also	include	in	this	equation	the	regressors	that	
control	for	the	characteristics	and	composition	of	the	household,	its	human	and	physical	capital	
assets,	and	the	characteristics	of	its	surrounding	environment.	In	terms	of	the	first	group	of	
variables,	we	can	expect	that	the	younger	the	head,	the	higher	the	number	of	male	adults,	and	
the	higher	the	number	of	dependents	in	the	rural	household,	the	higher	the	propensity	to	
diversify	into	nonfarm	activities.	Regarding	human	capital,	evidence	shows	that	households	
with	higher	education	levels	engage	more	frequently	in	nonfarm	activities,	and	that	human	
capital	has	an	important	effect	on	the	level	of	nonfarm	income.	Hence,	the	years	of	schooling	of	
the	head	of	the	household,	and	the	total	years	of	schooling	of	the	entire	household,	are	both	
included	in	the	diversification	specification,	along	with	a	squared	term	to	permit	nonlinear	
returns	to	schooling.	As	we	mentioned	before,	the	land	assets	variable	has	usually	been	used	to	
proxy	wealth.	However,	among	all	the	types	of	assets	that	the	rural	household	owns,	land	is	
among	the	less	liquid	and	hence	might	not	help	diversification	in	terms	of	providing	the	means	
to	do	it.	As	a	consequence,	we	expect	a	negative	impact	on	the	diversification	decision.	Next,	we	
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also	expect	that	social	networks	influence	household’s	choices	regarding	diversification	
decisions.	The	higher	the	income	of	the	group	of	reference	the	greater	the	access	to	resources	
from	the	network	to	start	a	business	or	other	entrepreneurial	activities.	Finally,	we	also	believe	
that	the	contextual	characteristics	of	the	environment	where	the	rural	household	resides	
influence	the	decisions	of	the	farmers	regarding	undertaking	nonfarm	activities.	The	distance	to	
the	nearest	department’s	capital	is	included	here	as	well,	since	the	department	capital	is	the	
nearest	economic	and	political	center	for	the	rural	household,	where	they	might	find	nonfarm	
work.	
Finally,	dummy	variables	are	conveniently	included	to	capture	the	existence	of	possible	
regional	effects.	Two	of	them	are	used	to	discriminate	among	the	three	agroclimatic	regions	(i.e.	
Altiplano,	Valles,	and	Llanos),	and	a	third	one	to	differentiate	the	regions	where	coca	leaf	
production	exits.	 
2.5 Estimation	results	
	
Table	2	includes	some	descriptive	statistics	of	the	variables	used	in	the	nonfarm	income	and	
remittances	equations	of	our	bivariate	probit	model.	Recall	that	nonfarm	income	refers	to	
whether	a	household	diversifies	farm	income	from	nonfarm	activities,	and	remittances	in	turn,	
to	whether	the	household	receives	remittances.	Since	we	want	to	contrast	among	households	
coming	from	the	three	different	geographic	regions,	we	present	the	data	in	this	and	the	
following	tables,	in	regional	terms.		
With	respect	to	human	capital,	Table	2	shows	that	households	in	the	Llanos	have	more	human	
capital	than	households	living	in	the	other	two	regions.	It	also	shows	that	while	households	
living	in	the	Llanos		
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have	the	highest	mean	land	value,	the	asset	is	highly	dispersed	in	all	three	regions.	In	terms	of	
skewness,	the	asset	is	positively	skewed	in	all	three	sub‐samples,	with	the	Valles	region	having	
a	relative	longer	tail.63			
In	terms	of	our	two	binary	outcomes,	Table	3	provides	a	cross‐tabulation	statistics	for	each	
region.	According	to	it,	a	smaller	percentage	of	households	in	the	Llanos	receive	remittances	
compared	to	the	other	two	regions;	however,	it	is	precisely	in	that	region	where	there	is	a	
higher	portion	of	the	households	having	income	coming	from	nonfarm	work,	while	the	smallest	
percentage	of	households	with	nonfarm	income	among	regions	is	in	the	Altiplano.		
Table 2 - Descriptive statistics, by region 
	
																																																													
63	The	overall	skewness	value	for	land	is	20.11.	In	regional	terms,	the	measure	is	7.27	for	the	Altiplano,	16.29	for	the	
Valles,	and	11.13	for	the	Llanos.	
Table 2. Descriptive statistics, by region (a)
Variable        Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Remittances (1=yes; 0=no) 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.18 0.38 0 1 0.11 0.31 0 1
Nonfarm income (1=yes; 0=no) 0.25 0.43 0 1 0.38 0.49 0 1 0.40 0.49 0 1
Number of male adults 1.0 0.7 0 5 1.2 0.7 0 5 1.4 0.9 0 6
Number of children 1.0 1.3 0 6 1.0 1.2 0 5 1.3 1.3 0 6
Age of the household head 48.6 16.9 13 98 46.2 15.7 11 90 44.6 14.8 15 90
Household total years of schooling 11.6 10.5 0 64 12.7 10.8 0 68 16.3 12.1 0 76
Head's years of schooling 4.1 3.9 0 17 3.8 3.8 0 17 4.4 3.5 0 16
Land assets (b) 826.0  2,151      0 25,000    2,343   8,079    0 175,000   5,337    29,570     0 448,000      
Land assets per capita 309.7  825.1      0 12,500    939.1   3,931    0 87,500     1,567    7,275       0 89,600        
Number of households receiving 
remittances in the group of reference 2.6 2.2 0 11 2.5 2.4 0 9 1.6 1.8 0 9
Wealth of the group of reference (c) 4,706  3,915      546 20,926    7,657   5,847    586    30,385     12,285   7,514       3,093  37,123        
Distance to the nearest's capital of 
Department (d)
69 37 16 193 76 44 7 197 125 76 13 470
N 798 714 448
(a) Source : Own calculations based on MECOVI Survey for year 2000, Bolivian National Statistic Institute (INE).
(b)(c) Measured in US$.
(d) Measured in miles.
Altiplano Valles Llanos
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Table 3 - Cross-tabulation of Nonfarm income Vs. Remittances, by region 
	
Households	in	the	Altiplano	and	the	Valles	are	more	likely	to	receive	remittances	than	
households	in	the	Llanos.	Since	these	two	regions	are	poorer	compared	to	the	third	one,	this	
could	be	a	sign	that	altruism	is	a	stronger	motive	for	receiving	remittance	in	those	two	regions,	
and	that	their	constraints	in	terms	of	liquidity	are	more	severe.	Also,	Altiplano	farmers	diversify	
their	income	less	frequently	compared	to	ones	in	the	other	two	regions.	This	would	suggest	in	
turn	a	relatively	lower	willingness	to	do	it,	or	lower	means	to	do	it.	The	results	on	the	impact	of	
remittances	on	the	diversification	decision	will	provide	insights	regarding	these	hypotheses.	On	
the	other	hand,	the	statistics	also	show	that	income	diversification	is	more	widespread	in	the	
Llanos.	This	could	be	driven	by	a	stronger	willingness	to	undertake	risk‐spreading	strategies	in	
the	region,	and	that	households	in	that	region	have	more	successfully	found	ways	to	reduce	
liquidity	constraints.	The	Valles	region	is	more	of	a	mixed	story,	with	higher	number	of	
households	receiving	remittances,	but	a	relatively	high	proportion	of	them	involve	in	nonfarm	
employment.	Here	we	also	want	to	investigate	and	bring	some	insights	regarding	the	role	of	
remittances	in	the	diversification	strategies,	in	these	high	prone	nonfarm	employment	regions.	
Table 3. Cross-tabulation of Nonfarm income Vs. Remittances, by region(a)
NONFARM INCOME =0 NONFARM INCOME =1 Total
REMITTANCES =0 61% 21% 82%
REMITTANCES =1 14% 3% 18%
Total 75% 25% 100%
NONFARM INCOME =0 NONFARM INCOME =1 Total
REMITTANCES =0 51% 32% 82%
REMITTANCES =1 11% 6% 18%
Total 62% 38% 100%
NONFARM INCOME =0 NONFARM INCOME =1 Total
REMITTANCES =0 54% 35% 89%
REMITTANCES =1 6% 5% 11%
Total 60% 40% 100%
(a) Source : Own calculations based on MECOVI Survey for year 2000, Bolivian National Statistic Institute (INE).
Altiplano
Valles
Llanos
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The	full	information	maximum	likelihood	estimates	from	the	bivariate	probit	model	are	given	in	
Table	4.	As	mentioned	already,	the	estimator	is	consistent	and	fully	efficient	for	all	the	
parameters	in	the	model.	Each	set	of	results,	marked	with	a	number	at	the	top,	show	the	
estimates	of	the	remittances	outcome	equation	in	the	second	column,	and	the	estimates	for	the	
presence	of	nonfarm	income	in	the	first	column.	Column	(1)	includes,	in	the	nonfarm	income	
equation,	the	remittances	discrete	variable,	all	the	household	characteristics	and	human	capital	
variables,	along	with	a	social	network	variable	(wealth	of	the	group	of	reference),	and	a	
contextual	variable	(distance	to	the	nearest	capital	of	Department).	The	specification	of	land	in	
the	diversification	equation	is	the	total	value	of	the	asset,	and	it	acts	as	the	exclusion	restriction	
that	helps	identify	the	presence	of	the	remittances	equation.	The	remittances	equation	on	the	
other	hand,	also	includes	the	same	household	characteristics	and	human	capital	variables,	as	
well	as	the	same	social	network	and	contextual	variables.	Additionally,	we	also	add	the	
household’s	land	assets	per	capita,	and	the	number	of	households	receiving	remittances	in	the	
group	of	reference.	These	two	variables	are	the	exclusion	restrictions	that	identify	the	nonfarm	
income	equation.	 	
‐	35	‐	
	
	 	
Table 4 - Bivariate probit model estimates 
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As	we	can	see	from	this	first	set	of	results,	remittances	are	highly	and	positively	related	to	
diversification.	The	head’s	level	of	schooling,	household	total	years	of	schooling,	and	income	of	
the	reference	group	each	have	positive	and	significant	impacts	on	the	probability	of	income	
diversification.	The	results	on	the	total	years	of	education	for	the	household	are	quite	
interesting.	Given	the	signs	of	the	coefficients,	there	exists	a	minimum	education	level	(i.e.	1.5	
years)	above	which	the	impact	of	education	on	the	probability	to	diversify	income	is	not	only	
positive,	but	increasingly	positive.	Below	such	threshold,	the	impact	is	negative	which	can	be	
interpreted	as	for	those	extremely	low	education	levels,	the	returns	to	education	from	farm	
work	and	from	nonfarm	work	are	similar.	The	coefficient	of	the	land	assets	variable	is	
significant	and	with	the	expected	sign,	but	since	its	magnitude	is	quite	small,	the	impact	of	the	
variable	is	almost	negligible.		
In	turn,	the	remittances	decision	is,	as	expected,	positively	affected	by	the	age	of	the	
household’s	head	and	adversely	impacted	by	the	number	of	male	adults.	In	terms	of	human	
capital,	the	head’s	number	of	years	of	education	reduces	the	probability	of	receiving	
remittances.	The	more	educated	the	head	of	the	household,	the	less	likely	to	receive	
remittances	due	to	a	loosening	liquidity	constrain.	The	number	of	dependents,	the	income	of	the	
reference	group,	the	value	of	land	assets	per	capita,	and	distance	to	the	nearest	capital	of	
Department,	have	no	effect	on	the	propensity	of	remittances.	Finally,	the	results	show	that	
migration	networks	are	an	important	consideration	for	remittances.		The	higher	the	number	of	
households	in	the	social	network	who	receive	remittances,	the	higher	the	probability	for	each	of	
them	to	receive	remittances	as	well.		
In	terms	of	the	correlation	coefficient	between	the	two	structural	disturbances,	rho,	it	has	an	
estimated	value	of	‐0.33.	Given	the	standard	error	for	the	parameter	(0.13),	the	Wald	statistic	
for	the	hypothesis	that	ߩ ൌ 0	is	6.06	which	is	greater	than	the	critical	value	for	߯ଶሾଵሿ.	This	result	
‐	37	‐	
	
suggests	the	likely	existence	of	unobservable	characteristics	of	the	households	that	influence	
both	outcomes.	An	asymptotic	similar	test	to	the	Wald	statistic	was	also	obtained	automatically	
after	the	estimation	of	the	model	of	Column	(1).The	value	of	a	likelihood‐ratio	test	of	
ߩሺߝଵ, ߝଶሻ ൌ 0	again	confirms	our	earlier	results.	With	a	test	statistic	of	5.54,	the	null	hypothesis	
is	rejected	at	the	5%	level	of	significance.64	Therefore,	the	simultaneous	estimation	of	both	
equations	appears	to	be	justified	relative	to	the	estimation	of	independent	probit	models.	The	
bivariate	probit	is	thus	consistent	and	provides	fully	efficient	estimates	for	our	model	(Greene	
1998).	The	negative	sign	of	the	correlation	coefficient	implies	that	unobserved	and/or	
unmeasured	factors	that	increase	the	probability	of	receiving	remittances	also	decrease	the	
nonfarm	income	diversification	propensity.	Finally,	as	Greene	and	Seaks	(1998)	show,	the	
results	of	the	likelihood‐ratio	test	can	also	be	used,	asymptotically,	as	a	Hausman	test	for	the	
exogeneity	of	the	remittances	discrete	outcome	in	the	diversification	equation.	This	means	that	
the	correlation	results	also	suggest	that	receiving	remittances	is,	as	expected,	an	endogenous	
variable	in	the	model.	Its	positive	and	highly	significant	coefficient	confirms	the	role	of	
remittances	in	relaxing	capital	constraints	that	frequently	prevent	rural	farmers	from	
diversifying	its	sources	of	income.	
The	positive	and	significant	effect	of	remittances	on	the	nonfarm	income	diversification	
equation	remains	robust	to	different	specifications	of	the	model	as	it	is	shown	in	Table	3.	
Column	(2)	adds	two	dummy	variables	to	the	model	to	explore	the	possible	existence	of	
intercept	regional	differences.	The	first	one	includes	three	categories	to	distinguish	among	the	
three	geographic	regions,	and	the	other	aims	to	differentiate	the	regions	where	coca	leaves	are	
produced.	The	regional	dummies	for	the	Valles	and	Llanos	regions	are	found	to	be	significant	for	
																																																													
64	An	extensive	analysis	of	the	different	methods	available	to	test	the	hypothesis		ߩ ൌ 0,	in	simultaneous	equations	
models,	and	involving	limited	dependent	variables,	can	be	found	in	Monfardini	et.	al.	(2008).	
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the	nonfarm	income	equation,	(although	not	for	remittances),	but	the	one	for	the	coca	leaves	
production	region	is	not	significant	for	neither	of	the	equations.	65	
Independently	of	the	individual	significance	of	the	dummy	regional	variables,	we	also	need	to	
test	whether	they	altogether	significantly	improve	the	prediction	of	our	outcomes.		This	was	
done	using	the	likelihood‐ratio	test	of	the	null	hypothesis	
ܪ଴:	all	regional	dummy	coefficients	equal	to	zero.	Since	the	test	statistic	value	of	27.84	(݌‐value	
0.000)	was	significantly	larger	compared	to	the	relevant	critical	value,	there	was	sufficient	
evidence	of	the	joint	significance	of	the	regional	dummy	variable.66		
Based	on	those	results	and	on	the	rejection	of	the	equality	of	the	model	parameters	across	
regions	for	the	income	diversification	equation,	but	not	for	the	remittances	equation,67	the	last	
set	of	results	in	Table	4,	Column	(3),	includes	interaction	terms	for	the	three	regional	dummy	
variables	with	the	remittances	discrete	outcome	in	the	nonfarm	income	equation.	This	last	
specification	aims	to	provide	more	insights	regarding	the	existence	of	regional	effects	in	terms	
of	the	impact	of	remittances	on	the	nonfarm	income	diversification	decision.	The	resulting	
coefficients	show	that	two	out	of	three	regional	interaction	coefficients	are	positive	and	
significant	at	conventional	levels.	The	coefficient	for	the	Altiplano	region	is	positive	and	nearly	
significant	at	10%.	In	terms	of	magnitudes,	remittances	in	the	Llanos	have	a	larger	effect	on	
diversification	than	they	do	in	the	Valles	region.	
																																																													
65	The	Valles	and	Llanos	regional	dummies	coefficients	represent	deviations	with	respect	to	the	reference	category	
Altiplano,	which	has	been	dropped	as	customary	to	avoid	multicollinearity.			
66	We	also	run	the	test	including	a	dummy	variable	for	coca	leaf	production	regions	(1	if	the	household	is	located	in	a	
region	where	it	has	been	established	there	is	coca	production	and	0	otherwise);	the	results	confirmed	the	
appropriateness	of	the	inclusion	of	such	regional	dummy	variables	in	the	model.	
67	We	formally	tested	if	the	estimated	coefficients	for	the	three	agroclimatic	regions	were	equal	to	each	other	in	
terms	of	each	of	the	two	equations	in	the	model.	We	used	the	SUEST	test,	a	variation	of	the	Hausman	specification	
test	that	ensures	that	the	test	will	be	well	defined	(i.e.	the	estimator	of	the	variance	of	the	difference	between	the	
two	estimators	is	guaranteed	to	be	positive	semidefinite).	The	test	statistic	has	a	Chi‐square	distribution	with	k	
degrees	of	freedom	(White,	1982).	The	detailed	results	for	the	SUEST	test	are	found	in	Appendix	A.		
‐	39	‐	
	
Our	battery	of	specification	tests	includes	two	final	steps.	First,	we	need	to	make	sure	that	our	
interaction	terms	for	the	three	regions	are	jointly	significant,	and	hence	improve	the	
specification	of	the	model.	The	Hausman	test	of	the	constraint	that	those	coefficients	are	all	zero	
has	a	chi‐squared	distribution	with	3	degrees	of	freedom.	The	resulting	statistic	of	6.75	with	a	
݌‐value	of	0.07	allow	us	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	at	the	10%	level.	Secondly,	we	want	to	
know	if	our	regional	interaction	terms’	coefficients	are	all	statistically	equal	to	each	other.	Again	
for	this	purpose	we	use	a	Hausman	test	which	in	this	case	has	a	chi‐squared	distribution	with	2	
degrees	of	freedom.	The	test	statistic	of	2.47	with	a	݌‐	value	of	0.292,	tells	us	that	there	is	no	
enough	evidence	to	reject	the	null	hypothesis	of	equality.	This	of	course	could	have	been	
anticipated	based	on	the	almost	identical	coefficients	of	the	Altiplano	and	Valles	regions.		
It	is	worth	to	note	that	among	all	the	different	specifications	in	Table	4,	the	control	variables	
have	always	maintained	their	sign	and	significance	level.	
Before	examining	the	magnitudes	of	the	marginal	effects,	one	more	check	of	the	specification	is	
performed.	A	consistent	estimation	of	the	parameters	depends	on	the	exogeneity	of	
diversification	in	the	remittances	equation.	If	it	is	endogenous	then	the	system	is	not	fully	
recursive	and	the	estimates	will	not	be	meaningful.	Although	this	proposition	is	not	directly	
testable,	the	possibility	that	the	causality	should	be	reversed	can	be	explored.		To	that	effect	the	
model	is	estimated	treating	the	diversification	as	being	determined	by	all	of	its	factors,	save	
remittances,	and	treating	diversification	as	an	endogenous	determinant	of	remittances.	This	
basically	flips	the	model	around;	if	diversification	is	insignificant	in	the	remittances	equation	
then	we	have	indirect	evidence	that	the	two	are	not	jointly	determined.	
Thus,	another	bivariate	probit	model	is	estimated,	but	this	time	with	the	nonfarm	income	
variable	as	endogenous	variable	in	the	remittances	equation.	The	estimated	coefficient	is	‐0.36	
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with	a	standard	error	of	1.03.	These	results	are	consistent	with	the	original	specification	that	
remittances	affect	diversification	and	not	vice	versa.		
As	it	is	widely	known,	only	the	sign	and	statistical	significance	can	be	directly	interpreted	from	
the	estimated	coefficients	of	a	binary	choice	model;	as	Winkelmann	et.al.	(2006)	explain,	the	
parameter	estimates	ߚଵ, ߚଶ	and	ߛ	in	our	model	do	not	directly	measure	the	marginal	effect	of	
each	ݔ௜	on	the	binary	response	variables.	The	marginal	probability	effect	is	then	what	we	need	
to	estimate.	Such	effect	of	remittances	on	nonfarm	income	diversification	was	computed	as	the	
change	in	the	diversification	probability	when	the	remittances	dummy	variable	changes	from	
zero	to	one,	and	all	other	variables	are	fixed	at	their	means.	The	marginal	effect	for	the	Valles	is	
0.19,	and	for	the	Llanos	0.29,	both	coefficients	highly	significant;	that	is,	the	nonfarm	income	
propensity	of	rural	households	that	receive	remittances	is	19	and	29	percentage	points,	
respectively,	higher	than	that	of	non‐receiving	remittances	households.	The	marginal	effect	for	
the	Altiplano	is	relatively	smaller,	but	statistically	insignificant	at	conventional	levels.	
Table 5 - Estimated Marginal Effects 
	
Table 5. Estimated Marginal Effects
Variable        Total effect Z Type of variable
Age of the household head 0.001 1.860 Continous
Number of households receiving remittances 0.017 11.430 Continous
Land assets 0.000 0.570 Continous
Number of male adults -0.035 -2.840 Continous
Head's years of schooling 0.011 2.310 Continous
Number of children -0.006 -1.090 Continous
Household total years of schooling 0.003 2.430 Continous
Wealth of the group of reference 0.000 2.730 Continous
Land assets per capita 0.000 -1.990 Continous
Distance to the nearest's capital of 0.000 -0.620 Continous
Coca production region (1=yes; 0=no) 0.348 1.420 Binary
Valles  (1=yes; 0=no) 0.007 1.080 Binary
Llanos  (1=yes; 0=no) 0.011 1.150 Binary
Remittances * Valles 0.191 3.560 Endogenous
Remittances * Llanos 0.291 2.970 Endogenous
Remittances * Altiplano 0.088 1.560 Endogenous
Nonfarm income equation
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The	estimated	marginal	effects	of	the	variables	in	the	nonfarm	income	diversification	equation	
are	given	in	Table	5.		The	derivation	of	the	formulas	for	such	effects	of	a	binary	variable,	and	
that	of	a	continuous	variable,	on	a	bivariate	probit	model	are	shown	in	detail	in	Greene	(1998).	
Note	here	that	the	marginal	effect	of	a	variable	in	the	nonfarm	income	diversification	equation	
may	be	a	sum	of	two	terms.	In	the	case	in	which	a	variable	appears	in	both	of	our	equations,	one	
will	be	the	direct	effect	of	such	variable	on	Equation	(2.1),	and	the	other	one	will	be	the	indirect	
effect	of	the	underlying	variable	on	equation	(2.1),	through	the	second	equation	(i.e.	age	of	the	
head	of	the	household	or	number	of	kids	in	the	household).	A	second	case	occurs	when	a	
variable	appears	just	in	the	nonfarm	income	diversification	equation,	in	which	case	the	effect	of	
the	explanatory	variable	is	direct	(i.e.	the	endogenous	variable	remittances	interacting	with	the	
regions,	and	land	assets).	We	yet	have	a	third	possibility	for	other	variables,	such	as	land	assets	
per	capita,	that	only	appears	in	the	remittances	equation,	and	which	marginal	effect	on	nonfarm	
income	diversification	decision	will	be	indirect.	
2.6 Conclusions		
	
This	paper	uses	a	nationally‐representative	household	survey	to	study	the	role	of	migration	
remittances	in	nonfarm	income	diversification	strategies	in	Bolivia.	There	are	three	main	
findings.	
First,	and	according	to	the	literature,	migration	remittances	represent	a	complementary	income	
source	for	rural	households	since	they	provide	them	with	liquidity.	The	calculation	of	the	
marginal	probability	effects	show	that,	at	the	national	level,	nonfarm	income	propensity	of	rural	
households	that	receive	remittances	is	13	percentage	points	higher	than	that	of	non‐receiving	
remittances	households.		
‐	42	‐	
	
Second,	the	results	also	suggest	that	the	variable	remittances	is,	in	fact,	endogenous	and	with	a	
significant	effect	on	nonfarm	income	diversification;	not	taking	this	effect	into	account	could	
result	in	biased	and	inconsistent	estimates.	The	significance	of	the	correlation	coefficient	
justifies	the	use	of	the	biprobit	estimation	model.	
Third,	accounting	for	the	existence	of	significant	regional	differences,	the	paper	finds	that	
remittances	has	a	substantial	positive	effect	on	nonfarm	income	diversification	in	the	Valles	
(with	a	marginal	effect	of	0.19)	and	Llanos	(with	a	marginal	effect	of	0.29)	regions,	but	not	in	
the	Altiplano.	These	results	are	consistent	with	the	profile	outlined	for	the	existence	of	two	
different	types	of	rural	farmers	in	the	country.	The	small	poor	farmers,	mainly	located	in	the	
Andean	region,	are	viewed	as	practicing	subsistent	farming,	where	the	reception	of	remittances	
may	have	the	sole	objective	of	supporting	consumption.	In	the	other	two	regions,	however,	the	
existence	of	capitalist	farming,	oriented	to	the	domestic	as	well	as	foreign	markets,	could	help	
explain	the	stronger	willingness	among	those	farmers	to	undertake	risk‐spreading	strategies.	
The	imperfect	and	sometimes	inexistent	insurance	and	credit	markets	make	them	search	for	
diversified	income	sources	off	the	farm.	Hence,	remittances	are	used	in	those	two	regions	as	a	
source	of	liquidity	that	could	help	compensate	the	imperfect	functioning	of	the	capital	and	
credit	markets	in	the	country.	
This	paper	uncovers	the	significance	of	an	additional	positive	role	of	migration	remittances	for	
poor	farmers.	Their	presence	help	reduce	liquidity	constraints	allowing	rural	households	to	
increase	their	propensity	to	diversify	income	out	from	the	farm	using	those	resources.	The	
regional	differences	found	in	terms	of	this	role	and	their	relation	with	different	profiles	of	
farmers,	make	this	research	work	quite	relevant	for	most	developing	regions.	
Finally,	our	findings	regarding	the	additional	positive	effect	that	migration	remittances	
represent	for	small	poor	farmers	clearly	reinforce	the	pertinence	of	policies	that	facilitate	these	
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transfers	in	terms	of	transaction	costs	and	the	development	and/or	strengthening	of	a	financial	
structure.	It	has	been	shown	that	major	improvements	can	be	done	in	these	regards	in	most	of	
the	developing	world.		
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CHAPTER	III	–	LAND	SIZE,	DISTORTIONS,	AND	MARKET	IMPERFECTIONS	IN	
EXPLAINING	THE	EXISTENCE	OF	SUBSISTENCE	FARMERS	IN	BOLIVIA	
 
3.1 Introduction	
	
With	an	annual	US$	1,363	of	GDP	per	capita68,	Bolivia	is	among	the	poorest	countries	in	
Latin	America,	and	the	poorest	compared	with	its	proximate	neighbors69.		Poverty	is	
particularly	prevalent	in	rural	areas	where	80%	of	the	population	is	poor	compared	with	
53%	of	the	urban	areas.	The	distribution	of	the	national	income	is	highly	unequal,	especially	
in	the	rural	area,	with	a	rural	Gini	coefficient	of	0.63.70	There	are	also	striking	differences	at	
the	regional	level,	a	GDP	per	capita	of	US$	3,033	in	the	department	of	Tarija	which	is	
geographically	located	in	the	Valleys,	compared	with	the	US$	1,972	for	the	department	of	
Pando	located	in	the	Lowlands,	or	with	the	US$	1,003	of	the	department	of	Potosi	located	in	
the	Andean	region.	
Bolivia’s	share	of	the	rural	population	in	total	population	is	still	high	(36%)	compared	to	the	
average	of	its	surrounding	neighbors	or	to	the	average	of	Latin	America	(around	22%	in	
both	cases)71.	However,	and	despite	the	fact	that	the	country	had	one	of	the	highest	
percentages	of	rural	population	at	its	Independence,	the	rate	of	decrease	in	its	rural		
																																																													
68	The	Gross	Domestic	Product	(GDP)	numbers	have	been	taken	from	INE	(2008);	they	are	preliminary	data	for	
the	years	2006‐	2007.	
69	Latin	America	includes	18	economies:	Argentina,	Bolivia,	Brazil,	Chile,	Colombia,	Costa	Rica,	Dominican	
Republic,	Ecuador,	El	Salvador,	Guatemala,	Honduras,	México,	Nicaragua,	Paraguay,	Perú,	República	
Bolivariana	de	Venezuela,	and	Uruguay.	Bolivia	is	bordered	by	Argentina,	Brazil,	Chile,	Peru	and	Paraguay.	
70	The	country’s	urban	Gini	is	0.55.Data	for	poverty	and	inequality	comes	from	CEPAL	(2006).		
71	Ibid.	CEPAL	2006.	
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population	has	been	greater	than	the	decrease	in	the	rest	of	its	neighboring	countries,	
closing	the	gap	between	its	rural	participation	ratio	and	the	average	of	the	region.	
Among	the	population	in	the	rural	sector	in	2006,	76%	was	considered	poor	according	to	
the	INE	(Bolivian	Bureau	of	Census),	compared	with	60%	for	the	whole	nation72.	Despite	the	
high	incidence	of	poverty	in	the	country,	however,	it	has	been	decreasing	slowly	during	the	
last	decades,	especially	in	the	rural	area.	
The	strategies	that	rural	households	have	used	to	overcome	poverty	are	varied.	As	
elsewhere,	in	Bolivia	the	more	important	ones	are	diversification	out	of	farm	activities	and	
migration,	both	of	which	most	of	the	time	complement	the	income	coming	from	farm	work	
(UDAPE,	2004)73.	Nevertheless,	farm	income	remains	the	most	important	means	of	earning	
a	living,	accounting	for	52%	of	the	income	of	rural	households.74	Even	though	the	
importance	of	farm	income	is	unquestionable	for	all	regions	of	the	country,	regional	
differences	arise	across	the	three	agroclimatic	regions.	The	percentage	of	the	rural	
household’s	income	coming	from	farm	work	is	around	50%	in	the	Altiplano	and	Central	
Valleys,	and	64%	for	the	Lowlands	households.75	
The	most	important	factor	of	production	and	asset	for	rural	farmers	has	traditionally	been	
land.	It	contributes	to	wealth	not	just	directly	as	an	input	of	production	or	because	it	is	a	
way	of	accumulation,	but	it	also	might	allow	its	owners	the	possibility	of	access	to	capital	
(credit)	when	it	can	be	used	as	collateral	(especially	in	an	environment	where	production	
risk	cannot	be	insured),	or	it	can	entail	some	status	among	neighbors	or	relatives.		
																																																													
72	Data	source:	INE’s	web	page	www.ine.gov.bo,	downloaded	October	2008.	
73	UDAPE	is	the	State	Unit	of	Economic	Policy	Analysis.	
74	Farm	income	includes	agriculture,	livestock	and	derived	products.	
75	Jimenez	and	Lizarraga	(2003).	
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The	fact	that	land	is	a	source	of	income	for	rural	households	has	been	widely	shown	in	
empirical	studies	across	the	developing	world,	where,	e.g.,	per	capita	income	was	found	to	
be	positively	correlated	to	the	area	of	land	owned,	controlling	for	other	possible	
determinants	of	income.76	Therefore,	land	ownership	is	potentially	a	good	instrument	for	
reducing	rural	poverty,	an	assertion	verified	by	different	analysts.77			
After	more	than	two	decades	of	intense	theoretical	and	empirical	analysis	of	the	production	
relationships	in	agrarian	economies	such	as	those	of	Latin	America,	where	land	and	market	
imperfections	may	explain	land‐size	and	productivity	relationship,	Bolivia	presents	a	case	
study	that	is	characteristic	of	those	studies.	The	highly	unequal	bimodal	land	ownership	
structure	present	in	Latin	America	is	even	more	striking	in	Bolivia.	According	to	the	last	
Bolivian	agricultural	census,78	the	size	of	about	70	percent	of	the	farms	does	not	exceed	five	
hectares.	The	small	farms	cover	only	3.7%	of	the	total	farm	area.	On	the	other	end	of	the	
spectrum,	about	3.7%	of	the	holdings	occupy	about	90%	of	the	farm	area.79	
The	country	faces	rural	market	failures	and	legal	barriers	that	prevent	small	poor	farmers	
from	accessing	credit.	Using	a	nationally	representative	survey	database	conducted	by	the	
INE,	and	using	nonparametric	techniques,	this	work	shows	that,	under	certain	conditions,	
small	farmers	have	a	low	and	negative	marginal	income	value	of	land	compared	to	large	
farmers.	We	model	two	types	of	agents	who	face	different	constraints	and	hence	face	
different	optimum	conditions.	
The	rest	of	this	essay	is	organized	as	follows.	Section	3.2	provides	a	review	of	the	relevant	
literature.	Section	3.3	presents	the	theoretical	framework	from	which	the	marginal	income	
effects	of	land	are	derived	for	small	and	large	farmers.	Section	3.4	briefly	explains	the	
																																																													
76	See	for	example	Scott	(2000)	for	Chile,	or	Gunning	et	al.	(2000)	for	Zimbabwe.	
77	See	for	example	Warriner	(1969)	and	Dorner	(1992).	
78	The	last	agricultural	census	in	Bolivia	was	conducted	in	1984,	and	there	is	no	other	source	of	up‐to‐date	data.	
79	World	Bank	(1995).	
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econometric	model	used	to	estimate	the	non‐linear	relationship	between	land	endowments	
and	productivity.	Section	3.5	describes	the	dataset	and	the	specification	of	the	model.	
Section	3.6	presents	and	discusses	the	results.	Finally	Section	3.7	concludes.	
3.2 Literature	Review		
	
This	section	provides	a	review	of	the	relevant	theoretical	and	empirical	literature	in	order	
to	position	the	current	work	in	the	context	of	the	existing	research.	
Feder	(1985)	explains	that,	based	on	the	rural	production	patterns	in	the	less	developed	
countries,	the	relationship	between	farm	size	and	its	productivity	can	be	direct,	inverse,	or	
do	not	vary	systematically	at	all.	The	author	assesses	that	the	existence	of	distortions	in	the	
relevant	rural	markets	i.e.	(land,	insurance,	credit	and	labor)	potentially	reconcile	the	
conflicting	results.	
Binswanger	et	at.	(1995)	demonstrate	that	distortions	or	imperfections	in	a	single	rural	
market,	however,	are	not	sufficient	conditions	for	the	existence	of	a	systematic	relationship	
between	farm	size	and	its	productivity	to	appear.80	The	existence	of	distortions	in	at	least	
two	markets	can	introduce	systematic	relationship	between	the	two	variables.	Thus,	the	
presence	of	multiple	market	distortions	could	explain	a	variety	of	farm	size	distribution	and	
productivity	structures.	
As	it	is	widely	known,	the	production	relationships	in	agrarian	economies	of	the	developing	
world	are	characterized	by	the	absence	of	certain	markets,	or	by	their	imperfect	existence	
(Stiglitz,	1986).	Bardhan	(1989)	uses	the	economic	theory	of	information	to	explain	that	
capital,	labor	and	land	markets	are	all	intrinsically	imperfect	in	agrarian	economies.	
																																																													
80	The	authors	explain,	for	example,	that	if	credit	is	rationed	according	to	farm	size,	but	the	rest	of	the	markets	
are	not	imperfect,	land	and	labor	market	transactions	will	produce	a	farm	structure	that	equalizes	yields	
across	farms	of	different	size.	
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Asymmetric	information,	covariance	risk	and	incentive	problems	account	for	the	absence	of	
the	insurance	market,	as	well	as	for	the	inability	of	the	credit	market	to	be	a	feasible	
substitute	for	it.81	Labor	markets,	on	the	other	hand,	face	imperfections	due	to	asymmetric	
information	and	incentive	problems,	as	well	as	due	to	market	seasonality	of	farm	operations	
and	labor	demand.	These	characteristics	not	only	increase	labor	costs,	but	can	also	cause	
unemployment	and	underemployment.	Finally,	covariate	risk,	imperfect	credit	markets,	and	
policy	distortions	can	affect,	in	turn,	the	perfect	functioning	of	land	sale	markets	as	well.82	
Carter	and	Kalfayan	(1989)	analyze	that,	given	the	existing	market	imperfections	in	the	
developing	world,	the	relationship	between	farm	size	and	productivity	can	be	represented	
by	a	U‐shaped	curve.		Based	on	their	analysis	of	a	Latin	American‐type	agrarian	structure,	
they	explain	that	the	relationship	between	land	size	and	productivity	is	based	on	the	
existence	of	a	dualistic	model	of	agriculture.83	There	is	a	small	farm	sector,	also	called	
traditional,	that	relies	on	family	labor,	faces	unemployment	and/or	underemployment,	but	
demands	fewer	resources	in	terms	of	supervision.	The	other	sector	(also	called	modern),	is	
comprised	by	large	farms	that	despite	their	advantages	(e.g.	lumpiness	of	management	
skills	and	machines,	better	access	to	credit,	and	other	risk‐diffusion	measures)	rely	on	hired	
labor	that	needs	to	be	supervised	to	be	efficient	(i.e.	it	demands	resources).	Concisely,	farm	
productivity	initially	declines	with	farm	size	mainly	due	to	the	constraints	in	access	to	
credit.	After	certain	land‐endowment	threshold	the	inverse	relationship	reverses	just	when	
credit	becomes	available	for	larger	landholders.		
																																																													
81	Binswanger	and	Rosenzweig	(1986)	explain	that	asymmetric	information	(e.g.	between	workers	and	
employers,	or	between	borrowers	and	lenders)	and	incentive	problems	(i.e.	moral	hazard,	adverse	selection	
and	screening	effects),	in	turn,	are	consequences	of	the	risks	faced	by	rural	households,	the	costs	of	acquiring	
information,	and	of	individuals	behavioral	characteristics.					
82	For	more	details	see	Binswanger	and	Rosenzweig	(1986).		
83	The	underlying	assumption	is	an	inactive	land	market.	For	more	details	see	Carter	and	Wiebe	(1990)	p.	9.	
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Empirical	evidence	for	this	U‐shaped	relationship	can	be	found	for	example	in	Carter	(1984)	
for	India	and	Carter	and	Wiebe	(1990)	for	Kenya.	More	recent	work	again	confirms	the	
limited	or	negative	effects	of	larger	land	endowments	for	small	farmers.	For	example,	using	
data	from	Pakistan	McCulloch	and	Baulch	(2000)	find	that	the	amount	of	rain‐fed	land	has	
no	effect	at	all	on	the	real	income	of	the	rural	households.	Imai	and	Gaiha	(2002)	use	data	
from	South	India	to	show	that	the	proportion	of	poor	households	actually	increases	
between	landless	and	small	farmers,	and	it	only	falls	as	it	moves	from	middle	to	large	
farmers.84	Gamba	and	Mghenyi	(2005)	for	Kenya	show	that	income	per	capita	increases	for	
three,	out	of	the	four	landholding	size	quantiles,	but	it	decreases	for	the	second	quantile	
compared	to	the	smallest	one.	The	rate	of	increase	of	income	rises	as	one	moves	toward	
larger	landholdings.	
There	is	some	empirical	evidence,	however,	that	acknowledge	that	the	only	relative	
advantage	for	small	farmers	is	related	to	the	productivity	of	land;	the	marginal	contribution	
of	the	asset	is	higher	for	small	farmers	than	for	larger	ones.	López	and	Valdés	(2000)	and	
their	co‐authors	present	evidence	from	six	case	studies	in	Latin	America,85but	warn	that	the	
impact	is	limited	in	terms	of	the	household’s	income.86	These	studies,	or	any	other	of	which	
we	are	aware	of,	have	not	included	Bolivia	in	its	analysis.		
The	results	found	by	López	and	Valdés,	regarding	the	higher	marginal	value	product	of	land	
for	small	farmers,	have	been	tested	by	de	Janvry	et.	al.	(2005)	with	data	from	Mexico	to	
show	that,	given	the	existence	of	market	imperfections	(market	failures),	a	small	amount	of	
land	can	create	large	income	gains	for	the	poorest	rural	households:	an	additional	hectare	of	
																																																													
84	Those	poor	for	6‐7	years.	
85	The	case	studies	were	for	Chile,	Colombia,	El	Salvador,	Honduras,	Paraguay,	and	Peru.	
86	As	the	authors	explain,	the	elasticities	of	land	they	find	suggest	that	a	10%	increase	in	land	would	raise	
income	per	capita	by	less	than	1.5%.	With	those	estimates,	for	the	income	contribution	of	land	to	be	
substantial	(rise	poor	households	income	above	the	poverty	line)	the	increase	of	the	landholdings	of	the	
poorest	should	be	more	than	sixfold	in	some	cases.	
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land	for	the	smallest	farmers	(land	holdings	less	than	one	hectare)	has	been	shown	to	have	
the	largest	marginal	contribution	to	income	among	all	landholdings,	increasing	their	
average	income	by	more	than	two	times.87The	assumption	behind	those	results	is	the	
increasing	credit	access	as	the	land	holdings	of	small	farmers,	increases.	
Bolivia	faces	rural	market	imperfections	and	market	failures	as	any	other	developing	
country.	Small	farmers	face	unemployment,	high	levels	of	underemployment,	and	a	rural	
environment	where	capital	markets	are	far	from	function	properly,	or	more	commonly	do	
not	exist.	Small	poor	farmers	bear	not	only	highly	unequal	distributions	of	income	and	land	
ownership,	but	also	confront	legal	barriers88	that,	coupled	with	the	market	barriers	(i.e.	
incredible	high	interest	rates)89,	ration	then	out	completely	from	accessing	credit.	The	large	
farmers,	on	the	contrary,	have	plenty	of	access	to	the	capital‐rationed	credit	market,	with	
the	available	capital	being	a	function	of	their	land	holdings	that	are	used	as	collateral.	Under	
such	conditions,	we	expect	for	Bolivian	farmers	a	marginal	wealth	effect	of	land	that	has	a	
“U”	shape.	As	Carter	and	May	(1999)	explain,	poverty	results	not	only	from	having	little	
land,	as	is	the	case	for	small	farmers,	but	also	from	being	constrained	in	the	ability	to	use	it	
effectively	and	gain	a	return	from	it.	
Therefore,	based	on	a	nationally	representative	survey	database	conducted	by	the	Bolivian	
Bureau	of	Statistics	(INE),	we	propose	to	test	that,	under	certain	conditions,	small	farmers	
may	not	have	positives	returns	from	larger	land	endowments	unlike	large	farmers	may	do.	
																																																													
87	The	different	income	gains	among	households	according	to	their	landholdings	means	that	the	marginal	
income	effect	of	land	(that	measures	the	impact	of	a	“unit”	change	in	land	over	income)	is	different,	favoring	
the	smallest.	In	terms	of	elasticities	the	impact	would	be	the	same	just	in	percentage	units.	
88	According	to	the	INRA	Law	(1996),	still	in	force	at	the	time	of	the	survey,	small	farmers	could	not	use	their	
land	as	collateral,	i.e.	ownership	of	small	farms	cannot	be	seized.	If	they	did	it,	they	were	going	to	be	
reclassified	as	a	medium	farmer	that	must	pay	taxes,	and	whose	property	(e.g.	land	holdings)	can	be	seized.	
89	Microfinance	institutions	do	offer	access	to	credit	to	small	borrowers	without	asking	for	any	collateral.	
However,	since	micro	loans	are	short‐term	are	rather	small	the	interest	rates	that	are	charged	are	quite	high,	
which	reflects	the	high	operational	costs	of	these	institutions	for	collecting,	and	the	riskiness	of	the	loans.	For	
more	details	see	(Valdivia	2004).	According	to	the	World	Bank	(1996),	the	average	loan	size	from	informal	
lenders	varies	between	US$	50	and	US$	500,	with	average	maturity	fluctuating	between	one	and	four	months,	
and	annual	interest	rate	as	high	as	50%	on	small	unsecured	loans.	
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In	this	research	work	we	derive	the	theoretical	land	productivity	expressions	to	support	
this	hypothesis	for	the	two	types	of	farmers	(i.e.	small	and	large)	conditioned	on	their	
respective	constraints.	We	obtained	the	equations	based	on	the	General	Equilibrium	Model	
develop	by	Carter	and	Kalfayan	(1989),	and	the	comparative	statics	approach	followed	by	
de	Janvry	et	al.	(2005).	We	make	use	of	the	slack	variables	approach	to	solve	the	Kuhn‐
Tucker	conditions	involved.	
In	terms	of	the	empirical	method,	this	work	uses	nonparametric	techniques	to	model	the	
relationship	between	land	holdings	and	its	productivity,	which	have	been	shown	to	more	
accurately	capture	the	nonlinearities	of	such	relationship	(de	Janvry	et	al.,	2005).	Using	data	
from	Mexico,	these	authors	propose	a	semiparametric	partial	linear	model	(PLR),	following	
Robinson’s	(1998)	method,	using	LOWESS	estimation,	and	a	bandwidth	of	0.8.	Our	paper	
takes	several	steps	forward	in	the	following	directions.	First,	in	terms	of	the	estimation	of	
the	semiparametric	PLR	model,	it	acknowledges	the	existence	of	both	continuous	and	
discrete	explanatory	variables	among	the	regressors,	which	urges	the	application	of	
nonparametric	estimation	techniques	that	differentiate	them	while	smoothing.	Li	and	
Racine	(2007)	propose	an	approach	that	uses	specific	kernel	density	estimators	for	each	
type	of	variable,	providing	gains	in	terms	of	efficiency	compared	to	the	widely	used	
nonparametric	frequency	approaches.	Second,	our	work	refines	the	selection	of	the	
smoothing	parameter,	using	least	squares	cross‐validation	(CV)	proposed	by	Li	and	Racine	
(2004).	As	it	is	widely	known,	smoothing	selection	using	data‐driven	methods	minimize	the	
risks	of	biasedness	and	oversmoothing,	usually	present	when	the	smoothing	parameter	is	
chosen	arbitrarily.	It	has	been	shown	that	the	CV	method	is	asymptotically	equivalent	with	
the	also	popular	Kullback‐Leibler	cross‐validation	method	(Hurvich	et	al.,	1998).		Third,	the	
specification	of	the	model	is	formally	tested	against	the	parametric	alternatives	to	ensure	its	
correctness.	We	use	the	Hiao	et	al.	(2007)	model	specification	method	since	it	concedes	the	
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existence	of	a	mix	of	continuous	and	categorical	variables	among	the	regressors,	which	
provides	power	gains	while	testing.	Four,	the	hypothesized	nonparametric	regressor	in	the	
PLR	model	is	conveniently	tested	in	terms	of	its	significance	using	a	test	statistic	develop	by	
Racine	(1997).	Additionally,	with	the	purpose	of	confirming	our	results	in	terms	of	their	
robustness,	the	paper	additionally	uses	the	Difference‐based	method	for	estimating	the	
semiparametric	PLR	model.	Yatchew	(1997)	proposes	such	approach.		
Finally,	a	regional‐type	analysis	is	performed	to	inquire	the	possibility	of	regional	
differences	in	terms	of	the	explanatory	variables	of	wealth,	and	more	importantly,	in	terms	
of	the	nonlinear	wealth	effect	of	land	proposed.	
3.3 Market	imperfections	and	productivity:	Theoretical	framework	
	
The	existence	of	legal	restrictions	regarding	land	use	as	collateral,	the	imperfect	and	
rationed	capital	market,	and	the	existing	labor	market	distortions	(supervision	costs	and	
underemployment),	are	all	characteristics	of	the	environment	in	which	farmers	take	
decisions	and	eventually	produce.	They	can	be	used	to	explain	differences	in	productivity	
between	the	two	broad	types	of	rural	producers	that	define	the	Bolivia’s	agriculture	sector	
(small	versus	large	farmers).	We	use	the	widely	known	theoretical	framework	of	Carter	and	
Kalfayan	(1989):	General	Equilibrium	Exploration	of	the	Agrarian	Question	to	build	our	
theoretical	model.	
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3.3.1 The	small	farmers	
	
A	household	that	cannot	access	the	imperfect	credit	market	(capital‐constrained),	needs	to	
supply	labor	to	the	market	in	order	to	meet	subsistence	needs	and	obtain	liquidity90,	and	
purchases	inputs	for	farm	production,	maximizes	an	income	equation	that	is	given	by:	91	
ܻ ൌ ܳ൫ܮ௙, ܫ, ܶ; ݖ൯ െ ݌ூܫ ൅ ݓ ߗሺܮ௦ሻ	 (3.1)
Where		ܳሺ∙ሻ	represents	the	production	function,	ܮ௙	is	the	household’s	time	allocation	to	
farm	work,	ܫ	are	non‐labor	purchased	inputs,	ܶ		is	land	endowment,	and	ݖ	denotes	
household	characteristics	and	factors	external	to	the	household	that	help	explain	income;	݌ூ	
and		ݓ	are	the	market	non‐labor	inputs	price	and	wage	per	unit	of	labor	time,	respectively.		
Under	seasonality	of	labor	demand	and	unemployment,	the	employment	specification	is	
given	by	ߗሺܮ௦ሻ,	which	is	the	number	of	days	employed	in	nonfarm	activities	as	a	function	of	
ܮ௦,	that	represents	the	days	supplied	to	the	labor	market,	with	ߗᇱ ൐ 0	and		ߗᇱᇱ ൑ 0.	In	this	
context,	ݓߗᇱ	represents	the	expected	earnings	from	a	marginal	unit	of	labor	supplied	to	the	
market.	Note	that	unemployment	may	push	an	individual	to	underemployment.92	
Additionally,	we	have	that	households	have	a	time	constraint	given	by	ܮ௦ ൅ ܮ௙	 ൌ ܮത.		
The	information	above	can	be	used	to	express	working	capital	needs	and	income	sources	as	
follows:93	
																																																													
90	The	model	assumes	that	a	household	that	supplies	off‐farm	labor	will	not	hire	in	labor.	
91	Price	of	the	famer’s	final	product	is	set	equal	to	1.	
92	According	to	Dooley	and	Prause	(2004)	underemployment	or	“inadequate	employment”	may	result	from	the	
existence	of	unemployment	which	makes	workers,	with	needs	and	responsibilities,	take	almost	any	job	
available	in	the	market.	Agricultural	workers,	i.e.,	currently	underproductive	due	to	highly	seasonal	
agriculture	work,	may	end	up	being	wage	employed	or	self‐employed	with	economic	inferior	conditions	
compared	to	the	peak‐season	jobs.		
93	Recall	that	production	is	roundabout	and	small	farmers	must	finance	its	subsistence	costs	and	the	costs	of	
purchased	inputs	with	wage	earnings.	
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݌ூܫ ൅ ܵ଴ ൑ ݓ ߗሺܮ௦ሻ (3.2)
where	ܵ଴	represents	the	family	subsistence	needs	less	savings.	Therefore,	Equation	(3.2)	
makes	it	clear	that	small	farmers’	production	costs	(working	capital)	can	be	solely	financed	
with	labor	market	earnings.		
To	solve	the	optimization	problem	of	these	households	we	let	the	Lagrangean	equation	be	
specified	by	ࣦ,	which	maximizes	household’s	income	subject	to	her/his	constraints,	and	the	
relevant	Lagrange	multiplier	denoted	with	the	lowercase	Greek	letter	ߤ,	which	represents	
the	capital	constraint	multiplier.	Appendix	A	shows	the	complete	set	up	of	the	small	famers,	
where	the	general	framework	is	developed	using	the	Kuhn‐Tucker	conditions,	and	the	final	
expressions	of	the	first‐order	conditions	are	derived.	Note	here	that	our	model	assumes	that	
the	small	farmers	face	capital	constrains,	which	joined	with	the	interior	solution	
assumption,	implies	that	these	agents	face	a	binding	capital	constraint	or	ߤ ൐ 0.		
Hence,	the	quantities	of	labor	and	non‐labor	inputs	will	be	chosen	to	fulfill	the	next	first	
order	conditions	that	maximize	the	constrained	household’s	income:	
߲ࣦ
߲ܮ௙ ൌ ݍ௟ െ ݓߗ
ᇱ ൅ ߤݓߗᇱ ൌ 0	
߲ࣦ
߲ܫ ൌ ݍூ െ ݌ூ ൅ ݌ூߤ ൌ 0	
(3.3)
According	to	Equation	(3.3),	inputs	are	used	by	these	farmers	until	marginal	factor	
productivities	are	equated	to	total	economic	costs.	This	means	that	family	labor	will	be	used	
until	its	marginal	productivity	(ݍ௟)	is	equal	to	the	expected	earnings	from	a	marginal	unit	of	
labor	supplied	to	the	market	(ݓߗᇱ),	minus	a	margin	given	by	the	shadow	price	of	the	
working	capital	(ߤݓߗᇱ).	The	latter	reflects	the	scarcity	of	working	capital	faced	by	small	
farmers,	which	lowers	their	productivity.	
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The	value	function	of	our	income	equation	(e.g.	the	objective	function	at	the	optimum	choice	
variables)	can	be	ultimately	written	as	a	function	of	prices,	household’s	endowment	of	
productive	assets,	and	other	household	characteristics	present	in	the	production	function	
that	determine	the	return	of	the	assets,	that	is:94	
ܻ∗ ൌ ܻሺݓ, ݌ூ, ܮ,ഥ ܵ଴, ܶ; ݖሻ	 (3.4)
If	we	differentiate	Equation	(3.4)	to	see	the	effect	of	an	increase	in	landholdings	on	income,	
we	get:95	
∂ܻ∗
∂ܶ ൌ ݍ் ൅ ቀݍ௟೑ െ ݓߗ
ᇱቁ ∂ܮ௙
∗
∂ܶ ൅ ሺݍூ െ ݌ூሻ
∂ܫ∗
∂ܶ 	 (3.5)
where	ܮ௙∗ 	and	ܫ∗	denote	the	optimum	values	of	our	choice	variables	ܮ௙	and	ܫ.	De	Janvry	et	al.	
(2005)	explain	that	in	the	presence	of	market	imperfections	(which	for	the	case	of	the	
capital	market	means	ߤ ൐ 0),	and	when	the	landholdings	of	small	farmers	can	be	used	as	
collateral	for	credit,	the	terms	in	parenthesis	are	positive,	and	are	interpreted	as	an	
additional	positive	income	effect	of	an	increase	in	landholdings,	due	to	a	hypothetical	
reallocation	of	production	inputs	and	the	existence	of	labor	unemployment	and	
underemployment.	96	
Under	the	market	imperfections	and	legal	provisions	framework,	explained	in	Section	3.2,	
we	do	not	expect	such	positive	additional	effect	of	land	for	Bolivian	small	famers,	and	
rather,	we	propose	that	any	increase	in	their	land	endowments	is	expected	to	have	the	usual	
positive	direct	effect	on	income,	but	also	a	negative	effect,	which	is	evident	when	we	
compare	the	first	expression	in	Equation	(3.3)	and	the	first	term	in	parenthesis	in	Equation	
																																																													
94	For	the	purpose	of	the	evaluation	of	the	income	impact	of	landholdings,	we	borrow	the	comparative	statics	
analysis	from	de	Janvry	et	al.	(2005).	
95	The	details	of	the	differentiation	procedure	and	how	we	obtain	Equation	(3.5)	are	in	Appendix	C.	
96	The	authors	explain	that	ߤݓߗᇱ	is	the	positive	difference	between	the	first	two	terms	of	the	first	first‐order	
condition	in	Equation	(3.3),	aspect	that	would	end	up	adding	a	positive	additional	effect	on	income	when	land	
assets	increase,	and	ߤ	is	also	assumed	to	be	positive.	The	same	logic	applies	to	ߤ݌௜.			
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(3.5).	Concisely,	the	total	income	effect	of	one	unit	increase	in	land	assets	for	the	small	
farmers	is	given	by:		
	∂ܻ
∗
∂ܶ ൌ ݍ் െ ߤݓߗ
ᇱ ∂ܮ௙∗
∂ܶ െ ߤ݌ூ
∂ܫ∗
∂ܶ 	 (3.6)	
The	reasoning	behind	Equation	(3.6)	is	as	follows.	First,	as	Kevane	(1996)	explains,	small	
farmers	with	liquid	assets	that	are	not	sufficient	to	meet	subsistence	needs	(argument	
highly	strengthen	by	the	fact	that	these	agents	have	no	access	to	the	imperfect	capital	
market	at	all),	will	have	to	allocate	some	labor	to	earn	wages,	as	already	explained.	But,	as	
land	endowments	increase,	it	is	expected	that	higher	amounts	of	inputs	are	going	to	be	
needed;	i.e.	the	farmer	need	to	devote	more	family	labor	hours	to	the	farm,	which	were	
initially	supplied	to	nonfarm	activities.	As	a	result,	part	of	the	resources,	e.g.	working	
capital,	provided	by	nonfarm	activities	would	be	lost.	Hence,	is	not	possible	to	say	a	priori	if	
the	increase	in	land	assets	will	ultimately	report	any	increase	in	income;	we	would	expect	
that	to	happen	if	ݍ்	is	greater	than	ߤݓߗᇱ ப௅೑
∗
ப் ൅ ߤ݌ூ
பூ∗
ப் .		
Secondly,	even	when	a	marginal	positive	effect	on	income	is	realized,	any	increase	in	
landholdings	will	rather	tighten	the	working	capital	constraint	since	the	demand	for	higher	
levels	of	inputs	is	not	accompanied	by	a	greater	availability	of	credit	or	of	any	other	
additional	source	of	income.		
The	marginal	value	of	land	will	only	start	to	increase,	through	the	reallocation	of	production	
inputs,	at	rather	larger	landholdings,	where	the	existing	legal	barriers	do	not	prevent	larger	
farmers	from	obtaining	credit	using	their	land	endowments.	As	it	was	explained	in	Section	
3.2,	it	is	not	just	that	a	small	farmer	cannot	use	his/her	land	endowments	as	collateral,	but	
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also	according	to	the	Bolivian	homestead	and	exempt	property	provisions97,	property	
cannot	be	seized	in	case	of	default	up	to	fifty	hectares.	Considering	that	around	90%	of	the	
famers	own	less	than	fifty	hectares,	we	can	expect	that	any	increase	in	the	marginal	value	of	
land	comes	to	landholdings	sizes	much	higher	than	the	land	endowments	of	the	poor	
farmers.	
To	sum	up	the	argument,	the	proposed	increase	in	the	marginal	product	of	land	due	to	an	
increase	in	landholdings	is	not	feasible	for	Bolivian	poor	farmers;	rather,	we	expect	a	falling	
marginal	income,	since	the	hypothetical	larger	land	endowments	could	not	be	used	
efficiently	in	production,	given	that	they	are	not	accompanied	by	increases	in	working	
capital,	and	hence	no	reallocation	of	family	labor‐time	is	possible.	
3.3.2 	The	large	farmers	
	
The	large	capital‐rationed	farmers	are	hypothesized	not	to	supply	labor	to	market	but	
rather	hire	labor,	and	choose	labor	and	non‐labor	purchased	inputs	to	maximize	their	
income,	can	be	characterized	by	the	following	income	equation:	
	ܳሺܮ, ܫ, ܶ; ݖሻ െ ݌ூܫ െ ݓܮௗ െ ݎߚሺܶሻ (3.7)
where,	aside	from	the	terms	already	explained,	ܮௗ	represents	hired	labor,	and	ݎ	is	the	
interest	rate	of	the	amount	of	credit	borrowed,	which	is	rationed	by	the	size	of	the	land	
assets	of	the	farmer	(ߚሺܶሻ).	These	large	farmers	are	in	turn	also	exposed	to	informational	
problems	that	give	rise	to	incentive	problems,	e.g.	the	hired	labor	needs	to	be	supervised	to	
be	incentivized	to	work	hard	(Binswanger	and	Rosenzweig,	1986).	Based	on	what	Carter	
and	Kalfayan	(1989)	proposed	for	such	an	environment,	we	assume	a	formal	hierarchical	
labor	supervision	technology	according	to	which	the	total	units	of	labor	(ܮ)	needed	in	
																																																													
97	See	World	Bank	(1996).			
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production	come	from	household	labor	ܮ௙,	which	is	self‐supervising	and	hence	one	unit	of	
the	input	produces	one	unit	of	effective	labor,	and	from	hired	labor	ܮௗ,	that	requires	
supervision.	Concisely:	
ܮ ൌ ܮ௙ െ ߜሺܮௗሻ ൅ ߛ଴ܮௗ (3.8)
Under	this	mode	of	supervision,	we	assume	a	constant	hired	labor	productivity	given	
by	ߛ଴ ൏ 1,	allowed	by	a	dedicated	supervisory	effort	given	by	ߜሺܮௗሻ,	with	ߜᇱ ൐ 0	and	ߜᇱᇱ ൑
0.	Additionally,	ߜሺ0ሻ ൐ 0	indicates	the	existence	of	fixed	costs,	which	represent	a	cost	
advantage	for	large	farmers	as	the	average	cost	of	labor	decreases	with	the	amount	of	labor	
hired.	Finally,	the	large	farmers	are	modeled	to	devote	all	his	endowment	of	time	(ܮത)	to	
farm	work,	that	is		ܮ௙ ൌ ܮത.	
The	most	important	assumption	of	the	large	famers’	model	lies	on	the	fact	that	their	
landholdings	allow	them	to	access	capital,	being	the	amount	of	the	credit	a	function	of	the	
size	of	the	land	they	own.	Therefore,	working	capital	needs,	e.g.	labor	and	non‐labor	inputs	
costs,	can	be	financed	through	credit.		
The	capital	needs	faced	by	these	agents	can	formally	be	written	as:	
݌ூܫ ൅ ݓܮௗ ൑ ߚሺܶሻ (3.9)
where	ߚሺܶሻ	is	the	amount	of	quantity‐rationed	working	capital	available	to	a	household	
with	land	endowment	of	size	ܶ,	which	is	used	to	finance	inputs.	Since	these	households	are	
also	hypothesized	to	be	capital‐constrained,	which	reminds	us	the	existence	of	an	imperfect	
capital	market,	we	once	again	assume	a	binding	capital	constraint,	which	implies	that	
is	ߤ ൐ 0.	
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As	we	did	in	section	0,	ࣦ	also	represents	the	Lagrangean	equation	that	maximizes	the	
household’s	total	income	subject	to	her/his	constraints,	and	ߤ	represents	the	Lagrange	
multiplier	for	the	capital	constraint,	or	its	shadow	price,	theorized	to	be	positive	according	
to	the	assumptions	of	a	binding	capital	constraint	and	a	interior	solution.	As	in	the	case	of	
the	small	farmers,	the	complete	set	up	of	the	maximization	problem	of	these	farmers	is	
developed	in	Appendix	C.		
The	maximization	problem	for	these	agents	with	labor	and	non‐labor	inputs	as	choice	
variables	leaves	us	the	following	first	first‐order	conditions:	
߲ࣦ
߲ܮௗ ൌ ݍ௟ሺߛ଴ െ ߜ
ᇱሻ െ ݓሺ1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߤሻ ൌ 0	
߲ࣦ
߲ܫ ൌ ݍூ െ ݌ூሺ1 ൅ ݎ ൅ ߤሻ ൌ 0	
(3.10)	
The	interpretation	of	the	equations	is	as	follows:	inputs	are	used	until	the	marginal	factor	
productivities	are	equated	to	their	real	economic	costs,	which	contains	two	parts.	For	the	
labor	input,	for	example,	we	have	the	direct	cost	that	appears	as	an	efficiency	wage,	or	the	
market	wage	paid	per	unit	of	effective	labor	input,	plus	the	borrowing	price	ݎ,	minus	the	
shadow	price	of	working	capital	(ߤ ൐ 0).98		
The	value	function	for	the	income	can	ultimately	be	written	as	a	function	of	prices	and	
household’s	endowment	of	productive	assets,	and	various	household	characteristics	that	
affect	the	return	of	the	assets,	that	is:	
ܻ∗ ൌ ܻሺݓ, ݌ூ, ݎ, ܮ,ഥ ܶ; ݖሻ	 (3.11)
																																																													
98	The	efficiency	wage	is	the	market	wage	marked	up	by	the	difference	between	the	constant	hired	labor	
productivity	and	the	increase	in	the	supervisory	cost	per	a	unit	increase	in	the	hired	labor.	Note	that	the	
greater	the	difference	between	them,	the	smallest	the	increase	of	the	efficiency	wage.	
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Since	our	aim	is	to	find	the	income	impact	of	an	increase	in	landholdings,	we	need	to	
differentiate	Equation	(3.11)	with	respect	to	land;	the	procedure	leads	us	to	the	following	
marginal	income	effect	of	a	one	unit	increase	in	land	endowments:99	
dܻ∗
dܶ ൌ 	ݍ் ൅ ൫ݍ௟ሺߛ଴ െ ߜ
ᇱሻ െ ݓሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ൯ ߲ܮௗ
∗
߲ܶ ൅ ሺݍூ െ ݌ூሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሻ
߲ܫ∗
߲ܶ 	 (3.12)
We	have	already	said	that	in	the	presence	of	perfect	markets,	the	Lagrange	multiplier	ߤ	
would	be	equal	to	zero,	which	together	with	our	FOC	in	Equation	(3.10),	would	lead	us	to	
set	the	second	and	third	terms	in	Equation	(3.12)	equal	to	zero	(e.g.	the	expressions	within	
the	parenthesis);	the	marginal	contribution	of	land	to	income,	therefore,	would	be	exactly	
equal	to	its	marginal	productivity.100	However,	since	the	markets	are	not	perfect,	
supervision	costs	and	access	to	rationing	working	capital	would	give	to	larger	farmers	the	
opportunity	to	obtain	not	just	a	direct	positive	effect	on	income,	but	also	indirect	benefits	
from	the	hypothetical	increase	in	their	landholdings.	These	results	can	be	visualized	in	
Equation	(3.13),	where	we	compare	the	expressions	in	Equation	(3.10)	and	the	terms	
within	the	parenthesis	in	Equation	(3.13),	obtaining	the	following	results:	
	dܻ
∗
dܶ ൌ ݍ் ൅ ߤݓ
dܮௗ∗
dܶ ൅ ߤ݌ூ
dܫ∗
dܶ 	 (3.13)
These	results	make	it	clear	that	the	access	to	working	capital	allows	larger	farmers	to	
increase	their	operations	and	the	usage	of	variables	inputs,	which	has	an	indirect	additional	
positive	effect	on	income	beyond	the	direct	marginal	product	effect	of	land	(ݍ்).	As	land	
endowment	increases	these	agents	are	able	to	access	more	credit	and	thus	increase	their	
working	capital,	which	will	enable	them	to	efficiently	use	their	larger	landholdings	by	
increasing	the	usage	of	inputs	of	production.	This	increase	will,	however,	lead	to	an	increase	
																																																													
99	The	details	of	the	differentiation	procedure	and	how	we	obtain	Equation	(3.11)	are	in	Appendix	C.	
100	See	that	under	perfect	conditions,	hired	labor	would	be	as	good	as	family	labor	in	terms	of	productivity.	
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in	costs,	but	since	these	agents	enjoy	cost	advantages	due	to	fixed	supervision	costs,	both	
effects	could	counter	balance	each	other.	Therefore,	the	final	effect	would	give	these	agents	
the	opportunity	of	increasing	operations	and	enjoy	increased	levels	of	productivity	as	land	
endowments	increase.	
3.4 Econometric	model		
	
Based	on	the	characterization	of	the	two	agents	and	the	conditioning	environment	in	which	
they	make	decisions,	we	need	to	estimate	a	model	in	which	the	relationship	between	land	
and	income	might	be	nonlinear,	i.e.	the	impact	of	a	unit	change	in	the	land	variable	is	
hypothesized	to	vary	over	the	size	of	the	holdings	owned	by	rural	farmers.	Therefore,	
instead	of	assuming	a	functional	form	of	the	income	regression,	which	depends	on	variables	
such	as	the	household’s	assets,	its	demographics,	and	on	the	contextual	characteristics	of	its	
proximate	environment,	this	study	will	estimate	a	flexible	form	that	permits	marginal	land	
effects	to	vary.	To	do	this,	local	estimates	or	nonparametric	regression	models	are	applied,	
as	they	will	allow	us	to	gain	a	more	representative	estimate	of	the	regression	function	
(Keele,	2008).101		
Nonparametric	regression	techniques	basically	use	the	data	to	estimate	the	value	of	the	
regression	function	at	a	given	point	using	neighboring	observations.	Their	flexibility	in	
regards	of	functional	form,	though,	is	greatly	offset	by	the	decrease	in	precision	and	
usefulness	when	several	explanatory	variables	are	included	nonparametrically	in	the	
regression	(Härdle	et	al.	2004).	As	Keele	(2008)	explains,	there	are	two	reasons	why	these	
models	are	less	useful	in	such	situations.	The	first	is	interpretation,	plots	of	more	than	two	
explanatory	variables	are	not	very	revealing.	The	second	is	the	curse	of	dimensionality	
																																																													
101	Global	estimates	are	those	models	in	which	the	analysis	assumes	a	functional	form	for	the	model.	Local	
estimation,	or	nonparametric	regression	models,	describes	the	statistical	dependency	between	two	variables	
not	with	a	single	parameter	but	with	a	series	of	local	estimates,	(Keele,	2008).				
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problem,	where	data	becomes	too	sparse,	and	hence	the	span	must	be	increased	to	a	point	
where	the	local	estimates	turn	to	be	highly	variable	and	less	local.102	
Therefore,	the	nature	of	the	main	relationship	considered	here	suggests	that	one	needs	to	
estimate,	rather	to	impose,	the	functional	form	of	the	relationship	between	land	holdings	
and	income.	However,	there	are	other	explanatory	variables	that	affect	income	but	have	
been	found	to	have	a	linear	effect,	and	hence	can	enter	the	model	in	a	parametric	fashion.		
Hence,	the	model	should	include	both	types	of	explanatory	variables,	which	is	precisely	
what	semiparametric	estimation	models	do.	If	it	is	additionally	assumed	that	the	
nonparametric	and	parametric	terms	can	be	separately	added	up,	the	income	equation	for	
each	household	can	be	expressed	as:	
ݕ௜ ൌ ݂ሺݐ௜ሻ ൅ ݔଵ௜ߚଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ݔ௞௜ߚ௞ ൅ ߝ௜ ݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊ (3.14)
where	ݕ	denotes	a	measure	for	wealth,	ݐ	stands	for	the	nonparametric	variable	in	the	
model,	i.e.	land	assets,	and	݂	is	a	smooth	function	whose	density	needs	to	be	estimated	from	
the	data	using	a	smoother.	ߚଵ, … , ߚ௞	are	the	model	parameters,	and	ߝ௜	are	the	error	terms	
assumed	to	be	independent	of	the	explanatory	variables	ݔଵ, … , ݔ௞	and	ݐ,	with	mean	zero	and	
variance	σ.2	103	Note	that	the	unique	assumption	regarding	݂	is	that	it	is	a	smooth	function.		
Adding	parametric	components	to	the	nonparametric	as	in	Equation	(3.14),	creates	the	
Semiparametric	Partially	Linear	(PLR)	model,	whose	estimation	is	outlined	in	the	following	
paragraphs.		
																																																													
102	For	nonparametric	regression	estimation	the	analysis	needs	to	construct	a	series	of	intervals	or	bins,	which	
widths	need	to	be	determined,	and	within	each	bin	the	dependent	variable	ݕ	is	estimated.	The	local	estimate	
is	the	predicted	value	of	ݕ	at	a	focal	point	ݔ଴.	Joining	the	predicted	values	produces	the	nonparametric	estimates.	When	using	nonparametric	regression	models,	the	choice	of	the	bandwidth	is	the	most	critical	
modeling	choice	to	take,	and	when	specified	as	the	proportion	of	the	observations	that	will	be	included	in	the	
window	(number	of	observations	used	in	the	local	estimation),	it	is	called	the	span.	Ibid.	pp:	28‐29,	(Keele,	
2008).	
103	Davidson	and	Mackinnon	(2004).	
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The	partially	linear	model	proposed	by	Robinson’s	(1988)	requires	five	steps	to	obtain	 መ݂.	
First	estimate	the	linear	coefficients	ߚመଵ, … , ߚመ௞.	The	conditional	expectation	of	ܻ	on	the	
explanatory	variable	ݐ	for	each	household	݅	in	Equation	(3.14)	is:104	
Eሺݕ௜|ݐ௜ሻ ൌ ݂ሺݐ௜ሻ ൅ Eሺݔଵ௜|ݐ௜ሻߚଵ ൅ ⋯൅ Eሺݔ௞௜|ݐ௜ሻߚ௞ (3.15)
Second,	subtract	Equation	(3.15)	from	Equation	(3.14)	gives:	
ݕ௜ െ Eሺݕ௜|ݐ௜ሻ ൌ ሾݔଵ௜ െ Eሺݔଵ௜|ݐ௜ሻሿߚଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ሾݔ௞௜ െ Eሺݔ௞௜|ݐ௜ሻሿߚ௞ ൅ ߝ௜	 (3.16)
Note	here	that	the	set	of	explanatory	variables	that	enters	the	model	in	an	ordinary	linear	
fashion	cannot	contain	a	constant	term.	The	subtraction	removed	the	nonparametric	
element	from	Equation	(3.15),	leaving	a	simpler	task	to	tackle.	Third,	once	the	estimates	for	
the	conditional	expectations	Eሺݕ௜|ݐ௜ሻ	and	Eሺݔଵ௜|ݐ௜ሻ, … , Eሺݔ௞௜|ݐ௜ሻ	are	obtained	through	
nonparametric	techniques,	Equation	(3.16)	becomes:105	
ݕ௜ െ ݕො௜ ൌ ሺݔଵ௜ െ ݔොଵ௜ሻߚଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ሺݔ௞௜ െ ݔො௞௜ሻߚ௞ ൅ ߝ௜ (3.17)
which	is	just	a	linear	regression	model	with	parameters	ߚଵ, … , ߚ௞	that	can	be	consistently	
estimated	by	ordinary	least	squares	(OLS).	Fourth,	the	unknowns	in	Equation	(3.14)	can	be	
replaced	by		ߚመଵ, … , ߚመ௞,	and	obtain:106	
ݕ௜ െ ݔଵ௜ߚመଵ െ ⋯െ ݔ௞௜ߚመ௞ ൌ ݕො௜ ൌ ݂ሺݐ௜ሻ ൅ ߝ௜	 (3.18)
Finally,	estimate	Equation	(3.18)	using	nonparametric	regression	to	obtain	 መ݂ሺݐ௜ሻ	using	a	
suitable	smoothing	procedure.	
																																																													
104	It	is	assume	that	ܧሺߝ௜|ݐ௜ሻ ൌ 0.	
105	With	a	suitable	choice	of	bandwidth	݄,	ݕො௜	and		ݔොଵ௜, … , ݔො௞௜	are	consistent	estimators	such	that	ݕ௜ െ ݕො௜	is	asymptotically	equal	to	ݕ௜ െ Eሺݕ௜|ݐ௜ሻ	and	ݔଵ௜ െ ݔොଵ௜, … , ݔ௞௜ െ ݔො௞௜	are	asymptotically	equal	to	ݔଵ௜ െ Eሺݔଵ௜|ݐ௜ሻ, … , ݔ௞௜ െ Eሺݔ௞௜|ݐ௜ሻ.	See	details	in	Davidson	and	Mackinnon	(2004),	pp:	689‐690.	
106	It	has	been	shown	that		ߚመଵ, … , ߚመ௞	are	√݊‐consistent	for	ߚଵ, … , ߚ௞	and	asymptotically	normal,	and	that	there	exists	a	consistent	estimator	of	its	limiting	covariance	matrix.	For	further	details	see	Robinson	(1988).	
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The	estimation	procedure	just	explained	requires	the	application	of	nonparametric	
techniques	twice,	and	a	simple	and	widely	used	approach	to	obtain	them	is	Kernel	
regression.	In	terms	of	Equation	(3.18),	 መ݂ሺݐሻ	is	obtained	by	regressing	ݕො௜	on	ݐ௜,	where:107	
መ݂ሺݐሻ ≡ ܧሺݕො௜|ݐ௜ሻ ൌ
∑ ݕ௜݇௜௝ሺݐ௜ െ ݐ௝݄ ሻ௡௝ୀଵ
∑ ݇௜௝ሺݐ௜ െ ݐ௝݄ ሻ௡௝ୀଵ
	 (3.19)
which	is	the	well‐known	Nadaraya‐Watson	estimator.108	݇	(kernel	function)	is	the	weighting	
function	for	the	continuous	variable	ݐ,	which	provides	weights	for	all	the	observations	
included	in	the	local	estimation;	it	typically	integrates	to	one	and	is	symmetric	around	
zero.109	The	parameter	݄	in	Equation	(3.19)	is	the	bandwidth	that	determines	the	number	of	
the	neighboring	observations	to	use	in	the	local	estimation.	As	it	controls	the	locality	of	the	
estimation,	it	is	highly	important	in	the	estimation	process,	and	hence	crucial	to	choose	it	
using	methods	that	minimize	the	risks	of	biasedness	and	oversmoothing.	One	of	such	data‐
based	methods	is	the	popular	least	squares	cross‐validation	(CV)	proposed	by	Li	and	Racine	
(2004).	According	to	it,	the	optimum	bandwidth	value	to	use	in	Equation	(3.19)	is	the	value	
of	݄	that	minimizes:	
ܥܸሺ݄ሻ ൌ ݊ିଵ෍ ሾݕ௜ െ
௡
௜ୀଵ
መ݂ି ௜ሺݐ௜ሻሿଶ	 (3.20)
where	 መ݂ି ௜ሺݐ௜ሻ	is	the	leave	one	out	nonparametric	estimator	of	݂ሺݐ௜ሻ,	that	is,	it	excludes	
observation	݅	when	the	prediction	for	it	is	being	compute.110	
																																																													
107	The	same	procedure	applies	for	Eሺݕ௜|ݐ௜ሻ	and	Eሺݔଵ௜|ݐ௜ሻ, … , Eሺݔ௞௜|ݐ௜ሻ,	except	for	the	type	of	kernel	function,	which	we	explain	shortly.	
108	Nadaraya	(1965),	and	Watson	(1964).	
109	The	kernel	function	used	for	the	continuous	land	variable	is	the	Second‐order	Gaussian.		
110	According	to	J.	S.	Racine	(2008),	the	CV	criterion	performs	reasonably	well	and	provides	the	best	fit	in	a	
variety	of	settings.	
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Robinson’s	method	outlined	above	also	demands	the	estimation	of	the	conditional	
expectations	Eሺݔଵ௜|ݐ௜ሻ, … , Eሺݔ௞௜|ݐ௜ሻ.	According	to	Racine	and	Liu	(2007),	the	variability	in	
the	estimates	of	those	expectations	will	be	reduced	if	appropriates	kernel	functions	are	
applied	depending	on	the	type	of	variable	involved.	For	instance,	the	authors	use	Aitchison	
and	Aitken’s	(1976)	kernel	function	for	unordered	discrete	variables	and	Wang	and	Van	
Ryzin’s	(1981)	kernel	for	ordered	discrete	variables.	
3.5 Data	
	
The	data	used	in	the	present	work	come	from	the	database	of	the	Program	for	the	
Improvement	of	Surveys	and	the	Measurement	of	Living	Conditions	in	Latin	America	and	
the	Caribbean	(MECOVI	for	its	acronym	in	Spanish)111,	which	is	conducted	by	the	INE	
(Bolivian	Bureau	of	Census),	and	provides	online	access.	It	collects	data	on	such	diverse	
topics	as	income,	expenditures,	education,	health,	employment,	food	consumption,	assets	
holdings	and	migration.		
The	MECOVI	surveys	have	been	conducted	annually	since	1999,	and	online	information	is	
available	from	the	surveys	conducted	during	1999	through	2002.	Since	each	survey	does	
not	track	the	same	households,	and	some	key	questions	are	not	asked	in	each	survey,	we	
perform	a	cross‐section	analysis	for	the	survey	of	the	year	2000.		
The	MECOVI	survey	covers	sample	units	from	urban	and	rural	households.	In	this	chapter	
the	focus	is	on	the	rural	sample	that	comprises	2,108	households,	or	9,092	persons,	over	
																																																													
111	The	Program	is	executed	by	the	World	Bank	(IBRD),	the	Inter‐American	Development	Bank	(IDB)	and	the	
United	Nations	Economic	Commission	for	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	(ECLAC),	as	well	as	specialized	
institutions	or	agencies	in	countries	participating	in	the	Program.	Subsequently	other	donors,	such	as	Canada,	
Denmark,	Germany,	Japan,	Norway,	Sweden,	UNDP,	USA,	and	the	Soros	Foundation,	have	supported	the	
Program	
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166	localities	in	the	nine	Departments	of	the	country.	112	Among	them,	we	are	interested	on	
those	that	are	farmers	and	for	which	we	can	measure	the	marginal	effect	of	land.	In	terms	of	
the	geographic	regions	there	are	588	households	from	the	Altiplano,	484	from	the	Valles,	
and	302	from	the	Llanos,	all	with	complete	information,	making	a	final	sample	size	of	1,374.	 
The	sampling	procedure	in	the	MECOVI	2000	combines	stratification	by	agglomerate	
population	size	and	a	two‐stage	sampling.	By	using	these	sampling	methods,	the	survey	is	
designed	to	reduce	bias	that	can	be	introduced	in	regards	of	what	household	is	included	in	
the	survey.	Additionally,	the	stratification	of	the	population	into	groups	ensures	that	the	
sample	is	representative	(INE	2000).	
Next,	we	specify	the	variables	involved	in	the	estimation	of	the	income	equation	outlined	in	
Section	3.3.	
3.5.1 The	dependent	variable	
	
The	variable	chosen	to	be	the	dependent	in	Equation	(3.14)	is	consumption	expenditure.	
This	is	a	broad	measure	of	the	household	wellbeing,	over	which	we	want	to	study	the	
impact	of	larger	land	asset	among	rural	farmers.	
The	reasons	for	preferring	consumption	over	income	as	a	proxy	for	well‐being	are	widely	
explained	elsewhere	(e.g.	Ravallion	2002,	and	Coudouel	et	al.	2002).	The	most	relevant	are:	
1)	it	is	more	closely	related	to	the	concept	of	having	enough	to	meet	current	basic	needs,	2)	
it	is	believed	to	be	better	measured	than	income	considering	that	in	poor	agrarian	
economies	income	flows	are	cyclical	and	erratic,	which	may	hinder	the	provision	of	income	
																																																													
112	From	the	total	2,108	households,	825	are	located	in	the	Andean	region,	756	in	the	Valleys	and,	527	in	the	
Lowlands.	The	survey	also	classifies	the	households	according	to	their	location	into	two	groups:	rural	
populated	centers	(212	households)	and	rural	dispersed	areas	(1896	households).	
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information	during	a	household	survey,	and	3)	consumption	better	reflects	the	ability	of	
households	to	meet	basic	needs	through	savings	and	credit.	
The	database	use	for	this	work	provides	detailed	information	regarding	consumption	
expenditure,	with	the	basic	unit	of	observation	being	precisely	the	household.		
3.5.2 The	independent	variables	
	
The	explanatory	variables	incorporated	in	the	welfare	equation	specification	can	be	
grouped	into	four	categories:	1)	human	capital,	specified	as	the	education	level	of	the	
household’s	head	and	the	total	number	of	years	of	education	in	the	household113,	2)	
household	characteristics	such	as	the	number	of	adults	and	the	number	of	children,	3)	
household	physical	assets	such	as	land	and	livestock,	and	4)	a	variable	that	controls	for	the	
contextual	characteristics	of	the	village	where	the	household	resides,	e.g.	distance	to	the	
nearest	capital	of	Department.		
Regarding	land	assets,	which	marginal	welfare	effect	is	believed	to	be	nonlinear,	the	2000	
survey	includes	the	value	of	the	asset	owned	by	the	household.	This	is	the	semiparametric	
variable	included	in	the	specification	of	Equation	(3.14).	
Given	the	striking	regional	differences	in	the	country,	a	set	of	regional	dummy	variables	is	
constructed,	with	three	categories	to	differentiate	among	the	three	agroclimatic	regions.	
Also,	given	its	relevance	in	the	agricultural	GDP,	another	dummy	variable	is	included	allow	
differences	between	regions	where	coca	leaves	are	produced	and	those	where	they	are	
not.114		
																																																													
113	The	possibility	of	correlation	between	these	two	variables	is	formally	tested	during	the	estimation	process.	
114	The	areas	where	coca	plantations	are	concentrated	are	the	tropical	valleys	of	the	Departments	of	
Cochabamba	(Central	Valleys)	and	La	Paz	(Altiplano).	Specifically,	coca	plantations	are	cultivated	in	the	
Chapare	and	Yungas	regions.		
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3.6 Estimation	Results	
	
Table	6	lists	the	variables	we	use	in	the	estimation	of	Equation	(3.14),	along	with	their	
means,	standard	deviations,	maximum	and	minimum	values,	for	the	entire	or	national	
sample,	as	well	as	for	the	three	contrasting	geographic	regions	of	the	country.	As	it	shows,	
consumption	expenditure,	the	variable	used	as	the	dependent	in	the	semiparametric	partial	
linear	model	(semiparametric	PLR),	varies	considerably	among	regions	in	a	range	that	goes	
from	US$.	65.2	to	US$.	155.3;	e.g.	the	average	value	for	the	Highlands	is	40	percent	and	60	
percent	smaller	compared	to	the	average	consumption	expenditure	in	the	Valley	and	
Lowplains	regions,	respectively.		Note	that	the	standard	deviation	for	these	two	regions	is	
significantly	larger	as	well.	
Concerning	human	capital	variables,	there	are	no	significant	regional	differences	in	terms	of	
the	average	of	the	household’s	head	years	of	education,	which	its	overall	level	is	four	years.	
However,	for	the	second	measure	of	human	capital,	i.e.	total	number	of	years	of	schooling	in	
the	household,	a	typical	family	in	the	Llanos	has	between	three	and	four	years	more	
schooling	in	average	than	their	peers	in	the	other	two	regions,	Valles	and	Altiplano.	
Table 6 - Descriptive statistics, national and by region 
	
With	respect	to	land	assets,	i.e.	the	variable	that	enters	the	model	in	Equation	(3.14)	in	a	
nonparametric	fashion,	the	statistics	show	that	rural	households	living	in	the	Llanos	have	
Table 6. Descriptive statistics, national and by region(a)
Variable        Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max Mean SD Min Max
Consumption expenditure(b) 101.4 95.8 3.7 1380.1 65.2 52.2 3.7 335.6 108.0 93.9 6.0 1303.4 155.3 126.3 11.3 1380.1
Head's years of schooling 4.1 3.8 0 17 4.1 3.9 0 17 3.8 3.8 0 17 4.4 3.5 0 16
Household's total years of 
schooling
13.1 11.2 0 76 11.6 10.5 0 64 12.7 10.8 0 68 16.3 12.1 0 76
Number of adults 3.3 1.8 1 9 3.0 1.7 1 9 3.3 1.7 1 9 3.7 1.9 1 9
Number of children 1.1 1.3 0 6 1.0 1.3 0 6 1.0 1.2 0 5 1.3 1.3 0 6
Land assets(c) 2,459.4 15,414.7 0.0 448,000 826.0 2,151.2 0.0 25,000 2,343.4 8,078.5 0.0 175,000 5,337.3 29,570.2 0.0 448,000
Livestock assets(d) 40.0 54.9 0.0 1,020          38.3 43.6 0.0 352 37.7 66.4 0.0 1,020        47.1 54.2 0.0 328
Distance to the nearest's capital of 
Department(e)
84.0      55.1         7.5      469.7 68.7      37.0      16.3   192.8       76.5 43.7 7.5 196.8 125.4 76.3 12.7 469.7
N 1,373     592 484 298
(a) Source : Own calculations based on MECOVI Survey for year 2000, Bolivian National Statistic Institute (INE).
(b)(c) Measured in US$.
(d) Total units of farm animals.
(e) Measured in miles.
Highland Valley LowplainsNational
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the	highest	mean	value,	which	is	2.3	times	higher	than	in	the	Valles,	and	6.5	times	higher	
compared	to	the	ones	living	in	the	Altiplano	region.	The	standard	deviation	of	this	variable	
in	the	three	regions	is	high,	especially	in	the	Llanos.		
Finally,	with	regard	to	the	livestock	variable,	the	Llanos	region	again	presents	the	highest	
average	value,	with	the	dispersion	of	the	variable	being	higher	in	the	Valles.	There	are	no	
significant	regional	differences	in	terms	of	the	average	number	of	adults	or	number	of	
children	living	in	the	rural	households.	
The	analysis	of	the	relationship	between	land	and	consumption	begins	with	an	exploratory	
plotting	of	a	nonparametric	estimate	of	the	regression	function	ݕ ൌ ݂ሺݐሻ ൅ ߝ,	as	well	as	the	
estimates	of	a	pure	parametric	quadratic	specification	for	land.115	As	Figure	1	shows,	the	
kernel	estimate	greatly	diverges	from	the	quadratic	estimate	at	the	left	tail	of	the	graph,	
where	land	assets	are	approximately	smaller	than	US$	2,000.	Thereafter,	both	estimates	
behave	similarly	and	in	parallel.	Whereas	more	than	80	percent	of	the	sample	has	the	value	
of	its	land	assets	equal	to	or	less	than	US$2000,	these	preliminary	results	are	quite	relevant	
and	show	that	the	effect	of	land	on	consumption	expenditure	is	evidently	nonlinear.	The	݌‐
value	from	a	test	of	significance	of	the	continuous	regressor	land	indicates	that	this	variable	
is	highly	significant	at	all	the	conventional	levels	(<	0.001).116		
																																																													
115	The	nonparametric	routines	are	kernel‐based,	and	the	method	used	to	select	the	bandwidths	is	the	least‐
squares	cross‐validation	(Hayfield	and	Racine,	2008).			
116	The	approach	used	by	Racine	(2008)	is	to	find	out	whether	a	regressor	is	irrelevant	or	redundant.	The	
computation	procedure	for	the	statistic	is	different	depending	on	the	type	of	the	variable	involved,	i.e.	
categorical	or	continuous.	The	null	hypotheses	for	a	continuous	variable	is	ܧሺݕ|ݔ, ݖሻ ൌ ܧሺܻ|ݖሻ,	where	ݕ	is	the	
dependent	variable,	ݔ	is	the	continuous	regressor	that	might	be	irrelevant	(i.e.	land),	and	ܼ	is	a	vector	of	the	
remaining	explanatory	variables.	The	test	statistic	denoted	with	ܫ,	tends	to	zero	in	probability	under	ܪ଴,	and	bootstrap	procedures	are	used	to	obtain	its	distribution.	
‐	70	‐	
	
	
Figure 1: Effect of land on consumption expenditure 
	
Before	moving	into	the	estimation	of	our	semiparametric	PLR	model,	we	also	want	to	
investigate	whether	the	functional	form	in	Equation	(3.14)	is	appropriate	for	our	cross‐
section	sample.	Two	specification	tests	are	run	for	this	purpose.	First,	based	on	a	test	
proposed	by	Hsiao	et	al.	(2007),	we	test	the	null	hypothesis	that	the	consumption	model	has	
a	parametric	form	such	as	ݕ ൌ ݐߛ ൅ ܺߚ ൅ ߝ,	against	the	proposed	alternative	that	it	takes	
the	semiparametric	following	form	ݕ ൌ ݂ሺݐሻ ൅ ܺߚ ൅ ߝ.	Recall	that	in	Equation	(3.14)	there	
were	݇	regressors	that	entered	the	income	equation	parametrically.	The	nonparametric	
kernel‐based	model	specification	test	differentiates	discrete	from	continuous	variables	
while	smoothing	and	it	is	asymptotically	normal	distributed	under	ܪ଴	.	The	resulting	
statistic	from	Hsiao	and	co‐authors’	test	is	8.17	(with	a	݌‐value	<	0.01),	result	that	rejects	
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the	linear	model	in	favor	if	the	semiparametric	one	at	the	0.1%	level	of	significance.	117	In	
terms	of	the	Goodness‐of‐Fit,	the	linear	model	has	an	ܴଶ	of	50.47%.	
Next,	using	the	same	test	for	model	specification,	we	want	to	test	a	parametric	quadratic	
model	for	land,	with	all	the	other	regressors	in	Equation	(3.14)	also	included,	against	the	
semiparametric	formulation	(the	alternative).	With	an	estimate	test	statistic	of	4.02,	and	the	
corresponding	݌‐value	<	0.01,	once	again	there	is	enough	evidence	to	reject	the	full	
parametric	null	hypothesis	in	favor	of	the	semiparametric	PLR	model.	The	quadratic	
specification	for	land	improves	the	fit	slightly	(ܴଶof	51.25%).118	
After	obtaining	the	specification	results	on	the	consumption	equation,	the	paper	now	
proceeds	with	the	estimation	of	the	semiparametric	partial	linear	model.	To	do	so,	it	
implements	Robinson’s	(1988)	method	outlined	in	Section	3.4	and	using	The	np	Package,	
which	as	mentioned	before,	uses	specific	kernel	functions	for	quantitative	and	qualitative	
variables,	and	it	applies	by	default	least‐squares	cross‐validation	bandwidth	selection	
(Hayfield	and	Racine,	2008).	
																																																													
117	The	distribution	of	the	test	statistic	“ܬ௡”	under	the	null	hypothesis	is	obtained	by	bootstrapping	methods	to	avoid	any	finite‐sample	issues,	based	on	which	the	bootstrap	݌‐values	are	obtained	(Hayfield	and	Racine,	
2008).	
118	According	to	Hayfield	and	Racine	(2008),	it	is	possible	to	use	a	mixed	residual	option	to	perform	the	
underlying	specification	tests,	which	leads	to	gains	in	terms	of	efficiency.	The	resulting	statistics	and	݌‐values	
from	this	alternative	method	confirmed	and	showed	sufficient	evidence	to	reject	the	parametric	specifications	
in	favor	of	the	semiparametric	formulation.			
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Table 7 - Semiparametric PLR model estimates 
	
	
Table	7	contains	the	coefficients	estimates	for	the	parametric	component	of	the	
consumption	function	(recall	that	consumption	is	used	as	a	proxy	for	the	household	
wellbeing),	which	includes	household	human	and	physical	capital	variables,	household	
characteristics,	a	contextual	variable,	and	the	geographic‐specific	dummy	variables.119	At	a	
first	glance,	a	comparison	of	this	model	with	the	parametric	ones	indicates	that	the	fit	
outperforms	them	with	a	ܴଶ	of	61.16%.		
The	results	in	terms	of	the	two	human	capital	variables	included	in	the	model	are	as	
expected.	They	have	a	positive	and	significant	impact	on	the	household	consumption	
expenditure.	Another	key	asset	affecting	wellbeing	is	the	ownership	of	livestock	assets.	
They	nourish	family,	provide	cash	when	sold,	and	serve	as	inputs	in	farming.	The	variable	is	
highly	significant	and	it	is	positively	associated	with	the	household	wellbeing.	In	terms	of	
the	household	composition	variables,	none	is	statistically	significant.	The	contextual	
variable	distance	to	the	closest	capital	of	Department	has	a	negative	impact	on	the	level	of	
																																																													
119	A	dummy	variable	for	the	regions	where	coca	leaf	production	exits	was	initially	included,	but	later	dropped	
since	the	coefficient	estimate	turned	out	not	to	be	significant	at	conventional	levels,	for	any	of	the	model	
specifications	estimated	for	the	consumption	function.		
Table 7. Semiparametric PLR model estimates
Variable SE
Head's years of schooling 1.99 *** 0.62
Household total years of education 2.43 *** 0.23
Number of adults 1.48 2.08
Number of children 1.04 1.87
Livestock assest 0.17 *** 0.03
Distance to the nearest's capital of Department -0.12 *** 0.04
Valley (1=yes; 0=no) 35.30 *** 3.83
Lowplains (1=yes; 0=no) 59.65 *** 4.94
N 1374
R2 0.61
Residual standard error 3472.34
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%
Coefficient
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the	wellbeing.	Being	located	further	away	from	the	market	tends	to	reduce	the	probability	
of	nonfarm	income	opportunities,	and	the	size	of	the	market	where	the	farm	products	can	
be	traded.		After	we	control	for	differential	asset	positions	and	contextual	characteristics,	
regional	dummies	are	highly	significant.	Households	in	the	Valles	and	Llanos	regions	have	a	
considerable	higher	level	of	wellbeing	compared	to	those	in	the	Altiplano.	The	positive	
coefficients	might	reflect	the	better	agroclimatic	conditions,	soil	quality,	type	of	farming	
practiced,	and	other	idiosyncratic	specificities	of	those	regions	that	make	them	enjoy	higher	
economic	wellbeing	levels.	
The	effects	of	the	parametric	linear	variables	on	the	farmers’	wellbeing	can	be	visually	
confirmed	in	Figure	2	through	the	partial	regression	plots	along	with	their	bootstrapped	
error	bounds.	While	each	2D	plot	of	the	outcome	consumption	expenditure	versus	each	
covariate	ݔଵ, … , ݔ௞	is	displayed,	all	the	other	covariates	are	held	constant	at	their	respective	
medians.	
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Figure 3 - Semiparametric PLR model: Effect of land on wealth 
	
In	terms	of	the	economic	impact,	Table	8	presents	the	average	percentage	change	in	wealth	
as	the	value	of	the	land	assets	held	by	rural	households’	increases.	The	fitted	values	
obtained	indicate,	for	example,	that	for	those	rural	farmers	whose	land	assets’	value	is	at	
most	US$	100,	which	accounts	for	11%	of	the	observations	in	the	sample,	the	average	
consumption	expenditure	decreases	in	45%	compared	to	those	that	have	no	land.	
Thereafter,	the	marginal	wealth	effect	is	decreasingly	negative	until	land	values	that	are	
greater	than	US$	900.	This	suggests	that	up	to	that	threshold,	larger	land	endowments	for	
small	farmers	cannot	be	used	efficiently	in	production	partially	because	they	are	not	
accompanied	by	increases	in	working	capital.		
The	estimated	results	also	show	that	the	positive	effects	of	an	increase	in	the	value	of	land	
assets	on	wealth	are	effective	for	farmers	with	larger	land	assets,	which	would	correspond	
more	likely	with	industrialized	and/or	modern	agricultural	farmers.	The	increase	in	the	
wellbeing	that	those	farmers	enjoy,	as	the	value	of	the	land	assets	increase,	ranges	from	
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11%	up	to	169%	on	average.	A	total	of	36%	of	the	observations	in	the	sample	have	this	
positive	marginal	return	of	land.	
The	results	from	a	significance	test	on	land	establish	that	this	variable,	with	a	highly	
nonlinear	impact	on	the	wellbeing	of	the	rural	farmers	in	the	sample,	is	significant	at	all	
conventional	levels.	With	a	normally	distributed	test	statistic	value	of	9.099,	and	a	݌‐value	
less	than	0.001,	the	restricted	model	in	which		݂ሺݐሻ	is	a	constant	against	the	nonparametric	
specification	(the	alternative)	is	by	far	rejected.	Yatchew	(2003)	proposed	a	test	using	a	
differencing	semiparametric	PLR	estimation	procedure	that	is	relatively	less	efficient	
compared	to	other	smoothing	methods	such	as	the	Robinson’s	(1998)	estimator.	Yatchew’s	
differencing	estimator	method	and	the	full	set	of	results	from	it	are	both	found	in	Appendix	
D.	The	overall	results	are	highly	similar	to	the	semiparametric	PLR	estimates	in	Table	7	in	
terms	of	the	sign	of	the	coefficients,	but	there	are	evidently	some	gains	in	terms	of	
significance	due	to	the	smaller	standard	error	estimates.	
‐	77	‐	
	
Table 8 - Marginal wealth effect of land 
	
The	statistically	significant	regional	dummy	estimates	reported	in	Table	7,	suggest	that	
individual	semiparametric	estimations	should	be	performed	for	each	region.	Before	we	do	
so,	however,	we	want	to	explore	the	(dis)similarity	of	the	parametric	effects	across	regions.	
In	order	to	do	so	we	perform	a	test	proposed	by	Yatchew	(2003),	which	is	based	on	the	
estimates	of	the	parametric	variables	and	the	corresponding	residual	variances,	both	
obtained	for	each	regional	subpopulation.120	Under	the	null	hypothesis,	the	statistic	
converges	to	the	Chi‐square	distribution	with	ܭ	degrees	of	freedom.	The	null	of	similarity	
between	each	pair	of	regional	parametric	estimates	were	plainly	rejected,	with	computed	
values	of	the	߯ଶ	test	statistic	equal	to	31.057,	16.925	and	26.22,	for	the	pairs	Altiplano‐
Valles,	Altiplano‐llanos,	and	Valles‐Llanos,	respectively.	In	all	three	cases	the	corresponding	
݌‐values	were	smaller	than	1%.		
																																																													
120	The	statistic	for	any	two	regions	is	calculated	as:	൫ߚመ௥௘௚ଵ െ ߚመ௥௘௚ଶ൯ᇱሺΣ෠ఉ෡ೝ೐೒భ ൅ Σ෠ఉ෡ೝ೐೒మሻିଵ	ሺߚመ௥௘௚ଵ െ ߚመ௥௘௚ଶሻ →
χௗ௜௠	ሺఉሻଶ .		
Table 8. Marginal wealth effect of landa
Land value (US$) Average wealth changeb Percentage of farmers affectedc
0 - 100 -45% 11%
101 - 200 -40% 10%
201 - 300 -37% 6%
301 - 400 -30% 7%
401 - 500 -18% 9%
501 - 600 -15% 1%
601 - 700 -32% 2%
701 - 800 -15% 1%
801 - 900 -12% 4%
901 - 1,000 11% 5%
1,001 - 2,000 10% 11%
2,001 - 5,000 28% 12%
5,001 - 10,000 42% 4%
> 10,000 169% 3%
a Based on the fitted values from the semiparametric PLR model
b Percentage change in the average consumption expenditure compared to the average level when land 
assets are zero.
c Percentage rate compared to the whole sample
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Based	on	the	preceding	test	results,	Table	9	provides	the	parametric	estimates	for	each	of	
the	regional	subpopulations.	As	it	is	evident,	the	three	sets	of	estimates	are	similar	in	terms	
of	the	direction	of	the	marginal	effects	on	wealth	for	those	explanatory	variables	that	are	
statistically	significant.	The	coefficients	of	the	household’s	assets,	human	capital	and	
livestock,	confirm	their	expected	positive	impact	on	wealth	in	all	three	regions.	However,	
there	are	some	variations	in	terms	of	statistical	significance	levels	and	the	size	of	the	
coefficients	across	regions,	as	could	be	expected	based	on	the	rejection	of	the	parametric‐
equality	tests	performed.	The	negative	wealth	impact	of	the	distance	to	the	nearest	
economic	and	political	center	is	significant	for	two	out	of	the	three	regions.	In	terms	of	the	
household’s	composition	variables,	they	are	only	significant	for	one	region	at	a	time.		
Table 9 - Regional Semiparametric PLR model estimates 
	
Having	estimated	the	parametric	effects	separately	for	each	sub‐population,	there	is	one	
last	question	that	needs	to	be	answered	regarding	the	land	variable	and	its	significance	in	
the	consumption	expenditure	specification.	Do	land	assets	significantly	affect	wealth	at	the	
regional	level?	Based	on	the	same	test	used	for	the	overall	significant	effect	of	the	variable,	
where	in	the	restricted	model		݂ሺݐሻ	is	a	constant	and	under	the	alternative	it	has	the	
nonparametric	specification,	we	found	that	the	asset	is	significant	in	all	three	agroclimatic	
Table 9. Regional Semiparametric PLR model estimates
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Head's years of schooling 1.42 *** 0.61 0.72 1.50 4.09 *** 1.40
Household total years of education 2.15 *** 0.25 4.33 *** 0.55 1.32 *** 0.44
Number of adults -3.05 2.32 -2.77 4.53 12.07 *** 4.13
Number of children 3.90 *** 1.85 -1.10 4.41 3.76 3.87
Livestock assest 0.13 *** 0.04 0.14 *** 0.05 0.30 *** 0.06
Distance to the nearest's capital of Department -0.20 *** 0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.28 *** 0.07
N 592 484 298
R2 0.39 0.28 0.79
Residual standard error 1467.7 6175.8 3478.6
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%
Highland Valleys Lowplains
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regions.	The	normally	distributed	coefficients	of	1.33,	3.50,	and	27.64	allowed	us	to	reject	
the	null	hypotheses	at	10%	level	in	the	Altiplano,	and	at	1%	level	in	the	other	two	regions.121		
Figure	4	graphically	presents	the	regional	semiparametric	curves	of	the	wealth	effect	of	the	
value	of	land	assets.	The	horizontal	axes	show	the	US$	value	of	land	owned	by	rural	
households	and	the	vertical	axes	the	regional	kernel	estimates	of	݂ሺݐሻ.	These	results	
confirm	our	earlier	semiparametric	estimates	when	the	overall	effect	of	land	was	obtained	
using	the	whole	sample.	There	is	an	initial	negative	marginal	effect	of	land	at	low	values	of	
the	asset	in	all	three	regions.	This	might	be	the	result	of	increases	in	landholdings	which	are	
not	accompanied	by	a	greater	availability	of	credit	or	of	any	other	additional	source	of	
income.	The	farmer	faces	a	tighter	working	capital	constraint.		
The	specifics	of	the	negative	effect	in	terms	of	wealth,	the	number	of	rural	households	
affected,	and	the	inflection	point	at	which	the	marginal	value	of	land	changes	to	be	positive,	
widely	varies	across	regions.	In	the	case	of	the	Altiplano	region,	for	land	assets	with	a	value	
no	greater	than	US$	50,	the	average	impact	on	wealth	is	negative,	and	the	percentage	of	the	
households	affected	negatively	is	8%.	From	there	on,	the	highest	average	increase	in	wealth	
is	194%.	For	rural	households	living	in	the	Valles,	the	negative	wealth	impact	is	effective	for	
land	values	that	are	smaller	than	US$	600,	and	affects	20%	of	the	regional	sample.	
Thereafter,	the	wealth	of	the	households	with	larger	land	assets	increases	1.56	times	on	
average.	Finally,	in	the	case	of	the	Llanos	region,	the	highest	negative	marginal	effect	of	land	
is	a	19%	decrease	in	wealth,	and	the	percentage	of	the	households	facing	it	14%.	In	this	
case,	the	land	value	at	which	the	marginal	wealth	effect	of	the	asset	turns	to	be	positive	is	
approximately	US$	4,000.	The	wealth	of	the	households	that	enjoy	this	positive	returns	
increases	1.1	times	on	average.		
																																																													
121			The	corresponding	p‐values	were	0.09,	0.00,	and	0.00.		
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Figure 4 - Semiparametric PLR model: Regional effects of land on wealth 
	
3.7 Conclusions	
	
The	production	relationships	in	agrarian	economies	of	the	developing	world	have	been	
widely	recognized	to	be	characterized	by	the	absence	of	certain	markets	(or	their	imperfect	
existence).	Additionally,	economic	theory	of	information	suggests	that	both	capital	and	
labor	markets	are	likely	to	be	intrinsically	imperfect	in	agrarian	economies.	These	are	all	
characteristics	of	the	environment	in	which	farmers	make	decisions	and	eventually	
produce.	This	environment,	and	the	access	to	the	relevant	rural	markets,	however,	may	be	
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different	for	different	rural	farmers,	depending	on	the	scale	of	production,	i.e.	the	size	of	
their	land	endowments.	For	instance,	small	farmers	that	do	not	access	the	imperfect	credit	
market	(and	hence	are	capital‐constrained)	face	the	necessity	to	supply	labor	to	the	market	
in	order	to	meet	subsistence	needs	and	obtain	liquidity.	Increases	in	land	endowments	in	
such	circumstances	may	not	return	large	(or	even	positive)	marginal	wealth	effects,	since	
they	might	not	be	able	to	use	them	efficiently	in	production.	These	farmers	face	a	trade‐off	
between	access	to	working	capital	through	off‐farm	labor,	and	availability	of	labor	force	to	
work	in	their	own	farm.	On	the	other	hand,	the	paper	also	models	large	farmers	that	have	
access	to	credit	markets	through	their	land	endowments,	which	allows	them	to	efficiently	
use	larger	landholdings	by	increasing	the	usage	of	inputs	of	production,	which	leads	to	cost	
advantages	due	to	the	existence	of	fixed	supervision	costs.	
Based	on	those	considerations,	the	theoretical	model	derived	for	each	type	of	farmer	
showed	us	that	the	marginal	return	of	land	for	the	small	farmers	might	be	smaller	
compared	to	the	larger	ones,	or	even	negative	depending	on	the	size	of	the	terms	involved	
in	the	derived	income	value	function.	For	the	larger	farmers	the	model	showed	that	
increasingly	positive	returns	to	land	can	be	expected.	
Using	data	from	a	nationally‐representative	household	survey	in	Bolivia,	three	are	the	main	
conclusions	that	emerge	from	the	estimation	results	using	a	Semiparametric	Partial	Linear	
Regression	model.	First,	the	relationship	between	land	and	wealth	is	significantly	nonlinear.	
Second,	for	farmers	with	very	low	values	of	land	endowments	(e.g.	less	than	US$50),	results	
showed	that	wealth	decreases	with	higher	land	values.	For	land	values	between	US$50	and	
US$	900,	the	effect	is	decreasingly	negative.	Beyond	land	values	of	US$	900,	the	effect	is	on	
average	positive	and	rising.	These	results	suggest	that	only	farmers	with	land	holdings	with	
value	that	is	above	that	threshold	can	effectively	access	the	credit	market	and	use	land	
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endowments	as	collateral.	Third,	accounting	for	regional	effects,	we	found	support	for	the	
nonlinear	effect	of	land	and	the	initial	negative	marginal	wealth	effect	in	all	three	
agroclimatic	regions.	However,	the	impact	in	terms	of	wealth	reduction,	the	number	of	
adversely	affected	farmers,	the	value	of	the	land	at	which	the	marginal	return	of	the	land	
starts	to	be	positive,	and	the	average	increase	in	the	wealth	that	farmers	experience	
thereafter,	widely	varies	in	regional	terms.		
Therefore,	our	findings	refine	and	contribute	to	the	conclusions	drawn	by	other	studies	
where	it	is	shown	that,	in	some	developing	countries,	small	farmers	would	enjoy	higher	
marginal	returns	on	land	compared	to	large	farmers.	This	paper	establishes	that	positive	
marginal	returns	on	the	asset	are	effective	if	the	demand	of	additional	working	capital,	as	
land	endowments	increase,	is	accompanied	by	greater	access	to	resources	through	the	
credit	market.		
The	regional	analysis	performed	confirms	the	results,	and	reveals	that	regardless	of	
regional	agroclimatic	and	idiosyncratic	differences,	the	constraints	that	an	imperfect	credit	
market	imposes	persist.		
The	relevance	of	policies	that	improve	the	access	of	small	farmers	of	the	developing	
countries	to	a	more	competitive	financial	market	becomes	clearer.	Additional	policies	that	
accompany	those	that	are	simply	related	to	increased	access	to	land	by	the	poor	are	also	
highly	advisable.	
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CHAPTER	IV	–	NONFARM	LABOR,	POVERTY	AND	INEQUALITY	IN	RURAL	
BOLIVIA	
	
4.1 Introduction	
	
There	is	a	consensus	regarding	the	increasing	importance	of	nonfarm	activities	and	the	
income	streams	coming	from	them,	for	countries	in	the	developing	world.	These	
diversification	activities	that	have	been	used	to	compensate	the	low	and	risky	returns	from	
farm	related	activities.		
The	mixed	empirical	evidence	regarding	the	effect	of	nonfarm	employment	on	the	income	of	
the	poor	in	the	rural	area	and	on	the	overall	income	distribution,	however,	has	motivated	
vast	theoretical	and	empirical	analyses.		The	differentiation	of	the	nonfarm	activities	in	
terms	of	their	return,	the	level	and	value	of	the	assets	of	the	poor,	and	the	overall	conditions	
of	the	rural	and	national	economies	in	terms	of	availability	of	land,	labor	and	wealth	
distribution,	can	be	used	to	explain	the	variety	of	the	results.					
Bolivia	presents	numbers	for	poverty	and	inequality	that	are	among	the	highest	in	Latin	
America.	At	the	same	time,	as	it	is	the	case	for	other	developing	countries,	the	participation	
of	nonfarm	income	has	been	constantly	increasing	over	the	past	years.	These	facts	have	
raised	questions	regarding	the	effect	of	the	presence	of	the	nonfarm	income	on	the	income	
of	the	households. 
‐	84	‐	
	
Despite	the	results	from	some	empirical	works	for	Bolivia	that	explain	the	potential	
unequalizing	effect	of	nonfarm	income,	this	work	proposes	that	based	on	the	characteristics	
of	the	country	in	terms	of	access	to	land,	supply	of	labor,	and	market	barriers	mainly		faced	
by	poor	farmers,	it	might	have	a	positive	impact	(i.e.	equalizing).	In	short,	we	want	to	find	
out	if	nonfarm	income	is	sufficient	to	help	poor	farmers	escape	from	poverty,	rather	than	
just	help	them	survive,	and	if	it	has	an	equalizing	effect	in	the	overall	income	distribution.		
Evidence	in	these	matters	will	fill	the	void	of	the	current	available	literature	in	terms	of	a	
rigorous	empirical	analysis	on	the	country.	
Using	a	nationally	representative	dataset	for	Bolivia,	we	follow	Chinn	(1979)	and	de	Janvry	
et	al.	(2005)	to	address	these	questions	by	simulating	a	“hypothetical”	state	in	which	
nonfarm	activities	do	not	exit.	The	results	show	that	the	depth	and	severity	of	poverty	in	
Bolivia	would	have	been	higher	if	diversifying	farmers	would	have	not	engaged	into	
nonfarm	activities.	The	results	show,	however,	that	the	increase	in	income	was	not	
sufficient	to	abate	the	number	of	poor.	We	found	no	evidence	that	nonfarm	income	affect	
negatively	nor	positively	the	overall	income	distribution.		
The	study	proceeds	in	four	further	sections.	Section	4.2	presents	a	brief	review	of	the	
relevant	literature.	Section	4.3	explains	the	econometric	model	and	estimation	procedures.	
Section	4.4	presents	the	data	and	the	specification	of	equations	of	the	model.	Section	4.5	
shows	and	discusses	the	results.	Section	4.6	concludes.	
4.2 Literature	review	
	
Farm	income	is	still	the	main	source	of	income	for	rural	dwellers	in	developing	countries	
(e.g.	in	Reardon	et.	al,	1998b,	and	Elbers	and	Lanjouw,	2001).	Income	coming	from	nonfarm	
activities,	however,	is	not	just	an	extraordinary	event	anymore,	but	a	regular	means	of	
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living.	As	it	has	been	widely	shown,	nonfarm	work,	and	the	income	that	rural	households	
obtain	from	them,	is	an	important	strategy	among	countries	of	the	developing	world	since	it	
has	been	used	to	compensate	the	low	returns	in	farm	related	activities	(Reardon	et	
al.1998a).	Comparing	regions,	Latin	America	was	found	to	have	an	average	share	of	40%	of	
nonfarm	income	in	total	rural	household	income,	just	2	points	behind	Africa,	and	8	above	
Asia.		
Diversification	into	nonfarm	activities	usually	responds	to	market	failures	and	the	
insufficiency	of	farm	income.	Its	ultimate	goal,	however,	is	to	achieve	poverty	alleviation	
(Barret	et	al.,	2001).	Rural	participation	in	nonfarm	activities	potentially	improves	rural	
income	as	a	whole.	The	ultimate	effect	of	nonfarm	sources	of	income	on	poverty,	however,	
will	depend	on	the	nonfarm	activity	sector	to	which	the	household	have	access:	one	with	
low	returns	that	will	only	ensure	a	survival	strategy,	or	one	with	rather	high	returns	that	
can	be	an	option	to	escape	poverty	(Davis	et	al.	2007).	De	Janvry	et	al.	(2005),	for	example,	
show	that	nonfarm	income	sources	in	China	effectively	reduce	the	incidence,	depth	and	
severity	of	poverty	among	rural	households	with	small	landholdings.		
Income	diversification	activities	can	be	classified	in	different	ways;	Barret	et	al.	(2001),	for	
example,	use	three	criteria:	sectoral,	functional	and	spatial;	Elbers	and	Lanjouw	(2001)	
distinguish	according	to	productivity;	Escobal	(2001)	classifies	first	between	self	and	wage	
employment,	and	then	according	to	the	level	of	the	skills	(entry	barriers	and	rates	of	
return).	Based	on	the	classification	suggested	by	de	Janvry	et	al.(2005),	the	income	of	the	
rural	farmers	is	classified	into	three	groups:	farm	income,	which	comprises	income	coming	
exclusively	from	activities	related	to	agriculture	such	as	forestry,	livestock	and	fishery;	
nonfarm	income,	which	includes	agricultural	wages,	formal	and	informal	nonagricultural	
wages,	and	the	proceeds	from	self‐employment	activities;	and	income	from	other	non‐
‐	86	‐	
	
productive	sources	such	as	pension	transfers,	grants/subsidies,	rents,	and	financial	income.	
We	follow	this	classification	to	group	the	sample	into	two	groups:	farmers	that	do	not	
diversify	income	(i.e.	households	with	farm	income	only),	and	farmers	that	do	diversify	into	
nonfarm	work	(i.e.	households	with	farm	and	nonfarm	income).	
In	terms	of	the	distribution	of	income,	de	Janvry	and	Sadoulet	(1993)	explain	that	the	
impact	of	nonfarm	activities	on	the	distribution	of	income	in	the	rural	areas	greatly	depends	
on	the	distribution	of	vital	agricultural	assets	such	as	land.	This	helps	to	understand	the	
varied	results	across	regions	within	a	country,	and	across	countries.	Concisely,	Adams	
(2001)	states	that	in	land‐scarce	and	labor	rich	countries,	the	inadequate	access	to	land	
“push”	poorer	farmers	into	the	nonfarm	sector,	which	provides	them	with	a	better	way	of	
increasing	income	and	with	employment	opportunities.		Note	that	nonfarm	income	might	
still	be	an	unequally	distributed	income	source,	but	not	as	bad	as	the	overall	income	
distribution.	Empirical	evidence	for	the	equalizing	effect	of	income	sources	generated	in	
nonfarm	activities	is	abundant.122On	the	other	hand,	it	is	expected	that	nonfarm	income	will	
increase	overall	income	inequality	in	land‐rich	and	labor‐scare	countries	where	access	to	
land	keep	the	majority	of	the	farmers	involved	solely	in	agricultural	work.	Only	the	richest	
are	“pull”	into	the	nonfarm	sector.	In	this	case	nonfarm	income	is	more	unequally	
distributed	than	farm	income.	Empirical	evidence	for	the	unequalizing	effect	of	nonfarm	
income	can	be	found	from	country	studies	in	each	developing	region.123	In	terms	of	
geographical	regions,	the	rough	pattern	seems	to	be	that	in	Africa,	nonfarm	employment	
tends	to	increase	inequality,	the	opposite	is	true	for	Latin	America,	and	Asia	is	definitely	a	
mixed	story.		
																																																													
122	See	for	example	De	Janvry,	et	al	(2005)	for	China,	Adams	(2002)	for	Egypt,	Adams	(1995)	for	Pakistan,	
Lanjouw	(1999)	for	Ecuador,	and	Chinn	(1979)	for	Taiwan.	
123	Davis	et	al.	(2007)	studies	15	developing	countries	and	concludes	that	nonfarm	income	is	increases	income	
inequality.	Other	studies	with	similar	results	include:	Elbers	and	Lanjouw	(2001)	for	Ecuador,	Adams	(2001)	
for	Jordan,	Escobal	(2001)	for	Peru,	Reardon	and	Taylor	(1996)	in	Burkina	Faso,	and	Collier	et	al	(1986)	in	
Tanzania.	
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Despite	the	controversy	concerning	the	effect	of	inequality	on	economic	development,	
based	on	cross‐country	data	analysis,	Easterly	(2007)	has	shown	the	significant	barrier	that	
inequality	is	to	development,	not	only	lowering	per	capita	income,	but	also	negatively	
affecting	other	aspects	of	it,	such	as	the	quality	of	institutions	and	schooling.	
According	to	the	CEPAL	(2006),	Bolivia	has	one	of	the	highest	percentages	of	poor	people	in	
the	rural	area	of	Latin	America.	Even	though	during	the	last	10	years	the	poverty	incidence	
has	decreased	in	the	country	by	more	than	three	percentage	points124,	for	which	the	major	
contributor	is	the	rural	decrease	in	poverty,	it	has	not	been	enough,	and	it	won’t	be,	to	
reduce	poverty	significantly	and	achieve	the	Millennium	Development	Goal	for	the	country.		
In	terms	of	income	inequality,	the	high	levels	existing	in	the	country	are	not	decreasing	over	
time	and,	on	the	contrary,	they	are	increasing.	According	to	the	National	Bureau	of	Census	
(INE),	the	Gini	coefficient	increased	from	0.58	to	0.59	between	1999	and	2006125.	The	index	
was	0.42	in	1990	according	to	the	Income	Inequality	Database	of	the	World	Bank126.		
As	it	is	the	case	for	other	developing	countries,	traditionally	rural	Bolivia	has	been	seen	as	
driven	almost	uniquely	by	agriculture;	policies	and	resources	have	been	focused	on	the	
farm	sector	as	the	way	to	alleviate	poverty.	Nevertheless,	according	to	the	INE	the	
percentage	of	workers	involved	in	the	agricultural	sector	in	2005	was	37%	and	the	
percentage	for	the	rural	area	was	79%.	Although	these	numbers	seem	high,	they	are	not	
unusual	for	a	developing	country,	and	have	been	decreasing	over	time:	in	1999	they	were	
39%	for	the	entire	country,	and	82%	for	the	rural	area.	Hence,	the	importance	of	nonfarm	
income	has	been	increasing	over	the	past	years.	
																																																													
124	According	to	the	INE	(Bureau	of	Census),	from	its	web	page	www.ine.gov.bo,	the	incidence	of	poverty	at	the	
national	level	dropped	from	63.47%	to	59.92%	between	1999	and	2006,	the	urban	numbers	dropped	from	
51.36%	to	50.27%	during	the	same	period,	and	in	the	rural	area	from	84.0%	to	76.47%.	
125	Access	through	the	web	page	www.ine.gov.bo.		
126	Access	through	its	webpage:	http://econ.worldbank.org		
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Jimenez	and	Lizarraga	(2003)	examine	the	structure	of	the	household’s	income	in	the	rural	
area	of	Bolivia,	and	show	that	almost	40%	of	the	income	comes	from	activities	not	related	to	
agriculture.	This	confirms	that	agricultural	activities	are	still	the	main	source	of	income	for	
rural	dwellers.	Nonfarm	activities,	however,	are	not	an	extraordinary	event	anymore,	but	a	
regular	means	of	living	that	increases	its	participation	in	total	income	as	time	goes	by.		
Studies	for	rural	Bolivia	have	suggested	that	the	rise	in	inequality	in	the	country	could	be	
due	to	the	increase	in	nonfarm	income	participation	in	the	income	sources	of	the	rural	
households.	Sanchez	(2006)	and	Jimenez	and	Lizarraga	(2003)	have	found	empirical	
evidence	for	the	potential	positive	contribution	of	nonfarm	activities	to	the	overall	income	
inequality.	The	available	empirical	evidence,	however,	is	based	on	limited	data	that	do	not	
differentiate	the	effect	of	nonfarm	income	across	the	different	agroclimatic	regions.	The	
works	mainly	focused	on	the	determinants	of	participation	and	income	related	to	nonfarm	
activities,	and	only	reports	the	potential	contribution	of	each	source	of	income	to	inequality.	
Contrary	to	those	studies,	this	work	proposes	that	given	that	Bolivia	is	a	land‐unequal	
distributed	and	labor‐rich	country,	the	prevalent	inadequate	access	to	land	might	“push”	
poorer	rural	households	into	diversification,	and	hence	nonfarm	income	can	have	an	
equalizing	effect	on	overall	income	inequality.	In	terms	of	poverty,	we	want	to	find	out	if	
nonfarm	income	sources	are	enough	to	help	poor	farmers	to	escape	poverty.	
We	follow	the	methodology	first	developed	by	Chinn,	D.	(1979)	for	evidence	from	Taiwan,	
and	later	by	de	Janvry,	et.	al,	2005	for	China,	to	assess	the	impact	of	nonfarm	income	in	rural	
Bolivia.	It	simulates	the	importance	of	nonfarm	income	under	a	“hypothetical”	situation	
where	the	nonfarm	opportunities	are	eliminated	to	see	how	the	rural	household	incomes,	
rural	poverty,	and	rural	inequality	would	have	been	in	such	a	case.	The	analysis	takes	
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special	care	of	the	specific	characteristics	that	the	households	have,	such	characteristics	
that	make	some	of	them	diversify,	while	makes	others	remain	as	pure	farmers.	
In	terms	of	the	estimation	process,	a	selection	model	is	used	to	obtain	the	fitted	incomes	of	
pure	farmers	that	will	later	be	used	to	predict	the	hypothetical	incomes	for	the	diversifying	
ones.	According	to	Winkelmann	and	Boes	(2006)	the	best	method	to	deal	with	sample	
selectivity	is	Maximum	Likelihood	Estimation	(MLE),	with	the	resulting	parameter	
estimates	being	consistent,	asymptotically	efficient,	and	asymptotically	normal.	
Identification	of	the	model	under	sample	selectivity	is	addressed	by	the	inclusion	of	specific	
exclusion	restrictions.	
4.3 Econometrics	of	the	model		
	
4.3.1 The	log‐income	estimation	procedure	
	
Following	de	Janvry	et.	al	(2005)	procedure	to	predict	the	income	of	the	rural	households	as	
if	all	were	only	farmers,	it	first	needs	to	be	estimated	the	income	equation	for	the	actual	
pure	farmers.	Since	the	data	contain	diversifying	and	non‐diversifying	households,	
estimates	of	the	farmer’s	income,	based	just	on	the	farmers	subsample,	could	give	rise	to	
sample	selectivity	problems.	It	is	necessary	to	account	for	the	diversification	decision	to	
obtain	unbiased	estimates.	
Hence,	the	initial	dependent	variable	is	binary	and	can	be	denoted	by	ݖ௜	for	household	݅,	
which	equals	one	when	the	household	is	a	pure	farmer,	and	equals	zero	when	the	
household	diversifies	out	from	farm	work.	Therefore,	ݖ௜	can	be	assumed	to	have	a	Bernoulli	
probability	function	of	the	form:127	
																																																													
127	For	details	see	Winkelmann,	R.	and	Boes,	S.	(2006)		
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݂ሺݖ௜| ௜ܺሻ ൌ ߨ௜௭೔ሺ1 െ ߨ௜ሻଵି௭೔,	 	ݖ௜ ൌ 0,1,		 ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ܰ	 (4.1)
where	 ௜ܺ	is	a	vector	of	observable	characteristics,	and	ߨ௜	is	equal	to	ܩሺ ௜ܺᇱߚሻ,	whit	this	
function	observing	the	condition	that:	0 ൑ ܩሺ ௜ܺᇱߚሻ ൑ 1.	
According	to	Crown	(1998),	using	ordinary	least	squares	estimation	for	such	binary	
dependent	variable	would	present	several	concerns	regarding	their	econometric	validity.128	
More	efficient	procedures	for	modeling	binary	outcomes	are	the	Logit	and	Probit	models.	It	
can	be	shown	that	Logit	and	Probit	MLE	are	highly	similar	in	terms	of	the	sign	and	
magnitude	of	the	slope	coefficients,	though	the	numerical	values	may	depend	on	the	
normalization	chosen.	For	simplicity,	the	paper	assumes	the	model	errors	are	normally	
distributed	and	hence	Probit	model	is	chosen.		
In	terms	of	our	variables,	the	Probit	model	has	the	following	form:	
ߨ௜ ൌ Φሺ ௜ܺ′ߚሻ ൌ න 1√2ߨ ݁ݔ݌ ቈെሺ
ݐଶ
2 ሻ቉ ݀ݐ
௫࢏ᇲఉ
ିஶ
  (4.2)
where	Φሺ∙ሻ		is	the	cumulative	density	function	of	the	standard	normal	distribution.129		
The	use	of	a	latent	variable	model	is	a	helpful	tool	to	derive	conditional	probabilities	within	
the	framework	of	sample	selectivity	and	Probit	models.130	The	diversifying	decision	and	the	
income	of	the	pure	farmers	are	the	two	equations	of	the	model,	where	the	dependent	
variables	ݕ௜°	and	ݖ௜°	are	latent	or	unobserved,	and	are	generated	by	a	bivariate	process:131	132	
																																																													
128	Among	them:	OLS	estimates	would	invalidate	the	interpretation	of	the	predicted	values	as	probabilities,	they	
could	cause	heteroskedasticity	for	some	observations,	and	they	would	assume	a	constant	marginal	effect	on	
the	dependent	variable	when	a	one‐unit	change	occurs	in	any	of	the	explanatory	variables,	which	is	clearly	not	
true.	
129	The	underlying	assumption	is	that,	in	the	latent	variable	equation,	the	error	terms	are	independently	and	
normally	distributed,	with	mean	0	and	variance	ߪଶ.	Besides	that,	the	required	normalization	procedure	is	
applied.	
130	See	for	example	Davidson	and	Mackinnon	(2004),	pp.	453‐454.	
131	The	section	follows	Davidson	and	Mackinnon	(2004).	
132	Here	it	is	worthwhile	to	stress	the	difference	between	the	superscript	“o”	and	the	subscript	“0”,	and	the	
different	contexts	within	which	each	one	is	used;	the	former	is	used	conventionally	to	denote	latent	variables	
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ቈݕ௜
°
ݖ௜°቉ ൌ ൤
௜ܺߚ
௜ܹߛ൨ ൅ ൤
ݑ௜
ݒ௜൨ , ൤
ݑ௜
ݒ௜൨ ~ܰܫܦ ൬0, ൤
ߪଶ ߩߪ
ߩߪ 1 ൨൰	 (4.3)
where	 ௜ܺ	is,	as	explained,	a	vector	of	exogenous	variables	explaining	the	income	of	rural	
households	that	remain	as	pure	farmers,	and	ߚ	the	vector	of	parameters	that	need	to	be	
estimated.	 ௜ܹ ,	on	the	other	hand,	is	the	vector	of	observations	on	explanatory	variables	for	a	
dependent	variable	of	which	only	the	sign	is	observed.	ߪ	is	the	standard	deviation	of	ݑ௜,	and	
ߩ	the	correlation	between	ݑ௜	and	ݒ௜.	As	in	any	other	typical	model	that	involves	latent	
variables,	these	are	not	directly	observed,	but	rather	inferred	from	the	decisions	taken	by	
the	households.	The	relationship	between	the	observed	and	the	latent	variables	can	be	
summarized	as	follows:	
ݕ௜ ൌ ݕ௜° ݂݅ ݖ௜° ൏ 0; ݑ݊݋ܾݏ݁ݎݒ݁݀ ݋. ݓ.	
ݖ௜ ൌ 1 ݂݅ ݖ௜° ൏ 0 ; ݖ௜ ൌ 0 ݋.ݓ.	
(4.4)
In	terms	of	Equations	(4.3)	and	(4.4),	there	are	two	types	of	observations:	a)	households	
who	decide	not	to	diversify	out	from	farm	activities	(ݖ௜° ൏ 0, ݖ௜ ൌ 1),	and	whose	farm	income	
ݕ௜	is	observed	(and	equal	to	ݕ௜°)	along	with	both	 ௜ܹ	and		 ௜ܺ;	and	b)	households	who	decide	
to	diversify	their	income	out	from	farm	activities	(ݖ௜° ൐ 0, ݖ௜ ൌ 0),	with	such	decision	
observed	in	the	value	of	ݖ௜,	along	with	 ௜ܹ .	
Following	Winkelmann	and	Boes	(2006),	a	model	such	as	the	one	contained	in	Equations	
(4.3)	and	(4.4)	can	be	efficiently	estimated	using	the	Maximum	Likelihood	Estimation	(MLE)	
method,	from	which	consistent	estimates	of	the	parameters	and	standard	errors	can	be	
obtained.	Therefore,	the	likelihood	function	of	the	full	sample,	as	reflected	in	Equation	5,	
contains	two	elements:	the	contribution	of	households	that	do	not	diversify,	and	that	of	the	
households	that	do	diversify	out	from	farm	work.	In	other	words:	
																																																																																																																																																																																					
whose	principal	characteristic	is	not	being	directly	observed	and	are	part	of	the	set	up	of	our	econometric	
model;	the	latter,	already	introduced,	denotes	the	situation	in	which	all	the	households	are	assumed	to	be	
pure	farmers,	and	so	will	be	used	in	subsequent	sections	when	we	are	predicting	/simulating	the	
corresponding	household’s	income	.				
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ܫሺݖ௜ ൌ 1ሻ Prሺݖ௜ ൌ 1ሻ ݂ሺݕ௜°|ݖ௜ ൌ 1ሻ,	 (4.5)
and		
ܫሺݖ௜ ൌ 0ሻ Prሺݖ௜ ൌ 0ሻ	
where	ܫሺ∙ሻ	is	an	indicator	function	that	takes	the	value	1,	when	its	argument	is	true,	and	0	
otherwise.		
Combining	the	two	terms	of	Equation	(4.5),	taking	logarithms,	and	adding	them	up	for	the	N	
observations	in	the	sample,	the	loglikelihood	function	of	model	is	given	by:	
݈ ൌ ∑ logሼPrሺݖ௜ ൌ 1ሻ௭೔ୀଵ ݂ሺݕ௜|ݖ௜ ൌ 1ሻሽ ൅ ∑ log Prሺݖ௜ ൌ 0ሻ௭೔ୀ଴ ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ܰ	 (4.6)
The	second	term	in	Equation	(4.6)	is	the	likelihood	contribution	of	a	household	that	
diversifies	into	nonfarm	activities,	and	equals	Prሺݖ௜ ൌ 0ሻ ൌ 	ΦሺW୧γሻ133.	The	first	term,	which	
is	the	likelihood	contribution	of	a	household	that	does	not	diversify,	can	be	written	as134:	
෍ logሼPrሺݖ௜ ൌ 1|ݕ௜°ሻ݂ሺݕ௜°ሻሽ
௭೔ୀଵ
	
where	݂൫ݕ௜°൯	is	just	the	density	of	ݕ௜°conditional	on	exogenous	variables,	which	is	normally	
distributed	with	mean	 ௜ܺߚ	and	variance	ߪଶ.	Using	the	facts	that	ݑ௜	and	ݒ௜	are	bivariate	
normal,	and	since	ݕ௜	is	observed	when	ݖ௜ ൌ 1,	we	have:	
Pr൫ݖ௜ ൌ 1หݕ௜°൯ ൌ Φሺെ ௜ܹ
ߛ ൅ ߩሺݕ௜ െ ௜ܺߚሻ/ߪ
ඥሺ1 െ ρଶሻ ሻ	
Thus,	our	final	loglikelihood	function	for	the	full	sample	of	rural	households	is	given	by:	
																																																													
133	We	use	the	fact	that	ݒ௜	is	normal	distributed.	
134	Since	the	two	error	terms	are	bivariate	normal,	ݒ௜ ൌ ߩݑ௜ ߪൗ ൅ ߝ௜,	where	ߝ௜	is	a	normally	distributed	random	variable	ሺ0, 1 െ ߩଶሻ.	For	more	details	see	Davidson	and	Mackinnon	(2004),	pp.	487.	
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݈ ൌ ∑ ݈݋݃௭೔ୀଵ Φቆെ
ௐ೔ఊାഐ൫೤೔ష೉೔ഁ൯࣌
ඥሺଵି஡మሻ ቇ ൅ ∑ log௭೔ୀଵ ሺ
ଵ
ఙ ∅ ൬ቀ
௬೔ି௑೔ఉ
ఙ ቁ൰ ൅ ∑ ݈݋݃௭೔ୀ଴ ΦሺW୧γሻ
	 	݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ܰ	
(4.7)
which	is	maximized	with	respect	to	γ,	ρ,	ߚ	and	ߪ	using	the	sample	for	pure	farmers.	
Once	the	estimates	from	the	above	explained	sample	selectivity	model	are	obtained,	the	
prediction	of	the	individual	log‐incomes	for	the	households	that	are	involved	in	nonfarm	
activities	are	obtained,	as	explained	in	the	next	section.		
4.3.2 Predicted	income	for	diversifying	households135	
	
Consider	a	log‐linear	model,	where	the	income	for	each	household	݅	is	given	by	its	logarithm	
form	as	follows:136	
݈݋݃ݕ௜ ൌ ௜ܺߚ ൅ ݑ௜ ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ܰ (4.8)
where	 ௜ܺ	is	a	vector	of	observations	on	explanatory	variables,	and	ݑ௜	are	the	error	terms	
that	account	for	unobservable	characteristics	of	the	household.	In	terms	of	conditional	
expectations,	Equation	(4.8)	can	be	written	as:	
ܧሺ݈݋݃ ݕ௜ | ௜ܺሻ ൌ ܧሺ ௜ܺߚ/ ௜ܺሻ ൅ ܧሺݑ௜/ ௜ܺሻ ൌ ௜ܺߚ ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ܰ	 (4.9)
since	it	is	assumed	that	ܧሺݑ௜/ ௜ܺሻ ൌ 0.	
Among	the	ܰ	rural	households,	as	explained,	there	are	݊ଵ	individuals	whose	sole	source	of	
income	is	from	farming,	and	ܰ െ ݊ଵ	individuals	that	diversify	their	income	sources.	Given	
that	this	work	looks	to	predict	the	income	for	all	of	them	as	if	all	would	be	pure	farmers,	the	
subscript	“0”	will	denote	such	a	predicted	state.	Note	that	in	the	case	of	the	actual	pure	
farmers,	this	notation	denotes	their	actual	current	state.	
																																																													
135	The	procedure	for	predicting	incomes	and	some	notation	used	in	this	section	follows	de	Janvry	et	al.(2005).		
136	The	use	of	income	in	its	logarithm	form,	instead	of	the	linear	alternative,	is	based	on	Ermini	and	Hendry	
(2008),	where	the	results	of	multiple	mis‐specification	tests	favor	the	use	of	income	in	such	form.		
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Making	use	of	such	notation,	and	following	Wooldridge	(2002),	Equation	(4.8)	can	be	
rewritten	in	a	decomposed	way,	and	the	log	income	for	any	household	݅,	predicted	to	only	
participate	in	farm	activities,	is	now	given	by:	
݈݋݃ ݕ଴௜ ൌ ܧሺ݈݋݃ ݕ଴௜ | ௜ܺሻ ൅ ݑ଴௜ ൌ ௜ܺߚ଴ ൅ ݑ଴௜, ݅ ൌ 1,2, … , ܰ	 (4.10)
Given	the	existence	of	the	two	types	of	households,	the	prediction	of	the	income	for	each	
household	݅,	as	if	it	would	be	a	pure	farmer,	can	be	split	into	two	groups:	one	for	the	
households	that	are	actually	pure	farmers	and	whose	predicted	income	is	the	observed	total	
income;	and	the	other	one	for	the	households	that	actually	diversify	and	whose	predicted	
income	would	be	the	predicted	income	as	if	they	were	pure	farmers.	
From	the	estimation	of	the	income	model	for	the	actual	݊ଵ	pure	farmers,	and	the	ߚመ଴	
parameters	gotten,	we	can	obtain	the	predicted	income	for	ܰ െ ݊ଵ	diversifying	households,	
as	if	they	were	pure	farmers.	Following	the	approach	suggested	by	de	Janvry	et	al.	(2005),	
three	variables	are	required	to	pursue	this	objective.	First,	the	same		 ௜ܺ 	explanatory	
variables	included	in	the	estimation	of	the	log	income	for	the	actual	pure	farmers,	which	are	
also	observed	for	the	diversifying	farmers.	Second,	the	estimated	parameters	ߚመ଴,	already	
obtained	from	the	MLE.	Finally,	an	estimator	for	the	unobserved	term	ݑ଴௜;	for	this,	a	random	
variable	݁଴௜	is	constructed	based	on	the	statistical	properties	of	the	pure	farmers’	errors	ݑ଴௜.	
Therefore,	݁̂଴௜ ൌ ߪො଴ߔି૚ሺݎሻ,	where	ߪො଴	is	the	estimated	standard	error	of		ݑ଴௜	for	the	group	of	
pure	farmers,	r	is	a	random	number	between	0	and	1,	and	ߔି૚is	the	inverse	of	the	CDF	of	
the	standard	normal	distribution.137		
With	this	information	at	hand,	it	is	easy	to	predict	the	log‐income	for	the	ܰ െ ݊ଵ	group	of	
diversifying	households,	as	if	they	were	only	involved	in	farm	activities,	in	the	following	
manner:	
																																																													
137	This	procedure	makes	sure	that	the	unobserved	terms	for	the	predictions	follow	the	same	variation	and	
probability	distribution	as	the	observed	residuals	for	the	pure	farmers.	
‐	95	‐	
	
݈݋෢݃ ݕ଴௜ ൌ ߚመ଴ ௜ܺ ൅ ݁̂଴௜		 	 	݅ ൌ ݊ଵ ൅ 1,… ,ܰ	 (4.11)
with	the	corresponding	predicted	income	equal	to:	
ݕ଴పෞ ൌ ݁ݔ݌൫݈݋෢݃ ݕ଴௜൯ ൌ ݁ݔ݌ ሺߚመ଴ ௜ܺ ൅ ݁̂଴௜ሻ				 ݅ ൌ ݊ଵ ൅ 1, … ,ܰ	 (4.12)
With	the	predicted	incomes	obtained,	we	can	proceed	now	with	the	assessment	of	the	
impact	of	nonfarm	income	on	poverty	and	inequality.	
4.3.3 Impact	of	nonfarm	income	on	rural	inequality	and	poverty	
	
This	section	briefly	explains	the	methods	used	to	measure	poverty	as	well	as	the	
distribution	of	income,	and	further	assesses	the	impact	of	nonfarm	income	on	them.	It	
explains	the	indicator	used	to	measure	household	welfare	and	the	chosen	measures	of	
poverty	and	inequality.	
4.3.3.1 Poverty	
	
In	this	chapter,	poverty	is	understood	as	a	“pronounced	deprivation	in	well‐being”	as	
explained	by	the	World	Bank	(2005).	In	its	more	basic	approach,	this	definition	assesses	
whether	households	or	individuals	have	enough	resources	to	meet	their	needs	by	
comparing	each	observation’s	income	or	consumption	expenditure	to	a	predefined	
threshold.	Since	the	approach	used	in	this	paper	requires	classifying	the	farmers	according	
to	income	sources,	the	variable	used	to	proxy	for	well‐being	is	income.		
As	also	explained	by	the	World	Bank	(2005),	the	choice	of	a	poverty	measure	is	highly	
arbitrary.	The	measures	included	here	aim	to	provide	complementing	estimates	that	
account	for	the	number	of	poor,	the	severity	of	poverty,	the	inequality	among	the	poor,	and	
the	median	income	of	the	poor,	or	the	median	statistic.	Concisely,	the	poverty	measures	
included	in	the	analysis	are	the	three	most	widely	used	developed	by	Foster,	Greer,	and	
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Thorbecke	(1984),	also	referred	as	P஑	indices	or	FGT	class	of	poverty	measures,	along	with	
the	median	income	of	the	poor.	In	terms	of	the	P஑	indices,	all	three	can	be	derived	from	the	
following	expression:	
ఈܲ ൌ 1ܰ෍ሺ
ܮ െ ݕ௜
ܮ ሻ
ఈ
௡
௜ୀଵ
ܫ௜݉௜	
where	ܰ	is	the	weighted	sample	size,	݅	subscripts	households,	ݕ	is	the	relevant	measure	of	
welfare	in	per	capita	terms	(i.e.	household	income	per	capita)138,	ܮ	is	the	poverty	line,	ܫ	is	an	
indicator	equal	to	1	if	ݕ௜ ൏ ܮ	,	and	0	otherwise,	݉௜	stands	for	the	weight	of	each	household	
in	the	measurement	given	by	its	number	of	members,	and	α	is	a	parameter	equal	or	greater	
than	zero.	When	α ൌ 0,	the	index	measures	the	proportion	of	total	population	that	is	below	
the	poverty	line,	also	known	as	the	headcount	index,	which	assesses	the	extent	or	incidence	
of	poverty.139	The	headcount	index	is	easy	to	calculate	and	interpret,	but	it	does	not	account	
for	the	intensity	of	poverty.	If	in	the	above	poverty	expression	we	set	ߙ ൌ 1,	the	measure	
obtained	is	the	Poverty	Gap	Ratio,	or	aggregate	shortfall	as	a	proportion	of	the	poverty	line,	
averaged	over	the	whole	sample.	It	counts	the	poor	among	the	population,	and	how	poor	
they	are,	i.e.	it	measures	the	depth	of	poverty.140	Finally,	if	ߙ ൌ 2,	the	expression	results	in	
the	Squared	Poverty	Gap,	which	is	a	more	difficult	measure	of	poverty	to	interpret,	but	it	
has	the	advantage	of	putting	more	weight	on	the	poorest	among	the	poor.	The	remaining	
summary	measure	is	the	median	income	among	the	poor,	and	its	inclusion	intends	to	
																																																													
138	As	already	explained,	the	survey	data	used	in	the	present	work	considers	the	household	as	the	unit	of	
observation.	This	requires	assuming	that	all	members	of	a	given	household	enjoy	the	same	level	of	well‐being,	
whenever	measures	such	as	poverty	are	only	meaningful	in	per	capita	terms	(World	Bank,	2005).	
139	It	is	insensitive	to	the	degree	of	poverty	and	the	distribution	of	income	among	the	poor.	
140	It	does	account	for	the	degree	of	poverty,	but	not	for	the	distribution	of	income	among	the	poor.	
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provide	a	very	straightforward	evaluation	of	poverty:	half	the	observations	in	the	sample	
have	values	smaller	than	it,	and	half	have	values	greater	than	it.141	
Once	the	poverty	measures	are	chosen,	and	the	estimation	and	prediction	procedures	
explained	in	Sections	4.4.1	and	4.4.2	are	accomplished,	the	evaluation	of	the	impact	of	
nonfarm	income	in	terms	of	poverty	can	be	performed.		
Next,	the	procedure	for	evaluating	the	impact	of	diversification	strategies	on	the	
distribution	of	income	among	farmers	will	be	explained.	
4.3.3.2 Inequality	
	
Inequality	measures,	as	compared	to	poverty,	make	a	more	extensive	use	of	the	data	since	
they	include	all	the	observations	in	the	calculations	regardless	their	poverty	status.	
However,	and	like	measurements	of	poverty,	there	are	a	number	of	options	from	which	it	is	
possible	to	choose.	One	of	the	most	common	measures	is	the	Gini	coefficient,	which	
possesses	many	desirable	properties.142	As	a	way	to	evaluate	the	robustness	of	the	results,	
the	paper	also	includes	the	estimation	of	the	Theil	index,	which	unlike	the	Gini,	is	
decomposable.		
The	first	inequality	measure	can	be	formally	obtained	from	the	following	expression:	
ܩ݅݊݅ ൌ 1 ൅ 1ܰ െ
2
ܰଶߤ௠෍ ݉௜̅ݎ௜ݕ௜
௡
௜ୀଵ
	
where	ܰ	is	again	the	weighted	sample	size,	݅	subscripts	households,	ݕ	stands	for	the	
household’s	income	per	capita	sorted	in	descending	order,	and	݉௜	is	the	weight	assigned	to	
each	household	according	to	its	number	of	members.	The	term	̅ݎ௜	is	the	average	rank	of	all	
																																																													
141	For	a	more	comprehensive	analysis	of	the	numerous	existing	measures	of	poverty	and	inequality	see	for	
example	World	Bank	(2005).	
142	They	are	mean	and	population	size	independence,	symmetry	and	transfer	sensitivity.	
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the	members	in	the	household,	and	ߤ௠	is	the	weighted	average	value	of	ݕ.	As	the	index	
approaches	1	the	distribution	becomes	more	unequal.	
The	second	index	of	income	inequality	can	be	expressed	as:	
݄݈ܶ݁݅ ൌ ሺ1ܰሻ෍ ݉௜ሺ
ݕ௜
ݕത ሻ
௡
௜ୀଵ
݈݋݃ ݕ௜ݕത 		
which	also	includes	the	average	income	in	the	sample’s	ݕത.		
The	above	explained	poverty	and	inequality	measures	are	computed	for	the	following	two	
states:	1)	the	actual	state	in	which	there	are	farmers	that	remain	as	pure	farmers	and	
farmers	that	do	diversify	out	from	the	farm,	and	2)	the	predicted,	or	counterfactual,	state	in	
which	the	pure	farmers	maintain	its	non‐diversifying	condition,	but	the	diversifying	farmers	
are	predicted	as	pure	farmers.	It	is	expected	that	if	nonfarm	income	helps	reduce	poverty	
and	equalize	income	distribution	among	Bolivian	rural	households,	the	measures	would	be	
smaller	in	state	1	compared	to	state	2.		
4.4 Data	
	
This	section	describes	the	basics	of	the	household	survey	data	including	the	sample	frame,	
the	size	of	the	relevant	subsample	for	the	study,	the	specification	of	the	equations	of	the	
model,	and	some	descriptive	statistics	regarding	the	variables	included	in	it.	
4.4.1 The	household	survey	
	
The	data	used	come	from	the	database	of	the	Program	for	the	Improvement	of	Surveys	and	
the	Measurement	of	Living	Conditions	in	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	(MECOVI	for	its	
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acronym	in	Spanish)143,	which	is	conducted	by	the	INE	(Bolivian	Bureau	of	Census).	It	
collects	data	on	such	diverse	topics	as	income,	expenditures,	education,	health,	employment,	
food	consumption,	assets	holdings	and	migration.	The	MECOVIs	have	been	conducted	
annually	since	1999,	and	they	are	available	online	until	the	2002.	Since	each	survey	does	
not	track	the	same	households,	and	some	key	questions	are	not	asked	in	each	survey,	we	
perform	a	cross‐section	analysis	for	the	survey	of	the	year	2000.	
All	the	surveys	provide	a	sampling	framework	that	ensures	they	are	statistically	
representative	of	urban	and	rural	Bolivia,	as	well	as	at	the	regional	level:	The	Andean	region	
(Altiplano),	the	lower	Andean	region	(Valleys),	and	the	lowland	plains	of	the	Amazon	Basin	
(Llanos).	According	to	Reardon	et	al.(2000)	different	agroclimatic	conditions	create	
different	incentives	to	diversify	income.	Likewise,	the	three	regions	are	explicitly	separated	
during	the	estimation.		
The	survey	for	2000	comprises	4,857	sample	units,	i.e.	households,	from	the	urban	and	
rural	areas.	We	concentrate	on	the	rural	subsample	of	2,108	households,	with	a	total	of	
9,092	individuals.144	Among	them	919	are	located	in	the	Altiplano,	782	in	the	Valles,	and	407	
in	the	Llanos.145	Finally,	the	households	are	distributed	in	239	Primary	Sample	Units	(UPM	
for	its	acronyms	in	Spanish)	across	the	9	Departments	of	the	country.146 
																																																													
143	The	Program	is	executed	by	the	World	Bank	(IBRD),	the	Inter‐American	Development	Bank	(IDB)	and	the	
United	Nations	Economic	Commission	for	Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean	(ECLAC),	as	well	as	specialized	
institutions	or	agencies	in	countries	participating	in	the	Program.	Subsequently	other	donors,	such	as	Canada,	
Denmark,	Germany,	Japan,	Norway,	Sweden,	UNDP,	USA,	and	the	Soros	Foundation,	have	supported	the	
Program	
144	Rural	area	is	defined	in	this	work	as	population	concentrations	of	2000	or	less.	
145	The	MECOVI	also	classifies	the	households	according	to	their	location	into	two	groups:	rural	populated	
centers	and	rural	dispersed	areas;	from	the	2108	rural	households,	121	are	located	in	the	first	one	and,	1898	
in	the	second	one.		
146	The	PSU	or	UPM	is	defined	as	the	unit	of	sampling	used	for	this	survey.	INE	divides	Bolivia	into	UPMs	that	
correspond	to	an	average	of	130	households	in	the	populated	centers,	and	approximately	50	in	the	dispersed	
area.	Based	on	the	number	of	households	to	be	surveyed,	the	number	of	UPMs	to	be	included	in	the	survey	is	
then	decided.	
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The	sampling	procedure	in	the	MECOVI	2000	combines	stratification	by	agglomerate	
population	size	and	a	two‐stage	sampling.	By	using	these	sampling	methods,	the	survey	
design	reduces	bias	due	to	the	households	that	are	included.	Additionally,	the	stratification	
of	the	population	into	groups	ensures	that	the	sample	is	representative.	The	two‐stage	
sampling	procedure	involves	in	the	first	stage	a	Probability	Proportional	to	Size	(PPS)	
technique	for	the	selection	of	the	UPMs	where	the	probability	of	selecting	a	sampling	unit	is	
proportional	to	the	size	of	its	population	(number	of	housing).147	According	to	Hansen,	M.	H.	
et	al.	(1943),	the	use	of	this	technique	decreases	the	sampling	variance	and	eliminates	the	
bias	that	arises	when	the	primary	units	are	drawn	with	equal	probabilities.	In	the	second	
stage	of	the	selection,	the	housings	or	Secondary	Sample	Units	(USM	for	its	acronyms	in	
Spanish)	were	selected	with	equal	probability	using	systematic	sampling.148	All	this	
information	is	taken	into	account	when	the	econometric	estimation	is	conducted.	
The	data	from	the	MECOVI	survey	of	2000,	allows	the	classification	of	income	
diversification	activities	suggested	by	de	Janvry	et	al.(2005)	since	it	includes	monetary	
income	and	income	in	kind	for	each	household,	earned	from	different	sources	during	the	
preceding	12	months	to	the	survey149.	This	work	only	consider	households	that	have	
income	coming	exclusively	from	self‐employment	in	agriculture	(farm	income)	and	
households	that	have	both	farm	and	nonfarm	sources	of	income	simultaneously,	as	shown	
below:		
																																																													
147	According	to	the	MECOVI	200	Methodological	Document,	the	number	of	housing	to	be	considered	in	each	
UPM	is	8	for	the	extended	area	and	16	for	the	dispersed	area.	Ibid.:	pp.	14.			
148	Given	that	the	UPMs	are	selected	with	PPS,	each	point	in	the	data	needs	to	be	weighted	by	the	probability	of	
the	households	falling	in	the	sample.	Therefore,	the	sampling	weights	are	the	reciprocal	of	the	probability	of	
its	selection,	and	are	already	included	in	the	MECOVI	database	for	each	household.	See	more	in	INE	(2000).	
149	The	MECOVI	2000	was	conducted	between	November	and	December	2000.	
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Table 10 - Rural households classification according to oincome source diversification 
	
4.4.2 The	equations	specification	
	
Four	sets	of	variables	have	traditionally	being	used	in	the	determination	of	income	
diversification	among	rural	households	across	the	developing	world:	demographic	
characteristics,	human	capital	endowments,	physical	capital	endowments,	and	those	related	
to	the	environment	where	the	household	is	located.	Table	11	explains	the	actual	covariates	
that	are	included	in	the	two	equations	of	the	sample	selectivity	model	explained	in	Section	
4.4.1.	The	logic	for	the	inclusion	of	such	variables	generally	lies	on	the	standard	available	
literature	on	income	diversification	into	nonfarm	activities.	
With	respect	to	the	selection	equation,	it	is	expected	that	male‐headed	households	have	
much	higher	probability	to	remain	as	pure	farmers	if	there	exists	unequal	access	to	inputs	
and	other	resources	(i.e.	extension	advice)	that	could	translate	into	a	higher	crop	income	
per	hectare	compared	to	female‐headed	households	(Minot	et	al.,	2006).	In	terms	of	the	
household’s	male	labor	force,	it	can	be	anticipated	that	the	higher	the	number	of	male	
members,	the	higher	the	labor	force	that	is	available	for	income‐generating	activities	in	
general,	and	in	particular,	for	farm‐related	activities	(Evans	and	Ngau,	1991).	Regarding	the	
number	of	kids	of	the	household,	Minot	et	al.	(2006)	explain	that	more	dependents	results	
in	more	mouths	to	feed,	and	in	the	presence	of	agricultural	risks,	this,	in	turn,	reduce	the	
likelihood	of	the	household	to	remain	as	a	pure	farmer.	Finally,	the	age	of	the	household	
head	is	also	included	as	part	of	the	variables	that	explain	the	household	composition;	this	
Only farmers 1,305     
Farmers with nonfarm activities 655        
Table 10. Rural households classification according to income source 
diversification (a)
(a) Source : Own calculations based on MECOVI Survey for year 2000, Bolivian National Statistic 
Institute (INE).
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into	nonfarm	activities;	a	negative	association	between	education	and	the	dependent	
variable	of	the	selection	equation	is	hence	expected.	Additionally,	given	that	much	of	the	
decisions	of	the	farmers	are	taken	at	the	household	level,	the	education	of	the	head	as	well	
as	of	the	whole	household	are	both	included	in	the	equation.150	
In	terms	of	agricultural	assets,	two	variables	are	used	as	proxies	and	are	conveniently	
included	in	the	selection	equation:	the	value	of	land	per‐capita	and	that	of	agricultural	
equipment	such	as	tractors.	The	former	enters	as	a	measure	of	land	availability	for	
agricultural	production	and	the	latter	as	relevant	inputs	that	greatly	improve	farm	
productivity	per	hectare.151	152	Consequently,	it	is	expected	that	both	affect	positively	the	
likelihood	of	being	exclusively	a	pure	farmer.		
It	has	been	also	shown	that	rural	infrastructure,	such	as	electricity	and	pipe‐borne	water,	
has	an	important	effect	on	nonfarm	income	activities	facilitating	the	establishment	of	self‐
employed	businesses	(see	for	example	Batunde,	2009,	and	Escobal,	2001).	Thus,	we	expect	
a	negative	association	between	those	variables	and	the	probability	of	being	a	pure	farmer.	
In	terms	of	the	explanatory	variables	that	account	for	the	characteristics	of	the	surrounding	
environment	where	the	farmer	resides,	the	existence	of	a	wealthier	social	group	of	
reference,	and	hence	a	greater	access	to	resources	for	income	diversification,	would	be	
negatively	associated	with	the	likelihood	of	remaining	as	a	pure	farmer.	Also,	proximity	to	
urban	areas	(i.e.	nearest	Department	capital)	would	in	turn	increase	the	probability	of	
nonfarm	income	diversification,	and	be	as	well	negatively	associated	with	the	dependent	
																																																													
150	The	possibility	of	correlation	between	these	two	variables	is	formally	tested	during	the	estimation	process.	
151	Using	land	value	of	the	landholdings	as	a	measure	of	agricultural	assets	reflects	also	land	quality,	Peterson	
(1986).	
152	Official	data	of	the	land	market,	i.e.	number	of	transactions,	prices,	etc.,	it	is	not	readily	available	for	the	
Bolivia.	Considering,	however,	that	more	than	50%	of	the	total	distribution	(and	redistribution)	of	land	in	the	
country	needs	to	go	through	a	process	of	titling	or	re‐titling	(saneamiento)	(INRA,	2002),	and	that	there	exist	
capital	and	cultural	constraints	that	prevent	a	free	access	to	the	land	market,	we	treat	household’s	per	capita	
land	variable	as	exogenous,	with	no	reallocations	due	to	participation	in	nonfarm	activities.	
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variable	in	the	probit	equation.153	In	terms	of	the	peer’s	participation	in	nonfarm	
employment,	it	has	been	shown	that	it	has	a	large	impact	on	an	individual’s	ability	to	engage	
in	such	type	of	employment	(Araujo	et.	al,	2004).	Therefore,	we	define	peers	as	all	
neighbors	surrounding	each	household,	or	people	living	in	the	same	dwelling154.	However,	
as	de	Janvry	et.	al.(2005)	explain,	it	is	valid	to	expect	that	the	peers’	decision	to	diversify	
could	be	determined	by	the	same	factors	determining	any	household’s	decision.	In	order	to	
deal	with	this	issue,	we	follow	their	approach	and	include	the	average	of	the	exogenous	
variables	included	in	the	selection	equation	as	peers.	We	deliberately	exclude	the	distance	
to	the	nearest	capital’s	department	variable,	since	we	can	expect	that	it	has	a	high	
correlation	with	the	household’s	distance	variable.			
According	to	the	literature	in	the	case	of	sample	selectivity,	individuals	should	usually	take	
into	account	the	variables	affecting	the	outcome	equation	(i.e.	log	income	for	pure	farmers),	
when	making	the	decision	(whether	to	remain	as	pure	farmers	or	not).	It	is	desirable	to	
have	variables	that	determine	the	diversification	decision,	but	that	do	not	affect	income.155	
These	variables,	which	are	loosely	referred	to	as	“instruments”	since	they	represent	
exclusion	restrictions	with	respect	to	income,	make	estimates	more	precise.		
Regarding	the	log	income	equation,	most	of	the	variables	included	in	the	selection	equation	
are	also	believed	to	explain	the	income	level	of	the	pure	farmers.	In	terms	of	household	
characteristics,	and	based	on	Taylor	and	Yunez‐Naude	(2001),	it	can	be	expected	that	as	the	
number	of	small	children	increases	in	the	household,	home	consumption	increases	as	well,	
which	will	cause	a	decrease	in	farm	income.	On	the	other	hand,	as	the	number	of	adult	
males	increases,	farm	production	and	hence	income	are	expected	to	increase.	The	variable	
																																																													
153	The	variable	is	not	included	in	the	data	set.	Instead,	the	distance	between	the	locality	where	the	farmer	is	
geographically	located	and	the	nearest	capital	of	department	was	obtained	from	the	Bolivian	Military	
Geographic	Institute	(IGM	for	its	acronym	in	Spanish).	
154	We	can	think	of	a	dwelling	(localidad)	in	Bolivia	as	a	village	or	small	town.			
155	For	more	details	see	for	example	Wooldridge	(2002)	and	Winkelmann	and	Boes	(2006).	
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age	of	the	head	should	also	have	a	positive	impact	on	farm	income	if,	as	explained,	older	
heads	are	more	experienced	famers	subject	to	more	specialization	(Minot	et	al.,	2006).	
Finally,	if	there	exits	gender	biased	in	the	access	to	productive	inputs,	a	dummy	for	male‐
headed	households	should	have	a	positive	sign.	
Regarding	human	capital	assets,	evidence	shows	that	households	with	higher	levels	of	
education	are	likely	to	be	more	productive	farmers	and	have	higher	returns	to	farming.	
Evidence	for	Mexico	and	Kenya,	for	example,	clearly	reveal	the	positive	effect	of	different	
levels	of	education	on	income	coming	from	the	production	of	staples.156Likewise,	it	is	also	
expected	that	the	other	two	family	assets	have	a	positive	effect	on	income	given	their	
positive	impact	on	farm	production.	
The	variables	representing	access	to	infrastructure	are	also	believed	to	be	positively	
associated	with	farm	income,	since	it	has	been	shown	they	increase	farm	productivity	of	
activities	that	are	already	being	undertaken	by	rural	farmers,	i.e.	electric	operation	of	
machines	or	agro‐processing	(Kooijman‐van	Dijk	and	Clancy,	2010).	Finally,	the	access	to	
the	market,	proxied	by	the	distance	to	the	nearest	capital	of	Department,	is	expected	to	be	
as	well	positively	associated	with	the	income	of	the	farmer	given	that	it	increases	the	size	of	
the	market	where	he	can	sell	his	products,	and	also	increases	the	availability	of	inputs.	
Finally,	the	usual	dummy	variables	are	included	in	both	equations	to	differentiate	the	
estimation	among	the	different	agroclimatic	regions,	and	the	ones	in	which	there	are	also	
coca	leaf	crops.		
	 	
																																																													
156	See	more	details	in	Evans	and	Ngau	(1991)	for	Kenya,	and	Taylor	and	Naude	(2001)	for	the	case	of	Mexico.	
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4.4.3 Descriptive	analysis	
	
Table	12	presents	summary	data	for	the	variables	used	in	the	estimation	of	the	sample	
selectivity	model,	with	a	total	of	1,696	observations	for	which	complete	data	is	available.	
The	statistics	are	shown	for	the	entire	sample,	as	well	as	for	each	geographic	region	of	the	
country.	In	terms	of	the	demographic	characteristics	of	the	households,	the	table	reveals	
there	are	no	sizable	regional	differences.	With	respect	to	human	capital,	it	shows	no	
significant	regional	differences	in	terms	of	the	average	of	the	household’s	head	years	of	
education,	which	has	an	overall	average	level	of	four	years.	In	terms	of	total	number	of	
years	of	schooling	in	the	household,	however,	a	typical	family	in	the	Llanos	has	three	and	
four	years	more	schooling	in	average	than	their	peers	in	the	other	two	regions,	Valles	and	
Altiplano	respectively.	
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Table 12 - Descriptive statistics, national and by region	
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The	data	also	demonstrate	the	existence	of	regional	differences	with	regard	to	various	
household	assets.	Comparing	the	value	of	three	such	variables	included	in	the	table	(i.e.	
land,	agricultural	equipment	and	income),	rural	households	living	in	the	Llanos	have	the	
highest	mean,	which	in	all	the	cases	is	more	than	two	times	higher	than	the	value	in	the	
Valles	and	Altiplano	regions.	The	biggest	asset‐value	regional	difference	comes	from	
comparing	agricultural	equipment,	and	the	region	with	the	lowest	values,	concerning	all	
three	variables,	is	the	Altiplano	region.	Finally,	the	standard	deviation	for	all	three	variables	
is	high,	especially	in	the	Llanos.	
The	statistics	of	the	access	to	infrastructure	variables	confirm	the	overall	low	coverage	
levels	existing	in	the	countryside	area	in	the	country.	In	relative	terms,	households	residing	
in	the	Llanos	have	the	highest	percentage	of	rural	farmers	with	access	to	electricity,	but	the	
lowest	in	terms	of	access	to	pipe‐borne	water.		
Finally,	with	regards	to	the	contextual	variables,	or	variables	that	describe	the	surrounding	
environment	where	the	farmer	resides,	the	data	shows	that	the	income	of	the	relevant	
social	group	of	reference	for	each	farmer,	and	the	distance	to	the	nearest	capital	of	
Department,	increase	both	in	value	as	we	move	from	the	Altiplano,	through	the	Valles,	into	
the	Llanos	region.			
4.5 Estimation	Results	
	
Table	13	shows	the	results	of	the	model	for	the	sample	selection	or	decision	equations	in	
columns	A,	and	for	the	log‐income	equation	estimates	in	columns	B.	The	first	set	of	results	
for	both	equations,	under	heading	(1),	include	all	the	explanatory	variables	described	in	
Section	4.4.2,	over	the	1,696	sample	observations,	with	956	of	them	uncensored.	The	
decision	model	estimates	show	that	two	household	characteristics	are	significantly	related	
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to	the	probability	of	remaining	as	a	pure	farmer:	the	age	of	the	head	(negative)	and	the	
gender	of	the	household	head	(positive).	There	exists	a	higher	probability	of	remaining	as	
pure	farmer	if	the	head	of	the	household	is	a	male,	which	is	consistent	with	the	fact	that	
usually	men	own	and	inherit	production	inputs	such	as	land,	more	frequently	than	woman.	
The	results	show	that	the	probability	that	Bolivian	rural	households	remain	as	pure	farmers	
decreases	as	the	head	becomes	older.		
Next,	Column	1A	also	shows	that	one	of	the	two	human	capital	proxies	included	is	
statistically	significant;	the	probability	of	specializing	in	farming	decreases	as	the	head	
receives	more	schooling.	This	result	confirms	previous	evidence	that	households	with	
higher	education	are	induced	to	shift	from	farm	to	nonfarm	activities.157	The	results	from	
the	first	decision	model	further	indicate	that	land	assets	per	capita	and	agricultural	
equipment	are,	as	expected,	positively	associated	with	the	probability	of	being	a	pure	
farmer;	the	magnitude	of	the	marginal	effect	of	both	variables	is	almost	negligible,	though.	
Access	to	infrastructure	variables	(i.e.	electricity	and	pipe‐borne	water)	have	a	negative	
impact	on	the	probability	of	remaining	as	a	pure	farmer,	which	is	coherent	with	the	existing	
evidence	that	such	factors	facilitate	income	diversification	(i.e.	establishment	of	self‐
employed	businesses).	
In	terms	of	the	contextual	variables,	there	are	three	peer’s	covariates	included	in	the	
selection	equation:	average	age	of	head,	average	number	of	households	where	the	head	is	
male	and,	average	value	of	agricultural	equipment.	At	the	household	level,	these	variables	
are	statistically	significant	in	the	selection	equation,	but	not	in	the	log	income	one.	Two	of	
the	peer’s	are	statistically	significant,	and	the	result	from	a	joint	significant	Wald	test	
confirms	the	relevance	of	their	inclusion	in	the	decision	equation	with	a	߯ଶሾଷሿ	test	statistic	
																																																													
157	The	results	of	the	Variance	Inflation	Factors	(VIFs)	statistic	show	values	in	all	cases	smaller	than	5	for	both	
explanatory	variables.	We	used	a	linear	specification	to	obtain	the		estimated	coefficients.	
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equal	to	25.37,	and	a	݌‐value	<	0.001.	These	variables	play	the	role	of	exclusion	restrictions	
that	assist	in	the	identification	of	the	income	equation.		
Another	contextual	variable	included	in	the	probit	equation,	heading	(1),	is	the	income	of	
the	farmer’s	social	group	of	reference.	According	to	the	results,	as	the	wealth	of	the	social	
group	increases,	the	probability	of	having	farm	work	as	the	solely	source	of	income	
decreases.	This	is	consistent	with	the	notion	that	as	the	income	of	the	social	network	
increases,	the	farmer	has	a	greater	access	to	resources	to	start	a	business	or	engage	in	other	
entrepreneurial	activities.	Finally,	the	regional	dummies	for	the	Valles	and	Llanos	regions	
are	negatively	associated	with	the	probability	of	remaining	as	pure	farmer,	confirming	the	
existence	of	intercept	regional	differences	in	term	of	the	propensity	to	nonfarm	
employment	diversification.	
Under	heading	(1),	column	(B)	shows	the	estimates	for	the	outcome	equation,	i.e.	the	log	
income	equation,	for	the	956	pure	farmers	in	the	sample.	Four	variables	significantly	
explain	the	log	income	levels	of	farmers	that	do	not	diversify:	Human	capital	proxied	by	the	
total	years	of	education	of	the	household	and	the	education	of	the	head,	the	value	of	the	land	
assets	owned	by	the	farmers	and,	whether	the	household	has	access	to	electricity.	As	
expected,	all	of	them	are	associated	with	higher	levels	of	income.	Likewise,	the	regional	
dummy	variables	are	significantly	positive,	confirming	the	advantage	of	wellbeing	that	
households	living	in	the	Valles,	Llanos,	and	where	coca	leafs	are	produced,	enjoy	compared	
to	the	base	categories	used	in	each	case.	
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13tivity model estimates 
	
Table 13. Sample selectivity model estimates
Variable z z
Household Characteristics
Number of children under age 5 -0.013 -0.33 0.021 0.45
Number of male over age 15 0.058 0.94 0.101 1.32
Age of the household head -0.012 *** -4.31 0.004 1.17
Dummy for gender of the household head 
(1=male; 0=female)
0.471 *** 4.02 0.156 0.92
Human Capital
Number of years of schooling of the 
household head
-0.069 *** -5.68 0.034 * 1.81
Total number of years of schooling of the 
household
-1.86E-03 -0.44 0.015 *** 2.77
Household assets
Land assets 7.57E-06 ** 2.40
Land assets per capita 5.99E-05 ** 2.29
Other productive assets 9.64E-05 * 1.68 5.00E-06 0.46
Access to infraestructure
Dummy for access to electricity  (1=yes; 
0=no)
-0.398 *** -4.46 0.440 *** 3.21
Dummy for access to pipe-borne water  
(1=yes; 0=no)
-0.407 *** -5.38 -0.020 -0.19
Contextual variables
Income of the social group of reference -2.06E-05 *** -3.06
Distance to the nearest's capital of 
Department
-4.98E-04 -0.72 1.05E-03 1.21
Average age of head of the social group of 
reference
0.015 ** 2.22
Average number of households in the group 
of reference where the head is male
1.571 *** 5.01
Average value of productive assets of the 
social group of reference
4.90E-06 -0.25
Regional dummy variables 
Valles -0.412 *** -4.89 0.342 *** 3.13
Llanos -0.317 *** -2.90 1.188 *** 9.29
Coca leaf production region 0.074 0.71 0.395 *** 3.14
Constant -0.85 * -1.81 1.30 *** 5.37
Log likelihood -2507.04
F (10,130)
Wald chi2 322.14
p -value <0.001
Residual standard error 1.218
Lambda 0.487
rho (ε1, ε2) 0.400 ** 2.549
LR (chi2) test of rho (ε1, ε2)=0 3.57
p -value 0.059
N 1,696
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%
Coefficient Coefficient
(1)
Decision Model (Pure 
farmers=1)
Pure farmers Log Income 
Estimates (Selection 
corrected)
(A) (B)
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Table 13. Sample selectivity model estimates (Cont.)
Variable z z t t
Household Characteristics
Number of children under age 5
Number of male over age 15 0.111 1.62 0.054 0.82
Age of the household head -0.011 *** -4.48 0.004 1.15 -0.012 *** -3.96 0.004 1.06
Dummy for gender of the household head 
(1=male; 0=female)
0.505 *** 4.94 0.471 *** 3.83
Human Capital
Number of years of schooling of the 
household head
-0.074 *** -7.02 0.040 ** 2.32 -0.082 *** -5.99 0.027 1.52
Total number of years of schooling of the 
household
0.015 *** 2.85 0.018 *** 3.31
Household assets
Land assets 8.13E-06 *** 3.74 9.84E-06 *** 3.58
Land assets per capita 6.76E-05 ** 2.46 7.88E-05 * 1.94
Other productive assets 1.01E-04 * 1.74 8.56E-05 * 1.89
Access to infraestructure
Dummy for access to electricity  (1=yes; 
0=no)
-0.364 *** -4.24 0.472 *** 3.59 -0.363 *** -2.65 0.395 * 1.91
Dummy for access to pipe-borne water  
(1=yes; 0=no)
-0.421 *** -5.72 -0.456 *** -4.93
Contextual variables
Income of the social group of reference -2.17E-05 *** -3.26 -2.13E-05 * -1.90
Distance to the nearest's capital of 
Department
1.20E-03 1.42 1.40E-04 0.10
Average age of head of the social group of 
reference
0.012 * 1.87 6.40E-03 0.70
Average number of households in the 
group of reference where the head is male
1.555 *** 5.04 1.721 *** 4.32
Average value of productive assets of the 
social group of reference
-4.54E-06 -0.23 -5.13E-06 -0.26
Regional dummy variables 
Valles -3.953 *** -4.90 0.368 *** 3.50 -0.413 -3.37 0.481 ** 2.53
Llanos -0.356 *** -3.53 1.204 *** 9.71 -0.421 -2.26 1.260 *** 6.53
Coca leaf production region 0.373 *** 3.06 0.547 *** 3.54
Constant -0.76 -1.63 1.469 *** 7.71 -0.484 -0.76 1.534 *** 6.51
Log likelihood -2514.37
F (10,130) 17.970
Wald chi2 317.06
p -value <0.001 <0.001
Residual standard error 1.200 1.152
Lambda 0.399 0.384
rho (ε1, ε2) 0.333 ** 2.356 0.334 * 1.833
LR (chi2) test of rho (ε1, ε2)=0 4.200
p -value 0.040
N 1,696 1,696
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%
Coefficient Coefficient
(2)
Decision Model (Pure 
farmers=1)
Pure farmers Log Income 
Estimates (Selection 
corrected)
(A) (B)
Coefficient Coefficient
(3)
Decision Model (Pure 
farmers=1)
Pure farmers Log Income 
Estimates (Selection 
corrected)
(A) (B)
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In	the	first	model	there	is	evidence	of	sample	selectivity	even	after	the	model	controls	for	a	
number	of	observable	characteristics	of	the	households.	The	rho	coefficient	is	significantly	
different	from	zero	with	a	Likelihood	Ratio	test	statistic	of	3.57,	and	a	݌‐value	of	0.059.	The	
positive	sign	of	the	coefficient	explains	that	the	sample	is	positively	selected,	or	that	the	
expected	log	income	of	pure	farmers	in	the	sample	exceeds	the	value	in	the	population.	The	
use	of	the	selection	correction	model	is	justified.	
Table	13,	i.e.	columns	2A	and	2B	correspond	to	the	sample	selectivity	model	estimates	that	
result	from	a	restricted	model,	where	explanatory	variables	from	columns	1A	and	1B,	with	
݌‐values	>	0.40,	have	been	drooped.	Wald	tests	of	the	joint	significance	of	those	variables	
were	run,	and	the	chi‐squared	distributed	resulting	statistic	of	1.29	(݌‐value	of	0.864)	for	
the	log	income	equation,	and	2.14	(݌‐value	of	0.829)	for	the	decision	equation,	widely	
support	the	approach	adopted.	The	resulting	estimates	from	both	equations,	including	the	
Likelihood	Ratio	test	on	rho,	remain	consistent	and	significant	at	conventional	levels	in	the	
restricted	model.	
As	explained	in	Section	4.5.1,	the	dataset	comes	from	the	2000	MECOVI	survey,	in	which	
multistage	sampling	procedure	was	implemented.	As	is	customary	in	such	cases,	it	is	
necessary	to	properly	identify,	and	control	for,	the	survey	design	and	data	collection	
procedure,	in	order	to	avoid	point	estimates	that	may	be	biased,	and	standard	error	
estimates	that	may	be	misleading.	The	resulting	estimates	that	incorporate	the	appropriate	
survey	design	are	contained	in	columns	3A	and	3B.	In	terms	of	the	selection	equation	
estimates,	all	but	one	of	the	peer’s	variables	and	the	regional	dummy	variables,	maintain	
their	statistical	significance	when	compared	to	the	previous	two	sample	selectivity	models.	
In	the	log	income	equation,	one	of	the	two	human	capital	variables	included	remain	
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significant.	Other	than	that,	the	model	retains	the	significance	of	the	covariates	at	
conventional	levels,	and	the	selection	correction	is	still	justified.158	
4.5.1 Income’s	prediction	and	nonfarm	income	impact	on	poverty	and	inequality	
	
Having	estimated	the	income	of	the	rural	farmers	that	do	not	diversify,	it	is	straight	forward	
to	proceed	with	the	prediction	of	the	income	of	the	farmers	that	actually	diversify	into	
nonfarm	activities,	as	if	they	were	pure	farmers,	following	the	method	explained	in	Section	
4.4.2.	Based	on	those	predictions,	on	the	actual	income	of	the	diversifying	farmers,	and	on	
the	actual	income	of	the	pure	farmers	in	the	sample,	comparisons	can	be	made	between	the	
two	following	states	of	the	rural	farmers	in	terms	of	poverty	and	inequality:	1)	the	actual	
state	in	which	there	are	farmers	that	remain	as	pure	farmers	and	farmers	that	do	diversify	
out	from	the	farm,	and	2)	the	predicted,	or	counterfactual,	state	in	which	the	pure	farmers	
maintain	its	non‐diversifying	condition,	but	the	diversifying	farmers	are	considered	pure	
farmers.	Table	14	shows	the	results.	The	table	includes	four	poverty	indicators	to	evaluate	
the	impact	of	nonfarm	income	on	poverty	levels	of	the	rural	area.	The	poverty	line	used	to	
determine	which	households’	income	falls	below	it,	and	hence	is	considered	to	be	poor,	was	
taken	from	the	dataset,	and	put	in	terms	of	US	dollars	using	the	exchange	rate	prevailing	at	
the	time	of	the	survey.	
Comparing	the	two	column	(a)	results,	the	Foster‐Greer‐Thorbecke	coefficients	suggest	that	
there	would	be	a	higher	percentage	of	rural	residents	being	poor,	or	that	the	incidence	of	
poverty	would	increase	(85.97%%	compared	to	82.04%),	that	on	average	the	poor’s	income	
shortfall	would	increase	or	that	the	depth	of	poverty	would	be	higher	(68.83%	compared	to	
60.07%),	and	that	the	severity	of	poverty	would	be	higher	as	well	(58.84	compared	to	
																																																													
158	The	peer’s	effects	have	also	maintained	their	joint	significance,	with	a	߯ଶሾଷሿ	test	statistic	equal	to	6.77,	and	a	
݌‐value	<	0.001.	
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49.12),	if	diversifying	farmers	would	be	modeled	as	non‐diversifying.	The	median	income	
value	among	the	poor	in	the	actual	state	compared	to	the	predicted	state,	confirms	these	
negative	results.	There	is	a	35%	decrease	in	the	value.		
Table 14 - Poverty and Inequality impact of nonfarm income 
	
The	values	of	the	coefficients	just	discussed	are	in	concordance	with	various	poverty	
measures	reported	for	the	country.159	Since	the	unit	of	analysis	of	the	present	work	is,	
however,	the	household,	and	the	income	used	to	calculate	poverty	is	measured	in	per	capita	
terms,	it	becomes	necessary	to	account	for	the	size	of	the	households	in	the	calculations	to	
obtain	correct	estimates.	The	resulting	coefficients	are	reported	in	columns	(b).	Also,	the	
use	of	survey	data	to	measure	poverty	rates	for	the	country	as	a	whole	gives	rise	to	
sampling	errors.	Measures	of	the	standard	deviations	and	confidence	intervals	are,	as	a	
consequence,	required	to	be	computed	and	reported	for	the	poverty	indices	estimates.	
Finally,	considering	the	multistage	sampling	procedure	used	in	the	survey	data,	it	is	often	
suggested	to	use	sample	weights	to	adjust	the	observations	accordingly	in	order	to	get	the	
																																																													
159	See	for	example	CEPAL	(2006).	
Table 14. Poverty and Inequality impact of nonfarm income 
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Variable
Poverty (a)
Headcount ratio (%) 82.04 87.54 85.40 89.68 85.97 88.96 86.95 90.98
Poverty gap ratio (%) 60.07 65.59 62.44 68.74 68.83 73.26 71.00 75.53
Squared poverty gap 49.12 54.36 50.85 57.87 58.84 63.78 61.22 66.34
Median income of the poor (US$) 6.98 6.98 4.52 4.52
Inequality
Gini index 0.70 0.68 0.64 0.72 0.73 0.71 0.65 0.77
Theil index (b) 1.12 1.01 0.73 1.29 1.47 1.25 0.75 1.76
N 1,960 1960(i) 1,960 1960(j)
(a) The poverty line was set at US$. 38.43 (Bs. 237.8817), based on the value reported in the data set. The same poverty line is used for both scenarios, the actual and the counterfactual.
(b) The entropy measure.
(c) (f) Coefficient estimates includes the required weights, i.e. household size. 
(e)(h) Following Jolliffe and Krushelnytskyy (1999), inequality measures include bootstrap estimates of the sampling variances for the stratified and multistaged sample design of the MECOVI 2000.  
(i) Twelve observations are being dropped from the calculations since their value is zero.
(j) Final number of observations used in the inequality calculations was 1834, number for which there was complete information.
(d)(g) Following Howes and Lanjouw (1998), poverty measures correct standard errors for the stratification and multistage sample design of the MECOVI 2000. Concisely, it includes 9 strata and 148 Primary 
Sample Units.
(c) (c)
95% confidence interval
(Sample design adjusted)(g)(h)
State in which there are pure farmers and diversifiers 
(Actual )
State in which all rural farmers are hypothesized to be pure 
farmers (Predicted )
Coefficient
Coefficients 
with weights (c)
Coefficient
Coefficients 
with weights(f)
95% confidence interval
(Sample design adjusted)(d) (e)
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appropriate	estimates.160	The	final	estimated	results	are	contained	in	columns	(b)	and	(c).	
As	the	estimates	show,	all	the	FGT	indices	increase	once	again	between	the	actual	state	and	
the	predicted	state,	confirming	the	positive	impact	of	nonfarm	income	on	poverty	(87.54	
compared	to	88.96,	65.59	compared	to	73.26,	and	54.36	compared	to	63.78).161		The	
bootstrapped	standard	errors	for	the	poverty	estimates	are	small	and	the	95	percent	
confidence	intervals	do	not	overlap	for	two	of	the	indices;	therefore,	we	can	say	with	some	
confidence	that	poverty,	as	measured	by	the	Poverty	Gap	and	the	Squared	Poverty	Gap,	
would	have	risen	if	nonfarm	income	diversification	would	have	not	existed.	Nonfarm	
income	helps	decrease	the	severity	of	poverty,	but	it	is	not	enough	to	significantly	reduce	
the	number	of	the	poor.	
Figure	5	shows	the	cumulative	distribution	of	the	actual	and	predicted	incomes	for	the	pure	
farmers	and	the	diversifiers.	Even	though	statistically	not	significant,	it	makes	evident	that	a	
greater	percentage	of	the	farmers	who	diversify	out	from	the	farm	work,	but	are	predicted	
to	be	pure	farmers,	fall	below	the	poverty	line	compared	to	the	situation	in	which	their	
actual	income	is	used.	The	farthest	northeast	curve	overlaps	the	cumulative	distribution	of	
the	actual	and	predicted	incomes	for	the	pure	farmers	in	the	sample,	since	both	are	exactly	
the	same.		
The	results	in	terms	of	the	impact	of	income	diversification	on	the	poverty	measures	can	
also	be	observe	through	Figure	6.	The	discrepancy	between	the	predicted	incomes,	in	which	
all	the	farmers	are	assumed	not	to	diversify	into	nonfarm	activities,	and	are	represented	by	
the	hollow	circles,	and	the	actual	incomes	that	form	the	solid	line,	becomes	wider	as	income	
																																																													
160	The	sample	has	146	Primary	Sampling	Units	(PSU)	and	9	strata	(one	for	each	department	in	the	country).	
161	When	using	data	from	a	household	survey,	the	resulting	estimates	are	sample	results	that	can	be	easily	used	
to	make	inferences	about	the	whole	population,	if	each	observation	in	the	sample	is	appropriately	weighted	
(World	Bank,	2000).	The	weights	are	the	total	number	of	observation	in	the	population	that	each	observation	
in	the	sample	represents.	The	sampling	procedure	in	the	MECOVI	2000	combined	stratification	by	
agglomerate	population	size	and	a	two‐stage	sampling.	The	corresponding	weights	are	part	of	the	available	
data	for	each	household.	
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increases.	This	gap	highlights	the	positive	and	significant	effect	of	nonfarm	income	in	
reducing	the	depth	of	poverty	with	reference	to	the	adopted	poverty	line.	To	the	right	of	the	
interception	between	this	line	and	the	one	that	plots	the	actual	incomes,	the	scatter	points	
below	the	poverty	threshold	represent	the	households	that	would	have	been	considered	
poor	under	the	predicted	state,	result	that	was	not	found	to	be	statistically	conclusive,	
though.		
	
Figure 5 – Cumulative income distributions 
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Figure 6 – Poverty effects of nonfarm income diversification 
	
Table	14	also	reports	the	results	of	the	two	inequality	measures	explained	in	Section	4.3.3.2,	
for	the	same	two	set	of	results:	the	actual	and	the	predicted	states.	In	terms	of	both	
estimates,	the	income	distribution	among	rural	farmers	would	be	more	unequal	if	farmers,	
who	actually	diversify	income	through	nonfarm	activities,	would	be	modeled	as	if	they	
would	not.	This	is	true	for	the	coefficients	in	columns	(a),	as	well	as	for	the	ones	that	include	
the	already	mentioned	number	of	household	member’s	weights	(columns	b).	The	
bootstrapped	standard	errors	estimates	that	observe	the	multistage	sampling	procedure	
used,	confirm	the	statistical	significance	of	the	inequality	indices,	this	time,	however,	the	
confidence	intervals	do	overlap.	Figure	7	shows	the	Lorenz	curves	for	the	actual	and	
predicted	incomes,	and	confirms	the	further	position	of	the	latter	with	respect	to	the	perfect	
equality	situation.	
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Figure 7 – Lorenz curves 
	
4.6 Conclusions	
	
It	is	well	known	that	rural	farmers	in	developing	countries	face	extremely	limiting	
condition,	making	agriculture	a	highly	risky	activity	with	low	returns.	Also,	the	existence	of	
extremely	high	transaction	costs	prevents	farmers,	especially	small	farmers,	have	access	to	
insurance.	Access	to	credit	markets	is	as	well	restrained	for	them,	when	the	size	of	land	
ownership	acts	as	collateral	to	access	production	financing.	Additionally,	it	is	also	common	
that	the	distribution	of	endowments	be	highly	unequal	in	poor	countries,	notably	in	terms	
of	the	distribution	of	primarily	agricultural	endowments	such	as	land.		
The	most	common	strategy	rural	famers	undertake	to	overcome	market	imperfections,	and	
the	low	returns	from	the	farm,	is	to	develop	sources	of	income	that	are	not	positively	
correlated	with	farm	income.		
Poverty	and	inequality,	on	the	other	hand,	are	among	the	most	worrisome	issues	in	the	
developing	world.	Since	nonfarm	income	has	been	increasing	its	importance	among	its	rural	
households,	a	large	number	of	empirical	studies	have	been	conducted	to	determine	the	
Cum. Pop. Prop.
.000632 1
0
1
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impact	of	income	diversification	activities	on	those	two	welfare	indicators,	with	different	
regional	patterns	found.		
Rural	Bolivia	is	precisely	one	the	worst	performers	in	Latin	America	in	terms	of	poverty	and	
income	distribution,	with	the	rate	of	participation	of	nonfarm	income	in	the	total	household	
income	around	the	average	of	Latin	America	(40%)	with	an	increasing	trend.	Farm	work,	
hence,	remains	for	now	as	the	most	important	source	of	income	across	rural	households,	
and	a	large	number	of	them	still	rely	solely	in	it.	
This	paper	has	shown	that	the	depth	and	severity	of	poverty	in	Bolivia	would	have	been	
higher	if	diversifying	farmers	would	have	not	engaged	into	nonfarm	activities.	The	existence	
of	this	additional	income	source	has	significantly	increased	the	livelihood	of	the	rural	
famers,	shrinking	the	gap	with	respect	to	the	poverty	line.	The	results	suggest,	however,	
that	the	increase	in	income	was	not	sufficient	to	abate	the	number	of	poor,	which	level	
would	have	statistically	remained	the	same.	
In	terms	of	inequality	there	was	no	evidence	of	a	significant	effect.	The	indices	of	inequality	
computed	for	the	observed	incomes	of	pure	farmers	and	the	diversifying	ones,	and	for	the	
predicted	incomes	where	the	diversifying	farmers	are	modeled	as	pure	farmers,	show	an	
increase	confirming	the	proposed	hypothesis.	Nevertheless,	the	overlapping	of	the	
estimated	confidence	intervals	restrains	us	from	drawing	a	statistically	valid	conclusion	
about	the	positive	effect	of	nonfarm	income	on	overall	inequality,	as	measured	by	the	Gini	
and	Theil	indices.	In	any	case,	it	is	clear	that	nonfarm	income	in	Bolivia	is	innocuous	as	far	
as	inequality	is	concerned,	at	least	thus	far.	But	if	the	nonfarm	activities	in	which	the	poor	
are	involved	remain	as	the	ones	with	low	returns,	as	can	be	inferred	from	the	results	in	
poverty,	the	trend	could	be	reversed.	
‐	121	‐	
	
In	terms	of	policy,	our	results	confirm	the	need	to	look	beyond	self‐employed	farm	work	
when	thinking	in	policies	aimed	to	promote	rural	development	in	the	developing	world.	
According	to	our	findings	nonfarm	activities	represent	an	income	source	that	increases	
overall	income	in	the	rural	area,	and	decreases	the	gap	between	the	income	of	the	poor	and	
the	minimum	level	it	is	established	as	necessary	to	avoid	poverty.		Secondly,	the	likelihood	
that	entry	barriers	may	limit	the	access	to	income	diversification	activities	of	poor	farmers,	
calls	for	direct	public	efforts	to	reduce	those	constraints	by	increasing	the	assets	of	the	poor,	
e.g.	human	capital.	This	would	not	just	facilitate	diversification	into	the	nonfarm	sector,	but	
would	also	allow	the	poor	be	able	to	access	the	high‐returns	nonfarm	sectors.	Income	from	
agricultural	activities	will	also	benefit	from	this.		
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APPPENDICES	
 
Appendix	A	
	
Table 15 - Bivariate probit model: SUEST specification tests 
 
Appendix	B		
	
B.1)	Household	income	maximization:	The	small	farmers	
	
Following	Carter	and	Kalfayan	(1989),	the	optimal	choice	problem	faced	by	small	farmers	
that	are	capital	constrained	and	need	to	provide	working	capital	by	supplying	part	of	their	
labor‐time	out	from	the	farm,	can	be	written	as:	
Table A.1 Bivariate probit model: SUEST specification tests
Testing jointly significance of regional dummy 
variables (Ho : regional dummies are all zero)
Likelihood-ratio test
Testing equality of coefficients across regions 
Ho : coefficients in Valleys and Lowplains are equal
Diversification equation 
Remittances equation 
Ho : coefficients in Highland and Lowplains are equal
Diversification equation 
Remittances equation
Coefficient p -value
0.30
0.02
0.59
0.01
0.0027.84
22.24
8.38
20.31
10.68
߯2ሾ6ሿ 
߯2ሾ10ሿ 
߯2ሾ10ሿ 
߯2ሾ9ሿ 
߯2ሾ9ሿ 
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max ܻ ൌ ݌ܳ൫ܮ௙, ܫ, ܶ; ݖ൯ െ ݌௜ܫ ൅ ݓ ߗሺܮ௦ሻ	 	 (b.1)
ݏ. ݐ.	
ݓ	ߗሺܮ௦ሻ െ ݌௜ܫ െ ܵ଴ ൒ 0	 (b.2)
ܮ௦ ൅ ܮ௙	 ൌ ܮത	 (b.3)
ܮ௦ ൒ 0; ܮ௙	 ൒ 0	 (b.4)
	
where	we	have	a	constrained	maximization	problem	with	an	inequality	capital	constraint,	
and	the	nonnegativity	constraints	on	the	household	labor	allocation,	that	need	to	be	solved	
using	the	Kuhn‐Tucker	conditions.	Following	Binger	and	Hoffman	(1998)	approach	to	solve	
this	set‐up,	we	introduce	a	set	of	new	variables,	also	called	slack	variables,	which	ensure	
nonnegativity	(	݃ଶ),	and	reformulate	the	inequality	constraint	to	hold	with	equality	(	ݐଶ).	
This	allows	us	to	write	the	Lagrangian	function	with	two	constraints	and	their	
corresponding	multipliers	(ߤ, ߬)	as:162	
ࣦ ൌ ܳ൫ܮ௙, ܫ, ܶ; ݖ൯ െ ݌௜ܫ ൅ 	ݓ ߗ൫ܮത െ ܮ௙൯ ൅ ߤൣݐଶ െ ሺݓ ߗ൫ܮത െ ܮ௙൯ െ ݌௜ܫ െ ܵ଴ሻ൧
൅ ߬൫ܮ௙ െ ݃ଶ൯	
(b.5)
	
And	the	first‐order	conditions	are:	
߲ࣦ
߲ܮ௙ ൌ ݍ௟ െ ݓߗ
ᇱ ൅ ߤݓߗᇱ ൅ ߬ ൌ 0 ⇒ ݍ௟ െ ݓߗᇱ ൅ ߤݓߗᇱ ൌ 0	 (b.6)	
߲ࣦ
߲ܫ ൌ ݍ௜ െ ݌௜ ൅ ݌௜ߤ ൌ 0		 (b.7)	
߲ࣦ
߲ߤ ൌ ݐ
ଶ െ ݓ	ߗ൫ܮത െ ܮ௙൯ ൅ ݌௜ܫ ൅ ܵ଴ ൌ 0 ⇒ ݓ ߗ൫ܮത െ ܮ௙൯ ൅ ݌௜ܫ ൅ ܵ଴ ൌ 0	 (b.8)	
߲ࣦ
߲ݐ ൌ 2ߤݐ ൌ 0 ⇒ 	ߤ ൌ 0, ݐ ൌ 0, or	both	 (b.9)	
																																																													
162	The	price	of	the	good	produced	by	the	farmers	has	been	set	equal	to	1.	
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߲ࣦ
߲݃ ൌ െ2߬݃ ൌ 0 ⇒ ߬ ൌ 0, ݃ ൌ 0, or both	 (b.10)	
	
where	the	final	expression	of	the	first	first‐order	condition	(b.6)	comes	from	the	fact	that	
even	though	߬	can	be	either	equal	to	zero	or	non	equal	to	zero	(equation	b.10),	if	we	assume	
an	interior	solution	for	family	labor	allocation	݃ ് 0,	implying	߬ ൌ 0.	Also,	by	the	first‐order	
conditions	given	above,	we	know	that	ߤ ൌ 0, ݐ ൌ 0,	or	they	are	both	0;	however,	given	that	
we	assume	small	farmers	are	capital	constrained163,	the	corresponding	constraint	is	binding	
implying	ߤ ് 0,	or		more	specifically	ߤ ൐ 0.164				
B.2)	Household	income	maximization:	The	large	farmers	
	
Once	more	the	characterization	of	the	maximization	problem	faced	by	the	larger	capital‐
constrained	farmers	follows	Carter	and	Kalfayan	(1989),	where	these	agents	are	theorized	
to	use	their	land	endowment	as	collateral	to	obtain	credit	of	size	ߚሺܶሻ,	for	which	they	pay	a	
financial	cost	ݎ,	to	devote	all	their	time	to	farm	work,	and	to	hire	labor	force	which	needs	to	
be	supervised.	This	optimization	can	be	formally	represented	by:	
max ܻ ൌ ݌ܳሺܮ, ܫ, ܶ; ݖሻ െ ݌௜ܫ െ ݓ ܮௗ െ ݎߚሺܶሻ (b.11)
ݏ. ݐ.	
ܮ ൌ ܮ௙ െ ߜሺܮௗሻ ൅ ߛ଴ܮௗ   (b.12)	
ߚሺܶሻ െ ݌௜ܫ െ ݓܮௗ ൒ 0		 (b.13)
ܮ௙ ൌ ܮത, ܮௗ ൒ 0  (b.14)	
	
																																																													
163	Assumption	also	set	for	such	farmers	by	Carter	and	Kalfayan	1989.	
164	It	can	be	showed	that	based	on	the	second‐order	conditions	for	a	constrained	maximization	problem,	ߤ ൐ 0	if	
the	constraint	is	binding,	Binger	and	Hoffman	(1998),	pp.	81.		
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Applying	again	the	slack	variables	for	the	nonnegativity	constraint	(	ݑଶ),	and	in	order	to	
reformulate	the	inequality	constraint	to	hold	with	equality	(	ݐଶ),	the	Lagrangian	function	
with	two	constraints	and	their	corresponding	multipliers	(ߤ, ߬)	becomes:165	
ࣦ ൌ ܳሺܮത െ ߜሺܮௗሻ ൅ ߛ଴ܮௗ, ܫ, ܶ; ݖሻ െ ݌௜ܫ െ ݓܮௗ െ ݎሺ݌௜ܫ ൅ ݓܮௗሻ+ߤሾݐଶ െ ሺߚሺܶሻ െ
݌௜ܫ െ ݓܮௗሻ ൅ 	߬	ሺܮௗ െ ݃ଶሻ	 (b.15)
߲ࣦ
߲ܮௗ ൌ ݍ௟ሺߛ଴ െ ߜ
ᇱሻ െ ݓ െ ݎݓ ൅ ݓߤ ൅ ߬ ൌ 0 ⇒ ݍ௟ሺߛ଴ െ ߜᇱሻ െ ݓ െ ݎݓ ൅ ݓߤ ൌ 0	 (b.16)
߲ࣦ
߲ܫ ൌ ݍ௜ െ ݌௜ െ ݎ݌௜ ൅ ݌௜ߤ ൌ 0  (b.17)
߲ࣦ
߲ߤ ൌ ݐ
ଶ െ ሺߚሺܶሻ െ ݌௜ܫ െ ݓܮௗሻ ൌ 0 ⇒ ߚሺܶሻ െ ݌௜ܫ െ ݓܮௗ ൌ 0	 (b.18)
߲ࣦ
߲ݐ ൌ 2ߤݐ ൌ 0 ⇒ 	ߤ ൌ 0, ݐ ൌ 0, or	both	 (b.19)
߲ࣦ
߲݃ ൌ െ2߬݃ ൌ 0 ⇒ 	߬ ൌ 0, ݃ ൌ 0, or	both	 (b.20)
	
where	the	final	expression	of	the	first‐order	condition	comes	from	the	fact	that	even	though	
߬	can	be	either		zero	or	non‐zero	(Equation	b.20),	if	we	assume	an	interior	solution	for	the	
choice	variables	g് 0,	which	implies	that	߬ ൌ 0.	Also,	given	the	large	farmers’	first‐order	
conditions,	we	know	that	ߤ ൌ 0, ݐ ൌ 0,	or	they	are	both	0;	however,	since	we	assume	these	
agents	are	also	capital	rationed,	the	corresponding	constraint	is	again	binding,	implying	
ߤ ് 0,	or	ߤ ൐ 0.	This	last	result	determines	the	final	expression	for	the	third	first‐order	
condition.	
	  
																																																													
165	Again	here	the	price	of	the	good	produced	by	the	farmers	has	been	set	equal	to	1.	
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Appendix	C	
	
In	order	to	be	able	to	evaluate	how	the	optimal	values	of	the	households’	income	equation	
are	affected	by	changes	in	the	parameters	of	the	model,	we	just	need	to	differentiate	ܻ∗	with	
respect	to	the	required	parameter.	Since	we	are	interested	in	the	income	effect	of	an	
increase	in	household’s	landholdings,	we	need	to	differentiate	ܻ∗	with	respect	to	ܶ	in	
Equation	(3.4)	of	section	0,	and	Equation	(3.11)	in	section	3.3.2,	for	the	small	and	large	
farmer’s	cases,	respectively.		
C.1)	Small	farmers	
	
In	order	to	accomplish	the	task,	we	make	use	of	the	fact	that	the	optimal	value	of	the	
Lagrangean	function	is	simply	the	optimal	value	of	the	income	equation	(objective	function)	
that	is:166	
ࣦሺܮ௙∗, ܫ∗, ߤ∗ሻ ൌ ܻሺܮ௙∗, ܫ∗ሻ	 (c.1)
	
So,	Equation	(3.4)	can	be	rewrite	in	the	following	manner:	
ܻ∗ ൌ ܻ൫ܮ௙∗ሺݓ, ݌௜, ܮ,ഥ ܵ଴, ܶ; ݖሻ, ܫ∗ሺݓ, ݌௜, ܮ,ഥ ܵ଴, ܶ; ݖሻ, ܶ; ݖ൯	 (c.2)
	
Which	in	terms	of	Equation	(3.1)	in	Chapter	3,	we	get:	
		ܻ∗ ൌ ܳ∗ሺܮ௙∗, ܫ∗, ܶ; ݖሻ െ ݌௜ܫ∗ ൅ ݓ ߗ൫ܮത െ ܮ௙∗൯	 (c.3)
	
Next,	we	differentiate		ܻ∗	with	respect	to	ܶ		using	the	chain	rule:	
∂
∂T Y൫ܮ௙
∗, ܫ∗, ܶ; ݖ൯ ൌ ݍ௟೑
߲ܮ௙∗
߲ܶ ൅ ݍ௜
߲ܫ∗
߲ܶ ൅ ݍ் െ ݌௜
߲ܫ∗
߲ܶ െ ݓ ߗ
ᇱ ߲ܮ௙∗
߲ܶ 	 (c.4)
	
																																																													
166	See	Binger	and	Hoffman	(1998).	
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Which,	rearranging	terms,	is	equal	to:	
∂
∂T Y൫ܮ௙
∗, ܫ∗, ܶ; ݖ൯ ൌ 	ݍ் ൅
߲ܮ௙∗
߲ܶ ቀݍ௟೑ െ ݓ ߗ
ᇱቁ ൅ ߲ܫ
∗
߲ܶ ሺݍ௜ െ ݌௜ሻ	 (c.5)
	 	 	 	 	 	
which	is	precisely	Equation	(3.5)	in	section	0.			
C.2)	Large	farmers	
	
In	this	case	we	just	need	to	follow	the	same	methodology,	and	so	the	Lagrangean	equation	
at	the	optimum	choices	of	labor	demand	and	non‐labor	inputs,	is	equal	to:	
ࣦሺܮௗ∗, ܫ∗, ߤ∗ሻ ൌ ܻሺܮௗ∗, ܫ∗ሻ	 (c.6)
	
Therefore,	 we	 can	 rewrite	 the	 income	 equation	 (Equation	 (3.11)	 in	 Chapter	 3)	 as	 being	
ultimately	a	function	of	the	model’s	parameters,	or:	
ܻ∗ ൌ ܻሺܮௗ∗ሺݓ, ݌௜, ܮ,ഥ ݎ, ܶ; ݖሻ, ܫ∗ሺݓ, ݌௜, ܮ,ഥ ݎ, ܶ; ݖሻ, ܶ; ݖሻ	 (c.7)
	
Next,	if	we	express	Equation	(3.7)	in	terms	of	its	optimal	value,	we	get:	
ܻ∗ ൌ ܳ∗ሺܮௗ∗, ܫ∗, ܶ; ݖሻ െ ݌௜ܫ∗ ൅ ݓܮௗ∗ െ ݎሺ݌௜ܫ∗ ൅ ݓܮௗ∗ሻ (c.8)
	 	
We	can	now	differentiate		ܻ∗	with	respect	to	ܶ,	and	using	the	chain	rule	finally	obtain:	
∂
∂T Yሺܮௗ
∗, ܫ∗, ܶ; ݖሻ ൌ െݍ௟ߜᇱ ߲ܮௗ
∗
߲ܶ ൅ ݍ௟ߛ଴
߲ܮௗ∗
߲ܶ ൅ݍ௜
߲ܫ∗
߲ܶ ൅ ݍ் െ ݌௜
߲ܫ∗
߲ܶ െ	
ݓ ߲ܮௗ
∗
߲ܶ െ ݎ ௜ܲ
߲ܫ∗
߲ܶ െ ݎݓ
߲ܮௗ∗
߲ܶ 	
(c.9)
	
Which,	rearranging	terms,	is	equal	to:	
∂
∂T Yሺܮௗ
∗, ܫ∗, ܶ; ݖሻ ൌ 	ݍ் ൅ ൫ݍ௟ሺߛ଴ െ ߜᇱሻ െ ݓሺ1 ൅ ݎሻ൯ ߲ܮௗ
∗
߲ܶ ൅ ሺݍ௜ െ ݌௜ሺ1 ൅ ݎሻሻ
߲ܫ∗
߲ܶ 	 (c.10)
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which	is	precisely	Equation	(3.12)	in	section	3.3.2.	
Appendix	D	
	
D.1)	Differencing	estimator	method		
	
Due	to	its	simplicity	and	versatility	difference‐based	estimation	has	been	used	commonly	to	
estimate	a	variety	of	settings	of	the	semiparametric	PLR	model.	The	method,	proposed	by	
Yatchew	(1997),	consists	of	two	steps.	First,	we	primarily	need	to	estimate	the	parametric	
variables	by	removing	the	nonparametric	regression	effect	through	a	differencing	
procedure.	Then,	conventional	smoothing	methods	can	be	applied	to	finally	obtain	the	
estimates	of	݂.		
Concisely,	for	the	estimation	of	the	function	݂ሺݐሻ	in	Equation	(3.14),	we	first	take	first‐order	
differences	over	the	rearranged	data,	i.e.	ݐ ൑ ⋯ ൑ ݐ௡,	which	yields:	
ݕ௜ െ ݕ௜ିଵ ൌ ሺݔଵ௜ െ ݔଵ௜ିଵሻߚଵ ൅ ⋯൅ ሺݔ௞௜ െ ݔ௞௜ିଵሻߚ௞ ൅ ൫݂ሺݐ௜ሻ െ ݂ሺݐ ௜ିଵሻ൯ ൅ ሺߝ௜ െ ߝ௜ିଵሻ 
 
݅ ൌ 2,… , ݊	
	
(d.1)
This	procedure	removes	the	nonparametric	effect	of	ݐ	as	the	values	of	the	ݔ’s	become	close,	
and	as	a	result	a	consistent	Ordinary	Least	Square	(OLS)	estimator	of	the	vector	ߚ	can	
readily	be	obtained.167		It	has	been	shown	that	the	linear	estimators	ߚመଵ, … , ߚመ௞	have	a	relative	
efficiency	of	1/1.5	compared	to	the	most	efficient	estimator,	such	as	Robinson’s	(1988)	
method.	The	performance	can	be	improved,	though,	if	higher‐order	differences	are	applied	
																																																													
167	The	approximate	sampling	distribution	of	the	parametric	estimates,	by	convention	denoted	with	ߚመdiff,	is	
→ ܰሺߚ, ଵ௡
ଵ.ହఙഄమ
ఙೠమ ሻ,	where		ߪ௨
ଶ	is	the	conditional	variance	of	ݔ	given	ݐ.	Yatchew	(1997).	
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(Yatchew,	2003)168.	Note	that	for	the	error	terms	in	Equation	(d.1)		to	have	the	same	
variance	as	those	in	Equation	(3.14),	all	the	terms	in	the	former	need	to	be	weighted	by	a	
factor	corresponding	to	the	order	of	the	differencing	applied.169				
Having	 estimated	 the	 vector	ߚ,	 we	 proceed	 to	 subtract	 the	 parametric	 estimated	 effects	
from	both	sides	of	Equation	(3.14),	and	obtain:	
ݕ௜ െ ݔଵ௜ߚመଵ െ ⋯െ ݔ௞௜ߚመ௞ ൌ ݂ሺݐ௜ሻ ൅ ሺݔଵ௜ߚଵ െ ݔଵ௜ߚመଵሻ ൅ ⋯൅ ሺݔ௞௜ߚ௞ െ ݔ௞௜ߚመ௞ሻ ൅ ߝ௜		 	
݅ ൌ 1,… , ݊	
	
(d.2)
	
expression	that	allows	us	finally	to	estimate	݂	using	a	smoothing	method,	for	which	a	
variety		of	options	exist.170	
D.2)	The	differencing‐based	estimate	results	
	
We	implement	differencing	estimation	method	which	applies,	by	default,	the	local	
regression	smoother	lowess	(a	variation	of	loess)	to	estimate	the	nonlinear	function	݂.171	
Table	D.1	shows	the	resulting	estimates	for	the	parametric	component.	These	differencing‐
based	semiparametric	estimates	and	the	semiparametric	Robinson’s	method	estimates	of	
Table	7,	(located	in	the	main	body	of	this	work)	are	overall	qualitatively	similar.	The	latter,	
however,	provides	a	better	fit	of	the	data	and	returns	standard	error	estimates	that	are	
consistently	smaller.	Table	D.1	also	reports	the	statistic	for	a	significance	test	of	the	variable	
																																																													
168	It	is	possible	to	obtain	an	asymptotic	efficiency	estimator	if	higher‐order	differences	are	applied,	for	which	
samples	that	contains	at	least	30,000	observations	are	needed.	For	smaller	sample	sizes,	higher‐order	
differences	might	result	in	biased	estimates,	though.	Lokshin	(2006).	
169	Yatchew	(2003),	provides	optimal	differencing	weights	up	to	order	100.		
170	This	is	possible	since	ߚመ	converges	sufficiently	quick	to	ߚ.	For	details	see	Yatchew	(2003).	
171	The	command	by	default	applies	the	tricube	weighting	function,	and	a	bandwidth	of	0.8	(Lokshin,	2006)	
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land	that	enters	the	consumption	specification	nonlinearly.	With	a	݌‐value	less	than	0.001,	
we	have	enough	evidence	to	reject	the	restricted	model	in	which		݂ሺݐሻ	is	a	constant.172	
	
	
D.3)	Regional	differencing‐based	estimate	results	
	
In	terms	of	the	three	agroclimatic	regions,	Table	D.2	reports	the	differenced‐based	
parametric	results	for	each	sub‐population.	The	estimates	have	an	overall	similarity	to	the	
more	efficient	ones	presented	in	Table	9.	The	smaller	standard	error	estimates	obtained	
with	the	Robinson’s	method,	however,	allow	increases	in	the	level	of	significance	of	some	of	
the	variables	in	the	Altiplano	and	Llanos	regions.	When	we	compare	the	fit	of	both	sets	of	
regional	estimates,	the	explanatory	power	of	the	ones	resulting	from	Robinson’s	method	are	
considerably	higher	for	each	region.	
																																																													
172	According	to	Yatchew	(2003),	the	specification	test	statistic	is	equal	to	ܸ ൌ ሺ݉ ∗ ݊ሻଵ ଶൗ ሺݏ௥௘௦ଶ െ ݏௗ௜௙௙ଶ ሻ ݏௗ௜௙௙ଶൗ ,	
with		ܸ ஽→ ܰሺ0,1ሻ,	where	ݏ௥௘௦ଶ 	is	the	variance	of	the	residual	under	the	null,	and	ݏௗ௜௙௙ଶ 	the	variance	of	the	
residual	under	the	alternative.	
Table D.1 Semiparametric PLR model estimates: Differencing estimates a
Variable SE
Head's years of schooling 4.96 *** 1.48
Household total years of education 2.68 *** 0.35
Number of adults 2.80 3.05
Number of children 2.14 2.68
Livestock assest -0.71 * 0.04
Distance to the nearest's capital of Department -0.10 ** 0.05
Valley (1=yes; 0=no) 33.68 *** 5.73
Lowplains (1=yes; 0=no) 70.25 *** 7.22
N 1374
R2 0.23
Significance test on land:     is a linear function 9.01
p -value <0.001
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%
a Order of differencing m=1
Coefficient
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Table D.2 Regional Semiparametric PLR model estimates: Differencing estimates a
Variable Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Head's years of schooling -0.51 1.10 0.03 2.33 9.08 *** 2.62
Household total years of education 2.03 *** 0.31 4.95 *** 0.67 1.10 * 0.62
Number of adults -0.43 2.90 -5.99 5.50 11.04 * 5.97
Number of children 2.94 2.28 -1.43 5.05 9.87 * 5.46
Livestock assest 0.08 * 0.05 0.21 *** 0.07 0.32 *** 0.10
Distance to the nearest's capital of Department -0.16 *** 0.05 0.01 0.09 -0.26 *** 0.09
N 592 484 298
R2 0.19 0.23 0.26
Significance test on land:     is a linear function 1.3 3.5 27.6
p -value 0.091 <0.001 <0.001
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%
a Order of differencing m=1
Highland Valleys Lowplains
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income	source	that	relax	credit	constraints,	and	hence	facilitate	further	diversification	of	
rural	households	into	other	nonfarm	activities.		The	results	are	based	on	an	endogenous	
bivariate	probit	model	where	the	probability	of	diversification	is	in	part	determined	by	the	
decision	to	remit. 
The	second	essay	demonstrates	that	the	access	to	larger	land	endowments	may	not	
translate	into	income	gains	under	conditions	in	which	farmers	may	not	have	access	to	
relevant	rural	markets,	and	hence	are	hypothesized	to	be	confined	to	low	(and	even	
decreasing)	marginal	income	values	of	land.	Large	farmers,	on	the	contrary,	freely	access	
the	market	using	their	large	land	endowments	and	enjoy	increasing	marginal	returns	of	the	
asset.	A	nationally	representative	survey	data	from	Bolivia	is	primarily	used	to	study	the	
issue,	and	a	semiparametric	partially	linear	(PLR)	regression	model	is	applied	to	estimate	
the	model’s	parameters.	The	results	obtained	confirm	the	derived	marginal	income	effects	
of	land	for	small	farmers	and	large	farmers,	i.e.	the	relationship	between	land	and	wealth	is	
nonlinear.	The	regional	analysis	carried	out	in	this	regard,	ratifies	the	findings.	Two	
estimation	techniques	were	applied	to	verify	the	robustness	of	the	results.				
The	third	essay	analyzes	the	impact	of	nonfarm	income	activities	on	the	country’s	
rural	poverty	and	income	inequality,	using	the	MLE	with	a	careful	incorporation	of	
exclusion	restrictions	that	ensures	the	identification	of	the	model.	In	order	to	differentiate	
the	estimation	among	the	three	contrasting	agroclimatic	regions	existing	in	the	country,	and	
the	ones	in	which	there	are	also	coca	leaves’	cultivations,	regional	dummy	variables	are	
conveniently	incorporated.	The	resulting	consistent	and	efficient	estimates	from	the	sample	
selectivity	model	were	used	to	predict	a	counterfactual	income	for	rural	households	that	
diversify	out	from	farm	activities,	as	if	they	would	be	pure	farmers.	The	paper	concludes	
that	nonfarm	income	in	rural	Bolivia	has	helped	reduce	the	depth	and	severity	of	poverty,	
but	the	number	of	poor	would	have	statistically	remained	the	same.	In	terms	of	inequality	
there	was	no	evidence	of	any	significant	effect.	
